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
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Knowledge and Truth.

1. Place of the Doctrine of Truth and Error.

By Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya.

The present-day doctrine of truth and error may be regarded as a part of logic or epistemology but it is to be recognised as standing on a level of self-consciousness different from that on which these subjects, as ordinarily conceived, appear to stand. The level is indicated by the contrast between the concept of falsity and the concept of negation. There are two grades of negation from both of which falsity has to be distinguished. When we disbelieve a content, we may only exclude it from a particular context while believing it to exist in another context. Such exclusion may be regarded as negation of the first grade. In the second grade, there is exclusion from a context without inclusion in another, disbelief without a positive complementary belief. It is what is sometimes called pure negation, the content negated being only known to be non-existent. Negation in both the grades is said to be known in the sense that truth may be asserted of it. Disbelief here amounts to a kind of knowledge which however is not the case when we reject a content as false. (The false is not simply the non-existent but the non-existent *as appearing existent*, to reject which is not logically to deny.) We cannot say that we know the falsity, for then falsity would be regarded as a truth. We should only say that we are aware of the falsity: we only disbelieve the content without knowing

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its non-existence. The non-existence of the possible, as in the second grade of negation, is a tautology but the non-existence of the false is meaningless.

Objective Logic recognises only the first grade of negation. It takes note of existents only, disbelieving them only in the sense of believing them as outside or distinct from the context in question and knows nothing of pure non-existence, far less of falsity. Pure non-existence is admissible as a known content only in epistemology and in such logic as is undistinguished from it. The believed and the disbelieved are taken here as two classes of known content and what is common to them is the *possible* which is a *quasi-objective* or "subsistent" content from the epistemic stand-point. But epistemology confines or should confine itself to the known, the possible being known, in the disbelief in its existence as a complete meaning. It should have nothing to do with what is only a problem in meaning as distinct from an accomplished meaning, with the consciously unknown or the unknowable, and with the false. We have no knowledge of the absence of known-ness; we speak of it and are aware of it variously in respect of the abstractly possible, of the impossible or the unnameable, or of what is only willed or felt but such awareness is not knowledge. Half-thoughts like these should find place in a new philosophical subject though they are as a matter of fact admitted in epistemology or logic. The doctrine of truth and error would really belong to this subject.

Epistemology is founded on a species of introspection different from what is called psychological introspection. The latter, if it knows knowing at all, knows it as indistinguishable in quality from mere believing. A qualitative distinction between knowing and believing is however known, being just what is called the logical character which is apprehended by a new quality of introspection. It is a confusion to speak of the function of knowing or the logical character being known by a logical procedure again. Kantian criticism is sometimes distinguished as logical from the criticism of Locke which is

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taken to be psychological. But the particular logical method by which Kant obtained his transcendental constants has never been identified or named in logic. There is indeed a quasi-logical transition from the logical forms to the apriori functions but it is not transition from one objective content to another, as one would expect in logic. The transcendental method is a self-evident transition, a process in self-consciousness and not in consciousness and as such should be taken as a kind of introspection which is neither logical mediation nor mere internal perception. To be necessarily implied or presupposed by the logical content is no logical relation at all nor is it a name for the mere psychological mode of knowing the content.

Epistemological introspection knows only this presupposition, the functional character that distinguishes the known content from the merely believed content. It claims a special quality of certitude, deeper than that claimed by mere objective or logical cognition, cognition through what Kant would call the uncritical employment of reason. Kant in fact hoped that critical reflection, as he understood it, would establish a final science of knowledge above the reach of philosophical controversy. The hope has not been realised and rival epistemologies have been put forward since his time, each claiming the same degree of certainty as that set up by him. The conflict of these assured theories of knowledge has brought to the fore the importance of a doctrine of truth and error competent to adjudicate between them and therefore based on a still deeper assurance of finality. The possible falsity of a theory based on epistemological introspection suggests the unique character of the general concept of falsity which, as we have indicated, belongs neither to logic nor to epistemology, as these subjects are ordinarily conceived.

The assurance of critical reflection does not in itself constitute the subjective criterion for distinguishing truth from error and cannot be the level of self-consciousness from which one can sit in judgment on an epistemology. A criticism of

epistemology is demanded to-day, of the very subject that emerged as the criticism of the logical or dogmatic procedure of reason. The doctrine of truth and error, if it could be systematised according to a principle, would furnish such a criticism of criticism. The two degrees of criticism are not distinguished and there is so far no principle on which we may decide between rival epistemologies. In the Kantian critiques, there is the hint of a transcendental Psychology behind the general theory of knowledge, with an occasional recognition of the necessity of distinguishing between them. Kant speaks, for example, of error being due to the 'subjective use' of reason as distinct from its intrinsically logical function and of certain principles being real to reason as employed in an extra-theoretic 'interest.' His theory of knowledge is properly concerned with the general logical function which is common to true knowing and error. His references to reason as a subjective faculty capable of perverse or extra-logical use are accordingly to be looked upon as mere *obiter dicta* within his epistemology and as really belonging to transcendental Psychology which was always assumed but never sufficiently distinguished by him.

The systematic doctrine of truth and error would be the same as or a part of this transcendental Psychology. To empirical psychology, the logical function going astray and yielding a false *content* conveys no meaning at all. Logic can recognise error only as a blind fact and epistemology should regard it as a miracle: the question of explaining its possibility does not arise at all in these subjects. Yet a theory of truth and error is ordinarily claimed to be established by a conscious or self-conscious logical method and there is no recognition so far of any mystery of cognitive level about it. One tendency however is noticeable in theories thus established—viz. to slur over the absolute distinction that is recognised in commonsense between truth and error. The suggestion is put forward in different forms that error is a partial truth, truth within a limited context; and it is sometimes

proposed in a manner to drop the conception of truth itself, a content being taken to be true only in the sense that it is known or 'asserted.' Such flagrant opposition to commonsense requires to be justified by something more than the consideration that it is conceivable and logically irrefutable. It is necessary to show on the one hand that a doctrine of this kind is itself knowledge and not a mere hypothesis and on the other that a theory admitting the absolute distinction of truth and error cannot be maintained.

Here we have the hint of a principle or criterion for deciding between rival theories of knowledge. *An epistemology must itself be a body of knowledge*; there is no room for a hypothesis or a mere conceivability in this region where finality is claimed for every assertion. With regard, for example, to a voluntarist theory of knowledge, the preliminary question must be asked in what sense, if at all, willing is *known*, if psychological introspection yields *knowledge* of it, and whether some spiritual consciousness of the practical kind amounts to the knowledge of the impossibility of pure knowing. There is the connected negative demand that *theoretic* reasons have to be adduced for the rejection of a theory that keeps within the commonsense distinction of truth and error. Such a theory in fact has a prior claim to consideration, even if these theories can interpret knowing all the way without stumbling. The interpretation of the cognitive by the non-cognitive—by willing or feeling or any superior spiritual process—is *prima facie* suspect and can be accepted only if a purely cognitive interpretation is shown to be impossible.

2. Mutual implication of knowledge and truth.

Two propositions may be stated about knowledge—that knowing is known only as implied in the explicit awareness of truth and that truth is asserted only of a content that is known. Knowledge and truth have to be defined in terms of each other, the former as what alone is true and the latter as what alone is known. It is only metaphorically that we speak of the truth of a feeling or willing; and values in the non-

cognitive sphere are what we only believe but do not know. We may examine in this connexion two positions that appear to be fundamentally opposed to our view viz. that knowing is known by psychological introspection and that truth is a relation, not to a known, but to a suggested possible content, an idea or mere meaning.

(i.) Knowing is not known by Psychological introspection.

We may know an object without knowing it explicitly to be true but do we ever know the psychic fact of knowing except as implied in the assertion of truth about its content? It may be contended that knowing is known by memory or internal perception, like any other psychic fact. The past perception of an object, for example, may be taken to be remembered in the remembering of the object without any conscious reference to the truth of it. When we remember an objective event, we do not at once reproduce every detail of it and need not know that it was perceived. But just as omitted objective details are gradually reinstated, so also, it may be said, does the subjective fact of perception come to be known in the course of the mere fulfilment of the memory without any question arising as to the truth of the memory. Is such a contention tenable?

There is in the first place the obvious difficulty that the past perception was not perceived in the past and so cannot be said to be now remembered, unless we admit either that all perception is implicitly perception of perception or that we can remember without having perceived. Nor can the past perception be said to be now internally or introspectively perceived, for the object of perception is ordinarily understood to be synchronous with the perception. There cannot be also any question of inferring the past perception from the remembered object of it, for that presupposes, what we never had previously, knowledge of other objects and their cognition as together. To know the cognition of object is not to know the cognition and the object to be together.

The past perception is indeed known but it is not known

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by memory, perception or inference, by any method in fact by which an object is known. There is occasion to know the past psychic fact if the object or content of it is challenged or confirmed. If any grounds now present themselves for doubting the reality of the past objective event, the doubt is laid by the assurance that we actually perceived it. Or again if any facts or inferences now yield an explicit confirmation of the reality of the event, the sense of confirmation implies the awareness of the past perception of the event. We cannot imagine any other occasion for such awareness. Not that we can say why the awareness of the past cognition emerges : We know only that this awareness is at the same time awareness of the confirmation or the rejected doubt that is involved in the explicit assertion of the objective content as true. Properly speaking, the knowledge of cognition does not emerge in time as the cognition itself emerges and so does not demand explanation. We start with this knowledge which is the same as the knowledge of the truth of the objective content. The time-position of the content determines, not the time position, but only a differential quality of its cognition, a quality however which does not appear to affect the knowledge of the cognition at all.

There is apparently then no memory of a cognition in the mere interest in fact as distinct from interest in the truth of the fact. Is there an introspective perception of knowing at the time of the knowing ? The question is really illegitimate, for as just shown there is no possibility of knowing the synchronisness of a content and the perception of it. A content and its perception are never known independently to be taken as together or successive : the content is never distinguished from its perception, though the perception distinguishes, manifests or reveals the content. If this holds good when the content is objective, it holds good with greater reason when the content is cognition itself. The cognition as we have said has no time-position but only a quality due to the position of its objective content ; and the knowledge of the cognition has not

even this quality, so that there is no question at all of the cognition and the knowledge of it being temporally related. We conclude then that neither a past nor a present cognition can be said to be known as such for the purposes of psychology.

Cognition is indeed known but not by the so-called psychological introspection, conceived either as perception or memory. It is known by what we have called epistemological introspection such as is involved in the explicit awareness of truth. All that psychology claims to know about cognition, it gets either through this unconfessed epistemological reflection or through a blend of imagination and verbal interpretation which yields only the appearance of knowledge. This blend is what passes by the name of psychological introspection which can never know a psychic process as a fact as distinct from fancy or mere meaning. Belief in psychic reality emerges only as the implication of belief in a spiritual value like truth or beauty or obligatoriness.

The object of cognition is distinguished by the cognition though it is not known as distinct from it. In the awareness of the cognition, the cognition is distinguished from its object which then as not appearing distinct from it becomes indefinite. In the awareness of a feeling or willing however, the psychic fact is not distinguished from the object, the object being only distinguished from it. The psychic fact and its object are in neither case presented as mutually distinct: the cognitive fact is only distinguished and the non-cognitive fact is only distinguished from. This is apparent from the nature of the value in the apprehension of which the awareness of the psychic fact is implied. Truth does not appear as a *character* of the object while beauty or sacredness appear as such. Hence in the awareness of truth, the object is indefinite and its cognition definite while the consciousness of beauty etc. implies the reverse-viz. the object as definite and the corresponding psychic fact as indefinite. The awareness of the fact of cognition accordingly itself amounts to a cognition while that of the non cognitive psychic fact is nothing more than a belief.

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There is no introspective belief in the reality of the mental except as the implication of belief in value; and there is introspective knowledge, as distinct from belief, of knowing only, not of feeling or willing.

There may however be a belief in willing or feeling along with and implied in the knowledge of knowing. In the knowledge of knowing, the object of the knowing is cognitively indefinite but that does not prevent it from being definitely real to a non-cognitive interest. Such definiteness of the object does not prejudice the completeness of the cognition of it, though the feeling or willing that it implies points to a new conception about cognition—viz. the necessity of subjectively realising it. The non-cognitive value of the object known—e. g. its beauty or sacredness—demands to be realised as the truth-value (if that can be called value at all) of the cognition, though the truth which has already presented itself does not suffer because it is not yet realised. Again just as there is the demand to realise other values as truth, so there may be demand in the non-cognitive interest to realise truth as other value, realise it, as we say, in life. Thus something can be done through feeling or willing to secure the subjective maturation of knowing, as these too may be matured by a discipline of knowing.

We have so far tried to establish that psychological introspection is not knowledge of psychic fact, that psychic facthood emerges only as the implication of belief in value, and that knowing alone among psychic facts, as implied in the belief in truth, can be said to be known. Certain consequences follow. There is in the first place no such thing as false knowledge. If knowing could be known as an indifferent psychic fact, both truth and falsity would be predicable of it. But if knowing is known only as the implicate of the awareness of truth, to know an object is to know it as in some sense implicitly true. Truth cannot be taken simply as additional confirmation of what already is known indifferently, though the explicit knowledge of truth itself testifies to a prior knowing

of the object without this conscious assertion of truth. Not that the truth of this mere object-knowledge can be said to be now *recognised*: the loose use of the term recognition is responsible for a good deal of epistemological superstition. Knowledge is implicit knowledge of truth only in the sense that the explicit knowledge of truth is the knowledge of a knowing that was not known. It does not mean that truth as a character or content of the knowing was somehow hidden in it. We can only say that the knowing, when it was not known, could not be false, as then it would be no knowing at all. An object to be known need not be known explicitly to be true; but if it now appears to be not true, it is never said to have been known but taken at best to have been believed.

Another consequence of the view that knowing is only known in the knowledge of truth is that there is no knowledge of objects as merely distinct but not otherwise related to one another. To be known, an object must not only be distinct but consciously confirmed by the contents of other cognitions. The known content must be explicitly coherent and not merely co-existent with other known contents. The coherence emerges not only within the content of a particular cognition but also between it and the contents of cognitions that fall beyond it. The content as a whole of a given cognition, without losing completeness or selfsufficiency, is felt to be confirmed by the contents of other cognitions that retain their distinction from it and do not get fused. The coherent plurality within the content may be taken as representing a fusion of cognitions, although the coherence does not appear as conscious confirmation but not therefore also as a mere relation of co-existent elements in a whole.

A third consequence of our view about the knowing of knowing is that interpretations of knowing in terms of feeling or willing are excluded as not themselves amounting to knowledge. If the awareness of willing, for example, is not knowledge but at best a belief, a voluntarist interpretation of knowledge has to be regarded, not as a scientific or

factual theory, but as a prescription to imagine or believe the fact of knowing in a particular way for some practical end or purpose. It is a contradiction in fact to claim a voluntarist epistemology to be true, though it may be practically useful or even obligatory as an imperative to the imagination. If cognition is only a means to activity, the knowledge that it is so cannot again be a means to further activity without leading to an infinite regress. The awareness that a belief works and is therefore cognition does not itself appear again as an *efficient* belief.

(ii). **Truth is not relation to a mere meaning.**

We have examined the proposition that knowing is only known as the implication of the awareness of truth. There is next the converse proposition that truth is asserted only of knowing. The affirmation of truth in respect of a feeling or willing is, as we have said, only a rhetorical expression of its non-cognitive value. Within knowing however, truth is sometimes taken to be asserted, not of the known content, but of the merely suggested content, of what has been proposed to be called *proposition* as distinct from judgment. We have said that the awareness of the truth of a content is knowledge of the content as *known*, not merely suggested. The content is known as known for the first time in such awareness; and to say that it is true is to say that it is known as known. In the view just suggested however, the assertion of the truth of a content means only the assertion that it is known, not that it is known to be or to have been known. The subject of the assertion 'it is known' is taken to stand only for a meant or 'subsistent' content as distinct from a known or existent content. The predicate *known*—or what is its equivalent, *true*—is understood to be external to it, to be however, not *in relation* to it, but the relation itself, being thus at once term and relation, constituting what is described as a 'flavour' of the content.

Our objection to such a view is two-fold. On the one hand the merely meant or subsistent content—the *possible*, as

it may be called—is an illegitimate abstraction of which no predicate may be asserted; and on the other, the knowledge or assertion of a content cannot be understood as a relation, far less as *in* relation to it. The first objection comes out definitely if we consider an existential judgment of the negative form “A is not”. As we have already indicated, the disbelief in A here may be knowledge but need not imply belief in A as having being in some context. Properly speaking, therefore, such knowledge cannot be called a judgment at all. A is here known as the possible only through the apparent predicate *non-existence*, it being a mere tautology to say that the possible is not actual. The possible has no positive being except as implied by verbal fixation. “A is not existent” is only an illegitimate extension of the form of a negative judgment like ‘A is not B’ which implies the existence of A. It should accordingly be recognised as a mere trickery of language: there is no belief in A here, the disbelief being the whole of the knowledge.

Our second objection is that it is a misleading use of the word *relation* to speak of the knowledge or assertion of an object as in relation or as the relation to the object. The relativist, we hold, is right when he takes knowledge as external to or distinct from the object: knownness cannot be understood as an attribute or character of the object. When we are aware of the knowledge of an object, we distinguish the knowledge from the object though the distinguishing does not amount to the knowledge of a factual distinction. It appears to be wholly wrong however to speak of the object as distinct from the knowing of it. We are not aware of the distinction from knowing as an objective fact. Nor is the knowing of the object the *distinguishing* of the object *from itself*. The object known is simply distinguished: it is not related at all to its knowing in the way of identity or distinction. If the act of knowing or distinguishing be knowledge of the distinction of the object from itself, that *itself* would be a term known as distinct from itself and so on indefinitely. We

have therefore to recognise that the reference of knowing to its object is no distinction or relation at all, that though we are aware of the knowing of the object as distinct from the object, the so-called distinction of the object from knowing is only unrelatedness of which we are aware but not cognitively.

To explain the concept of unrelatedness. When two contents are known together, they need not be known *as* together. They may not only be known as unrelated in space, time or nature : they may not even be known as barely distinct from one another. To know *two* contents, it is only necessary to know that one is distinct from the other but not that the other is distinct from it. When two contents A and B are thus known, A being distinct from B, B is known, not as distinct from nor therefore identical with A, but as unrelated to A. In fact even when we know them as mutually distinct, the two distinctions are not known as making up one distinction. They alternate and the alternation appears, not as distinction between A and B, but as their unity or whole in space, time or nature. They are then not only known together but also *as* together, though the distinction of A from B and that of B from A do not cease to be themselves distinct. Hence it follows that to know one content as distinct from another is *in no case* to know the other as distinct from it but only to know it as *unrelated*, though the two distinctions may sometimes be known together. It is thus intelligible how while knowing is known as distinct from its object, the object is known, not as distinct from, but as unrelated to the knowing.

When therefore in the view under discussion it is held that knowledge is the relation to the object, what is really meant is that knowledge is distinct from its object but not reversely. Our contention is that such onesided distinction is not relation at all. There is no relation without *mutual* distinction which implies some form of objective togetherness. Knowing and its object are not objectively together and therefore even the known distinction of knowing from its object, which we admit,

is not a relation. Yet such onesided distinction has to be necessarily symbolised as a relation. We have to speak of two things—knowing and object, though we know they are not objectively two, not known as two. The awareness of the distinction as onesided is the awareness of the evidentness, manifestation or *prakāśa* of the object, which is no relation but is only symbolised by it. The evidentness of the known content is a category utterly distinct from relation, to recognise which is to appreciate the differential character of knowing.

We have said that the object is known, not as distinct from or identical with its knowing, but as unrelated to it. Properly however we should say that it is known simply as evident and that it is *not* known as related to knowing. There is no knowledge of the circumstance of unrelatedness but only an extra-cognitive awareness of it. As already pointed out, it is only in the awareness of willing or feeling, as distinct from that of knowing, that the object referred to is distinguished from the psychic fact. This distinguishing is not the knowledge of distinction or relation but only a direction or phase of willing or feeling. The object is not known as related to knowing but is willed as an end to be realised or felt as a value that is being realised. There is therefore no conflict between the deliverances of cognitive and non-cognitive consciousness ; what we are *not* aware of cognitively we are aware of *non-cognitively*. The distinction between these deliverances is sometimes overlooked ; and we have realistic and idealistic theories of knowledge asserting the object to be distinct from or identical with the knowing of it. The former take the willed distinction and the latter the felt identity-in-difference as though it were the known distinction of the object from or the known identity of the object with the knowing of it. To knowledge, the object is only evident and not related to it though symbolised as such. To willing or feeling, this symbolism is real and unrelatedness is a believed quasi-relation which is by confusion taken to be a known relation.

3. Nature of Logical Confirmation.

Truth, we have said, is asserted of the known content. The assertion amounts to saying that the content is known as known. Known-ness or truth is external to it in the sense that knowing is distinguished from its object. Known-ness is no character of the object, being but the fact of knowing, the knowing that reveals the object as evident, as distinct but not distinct from itself. This knowing is also known, known only when confirmed by other cognitions and as so confirmed. The confirmation is not known as a relation within the content of the knowing, for then there would be no break between the content of one knowing and that of another. We have as a matter of fact many cognitions and a cognition does not, consciously at any rate, refer to the entire universe. The elimination of the distinction between cognitions or—what is the same thing—the conscious presentation of truth as single may be a spiritual ideal but we have no right to assume it in the characterisation of an actual cognition. Since a cognition however is not known except when confirmed, there emerges the paradox of the confirming relation constituting it and yet falling beyond it. A cognition, as we have seen, must be complete but it is never known except as confirmed by other cognitions.

Not that confirmation is known as a character of the cognition, or of its object. The object is unrelated to the object of the confirming cognition and the so-called systemic relation is only an imaginary objectification of the subjective circumstance of confirmation. Nor is the subjective circumstance felt as a character of the complete cognition that is confirmed. There are cases indeed where the confirming cognitions get telescoped into the confirmed cognition; but there the latter gives place to a new cognition of which the content is a synthesis of the contents of previous cognitions and presents the confirming relation as some immediate relation of coherence like that between the substantive and the adjective. The cognition however, that is said to be confirmed by others

without prejudice to its completeness does not get modified in the confirmation: it only gets to be known through it. There may be a strengthening of belief but that is only a psychological circumstance. Logically then, confirmation is not known character either of the cognition or of the object of it.

The confirmation of which we are aware in the awareness of a cognition implies a conscious distinction of it from the confirming cognitions but not the distinction of the latter from the former. It is accordingly no known relation of the cognitions, though as the onesided distinction is there, it has to be symbolised as a relation. What is symbolised here is a metapsychic or spiritual process which though not itself a cognition is not indifferent to cognition. The given cognition is known only in the assertion of truth in respect of it, truth that is manifested in conscious confirmation symbolised as a relation. It is this pseudo-relation that has been elaborated into the objective symbolism of a system of relations, the system that is said to constitute the known object and which may be regarded as a shadow of truth, an imaginary projection of the knowing of knowing or self-consciousness. It is important to recognise that system is but a symbolism.

There is symbolising in another direction. Confirmation in the subjective or epistemic sphere is no psychic character or relation but a non-cognitive or spiritual overnote of cognition as a psychic fact. It is itself a metaphor or symbolism: the strengthening or maturation of knowledge is but a figure of speech for a mode of cognitive realisation. The process may be otherwise symbolised as the shining out of thought, with the attenuation of error, as a mirror that catches the reflection of truth. Truth cannot be characterised, it has only to be symbolised by the evident content of a cognition, appearing within its magic interior. The interior or reference of a cognition is the conscious gap or discontinuity between the cognition and its object, the sphere of what may be called problematic thought—comprising incomplete but completing meanings, the

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consciously unknown, the contradictory, and this circumstance of confirmation—all centering round the evident content that is known. Truth is known as this evident content but not reversely: the particular known content is not known as the truth but is only demanded to be so known, by the process of confirmation and the consequent or independent process of the dissipation of error inherent in it.

Reason and Dogma.

G. R. Malkani.

The modern tendency in philosophy is towards extreme rationalism. This would appear to be all to the good. But unfortunately, modern philosophy has no orientation. The sense of the average student is that philosophy can prove nothing definitely and finally. One writer starts with one set of postulates and arrives at a certain conclusion. Another writer starts with exactly the opposite set of postulates and arrives at the very opposite conclusion. There are thus all sorts of cross currents in modern philosophy, and the honest seeker after truth is confounded. He does not know where truth lies, or even whether truth is attainable in this sphere of thought. It is a strange irony that in this age of the freedom of reason, we seem to be farther away from truth than ever before.

Another result of this over-rationalisation is that no one is ever convinced. Even the honest protagonists of certain views cannot make up their mind to be positive. They realize that reason favours no sort of absolutism. Opposite positions with regard to the nature of reality can in fact be advanced with equal plausibility, if only a person is endowed with sufficiently developed powers of reason, powers to make nicer distinctions, and in general to multiply issues where there was supposed to be only one real issue. For the one real issue is always capable of being analysed into many issues (equally real), according as one wants to have it answered in one way or in another. This is so, because in philosophy, we do not solve a problem by pointing to evidence which everyone so to say can see. That may be so in science. In philosophy, it is all a matter of how you take the evidence placed before you. Every philosophical problem is in the end an interrogation of experience.

REASON AND DOGMA.

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We raise a certain question. We then proceed analysing it. Is the question to be interpreted in this way, or in that way? What was meant to be asked? When that was asked, what was admitted? Was the admission justified? If it was justified, what were its implications? This analysis may be carried on till the original issue is lost sight of; or we may come to dogmatic assertions as to the nature of actual experience, and here reason has no place; it becomes all a matter of the one asserting and the other denying a certain proposition, of the one regarding it as self-evident and the other as questionable. What then can we say is the rational or the philosophical way? Those who seek guidance from reason alone do not know. They are left without guidance and in doubt.

There are people who want us to be satisfied with what little guidance we can get. We may not know *the* truth. But we can certainly avoid certain absurdities in thought. We can also render our experience into a more or less coherent system. Some even go so far as to say that there can be no true system of philosophy, but only philosophising. A true philosophy according to them must always remain unfinished. All we can say is: "So far as we can see, truth appears to be something like this." It may grow, and certainly it ought to grow, as we continue philosophising. There must be no end to this process. Philosophy is a certain spirit, the spirit of caution and of patient thinking and he is the true philosopher who has this spirit, and not one who adheres to a fixed system. The way of reason is by its very nature long, and unending but that is no detriment of reason.

One consequence of this attitude is that the present-day philosophy has only a very slight contact with life. Philosophy has become an intellectual effort for the mere sake of that effort. It does not arise from any deep-seated need of life, and does not in the end administer to any such need. If it arose from a real need of life, it could not halt half-way; it could not rest satisfied with a condition of uncertainty in

thought. It would have to go on in a more earnest spirit till it found something that satisfied the need. Reason would then only be regarded as a sovereign guide if it led to truth that satisfied.

The great need of modern philosophy is the recognition that philosophy cannot be a fruitful affair if its only impulse is intellectual. It must be related to some real need of life. This necessarily involves a certain limitation of the abstract logical method, and the recognition of the role of dogma. We are accustomed to minimise the philosophical effort of the ancients who always reasoned from a dogma, and who, it appeared, simply reasoned towards it. The method had its faults. But it also had its strong points. It gave philosophical reasoning a proper theme, relevance to the higher needs of life, and above all a direction. This raises the question : What is dogma and its place in philosophy ?

A dogma may be defined as a certain proposition which is accepted on faith, and for the sole reason that it prescribes a certain attitude towards things that satisfies. It must therefore naturally pertain to matters that cannot be directly observed. What can be directly observed is self-evident to us. It does not entail an act of faith on our part. The truth of a dogma then is not self-evident to us ; and yet we feel somehow impelled to give it our adherence. There is room for rational misgivings ; and at the same time there is a conviction that reason, if it went sufficiently far, would find in the belief something that is satisfactory to it.

Another thing about a dogma is that its appeal is to the whole man, and colours all his reasoning. He may try to give justification for the belief he holds, and his justification on the whole may be quite good in its way. But the real truth is that the justification is an after-thought, an improvisation. Logic will be manipulated to give the required conclusion. And this is not difficult ; since logic, as the science of abstract thought has no content of its own.

It is the great ideal of modern philosophy to free reason

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from the servitude of dogma in every form. But is it an ideal that is capable of being fully realized? It is not difficult to see that reason cannot proceed without an initial direction and a bias. We are in the habit of thinking that we reason first and come to the conclusion afterwards. That however is never the case. Paradoxical though it may appear, we come to the conclusion first and reason afterwards. No doubt we are not always conscious of this. But with a little thought we can see that that is the real procedure of reason. The conclusion is always implicit from the very beginning. It is common to speak of a man as not knowing his mind. It is not that he cannot reason, that he is not intelligent enough like some of those who easily know their mind. The truth is that he is swayed between different conclusions or dogmas, and this obstructs his reason. Men of decision are supremely dogmatic. Nobody can be dogged in action without being dogmatic in thought. Political men and newspaper editors who speak and write so freely and never seem to want an argument, have their dogmas, which they elevate into principles of statecraft. Philosophers who consider dogmatism as the greatest sin are proverbially indecisive in thought and weak in action. They are always weighing and wavering. No conclusion appears to be rational enough for them. They are over-critical, over-meticulous. They see difficulties and puzzles everywhere. They cannot solve one. Their reason leads them nowhere. People regard them as the true type of philosophers. For do they not exhibit the true character of the philosophical spirit, —over-punctiliousness as to the rationality of one's beliefs? Those among them on the other hand who show themselves to be positive and bold in constructive thought are not dignified with the name of "philosophers." They are called visionaries and mystics,—which is a polite way of saying that they lack the power of reason to save them from illusions.

There is however a limit to negative reasoning. Those who carry this tendency to an extreme, are seen, quite unconsciously to themselves, to be holding the most common-place

beliefs, which reason might easily show to be common superstitions. The truth is that if we do not care to be dogmatic consciously we do not even care to be rational. For reason, is impossible without an initial orientation. We cannot go on reasoning interminably, and have the satisfaction that we have reasoned well. There is a world of difference between a verbal argument and rational thinking. In the former, we need not reason. In the latter, we cannot help being dogmatic,—at least to a certain extent.

The question arises, are we then doomed to this irrational course? Must we hold to beliefs which we can not rationally justify; Now that may not be the case. But what is rational justification? It will be seen that any form of rational justification is in the end reducible to certain propositions that are self-evident. There is no rational justification for these. These self evident propositions cannot be called dogmas; they are evident to every one who wants to reason. Indeed, if we can reduce all processes of actual reasoning to propositions that will be accepted by all as self-evident, we need not consider ourselves doomed to an irrational course. But if these processes contain a proposition on which unanimity can not be obtained, we have evidently a case which does not satisfy all the conditions of rational justification. What we now contend is that any actual process of reasoning which is not merely formal implies in the end a proposition which is not self-evident at all. It is this proposition which in fact supplies the *raison detre* of reason itself. There would be no need to reason, if we did not *want* to establish a position which is not quite self-evident to us. We have this need, because a certain position vaguely appeals to us as the right one, but is not seen to be self-evident. We accept it on faith, and it is so far dogmatic. Dogma may then in a sense be said to be the real power behind any concrete and constructive piece of thinking.

But we still reason. We are never satisfied with a position that is dogmatic. While then it is true that reason must start with an initial dogmatic bias, it is equally true that reason

cannot stay in it and must necessarily tend to dissipate what is merely dogmatic. We never tire of exalting reason as an instrument of truth. And yet so long as we have need to reason, we are not really free from the dogmatic in thought. And if we hold such a funny proposition as that, there will never come a time when, in our search after truth, there will be no need to reason any more, we are really holding, although quite unconsciously, that reason can never be emancipated from itself. We may exalt an unending search after truth over truth itself. But let us not expose our unwisdom by declaring that it is the better thing. We do not value reason well enough if we do not realise what it must necessarily presuppose, and what satisfaction is in the spirit of reason itself. *We reason in order to get over the dogmatic in thought, and when we have really got over it, there is no need to reason.* Reason can only be a provisional god.

We do not advocate any sort of mysticism here. Reason is quite competent for its purposes. It takes reality no doubt without reason and on faith, guided by the fundamental needs of life. These needs however soon begin to conflict, leading to conflict in our beliefs. So long as this conflict has not become evident, reason has no problem. It has a problem when it sees the conflict. The beliefs can no longer be regarded as being all rational; and the process of rationalisation begins. This process consists in reconciling the conflict in a higher view of reality. Reason cannot reach this view by ignoring the beliefs which conflict. It has no first-hand acquaintance with reality as such. It simply tries, by means of analysis, to get at the common ground between those beliefs, and then to show how by a misapplication of the agreed principles, all the opposition and conflict has arisen. The work of reason is purely negative; it is to remove error; and the removal of error is all that we can possibly mean by rational truth. Different philosophers see error in different places; and they formulate the problem of philosophy in terms appropriate to what they see.

We thus find that the function of reason is interwoven with that of dogma. A dogma is a belief that is not seen to be rational, and easily gives rise to error ; yet it satisfies a need of life. Reason, in rationalising the beliefs, does not frustrate this need. It may be said to purify it. For does it not bring order into our desires and harmonise them with truth ? We can no longer desire blindly and without seeing. We can only desire in accordance with the greater truth which reason has helped us to see.

We cannot do without dogmas. They help us to realize truth. But we may easily go too far in our allegiance to them. We are in the habit of regarding certain dogmas as having behind them divine authority. Indeed so far as they satisfy a fundamental need that persists through all times and in all generations, they may be said to be unquestionable and in a way revealed. They raise experience to a higher level, and provide reason with a noble theme. Still it would not be in the service of truth to suppose that reason should not question them, or seek to alter their form in any way if it finds that necessary to a better comprehension of truth. A dogma is not pure truth. It is a human formulation of truth ; and very often it is a formulation designed to appeal to popular imagination. It is the task of reason to interpret dogma, to distinguish in it the divine and the human, the eternal and the temporal ; for the popular mind easily reads into a dogma, a literalness which sets the word at war with the spirit. No human dogma can therefore be said to be eternally valid as it stands. Reason alone can show what is eternally valid in a dogma, for it alone can get behind the form of words and vindicate its truth in living experience. The truly rational spirit is that which entertains dogmas with an open mind, ready to profit by others' experiences but critical of them and not confined to a fixed formula. Faith is necessary ; but faith must justify itself to reason,—it must be a faith that sees.

The orthodox man does not feel the need to reason. He is principally concerned with the practical issue. The blunt

expression of the dogma serves his purpose quite well. But those who have a seeing eye cannot help reasoning. Reason thus presupposes a certain power of intuition from the very beginning and a desire to see things better. The ultimate justification of truth, including the truth of divine revelation, can be no other than direct experience that satisfies the need to reason, the need to raise questions and doubts. This direct experience we all have. Only it is mixed up with erroneous beliefs. The work of reason is to set us free from the latter.

The Cognitive Value of Religious Experience.

B. N. Ray.

Religious experience is commonly held to be absolutely unique and distinctive in character, and to be possessed by a certain class of people only who are peculiarly susceptible to it. It is thus essentially personal and incommunicable, and those who lack it are, therefore, necessarily disqualified from forming an impartial estimate of its value. According to this view, then, religious experience, since it is unique and purely personal and lacks universality which is considered essential for any experience to be regarded as valid knowledge does not appear to possess the same amount of cognitive value as other experiences of the human mind, such as, aesthetic and moral.

The views concerning the nature of religious experience set forth in the present paper differ in essential elements from those expressed in the above paragraph. In what follows it would be my object to show the cognitive value of religious experience, that is, to show that religious experience possesses as much truth-value as any other human experiences. With this purpose in view, I shall analyse, firstly, the nature of religious knowledge, secondly, I shall point out that such knowledge is not altogether unique, and that it admits of metaphysical construction; and, thirdly, it will be my endeavour to illustrate the cognitive value of religious knowledge as exhibited in the life and conduct of persons who claim to possess it.

In religious experience the whole of our personality is called into play. It is the expression of our whole nature. In such an experience, the cognitive, the emotional and the volitional sides of human mind interpenetrate and interfuse and thereby create an experience unique in kind and distinct from merely aesthetic and moral experiences. In this respect religious experience occupies a unique place among the rest of human experience. With these remarks, let us now proceed to the confi-

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deration of the main problem of the paper, namely, the cognitive value of religious experience. Religious knowledge involves the cognition of a Reality infinitely superior to the knower himself. Now, the question is whether the cognitive consciousness employed in the apprehension of the Supreme Reality is of the same nature as the conceptual consciousness whereby things are ordinarily known in experience. To answer the question satisfactorily it is necessary to consider (1) the nature of discursive or conceptual consciousness, and (2) whether such consciousness is competent to apprehend the supreme Reality. If the answer to the second point be in the affirmative, the problem is solved; but if it be in the negative, then further perplexing questions arise, and it is asked (3) whether there is any faculty higher than the discursive understanding, which leads to a knowledge of the Supreme Reality; and again (4) whether such a faculty is absolutely divorced from the discursive reason, or it is only a further development of the latter, and both the so-called higher faculty and discursive reason are to be designated as rational, the term reason being used in a wider sense than its ordinary connotation in which it is identified with the merely logical or ratiocinative understanding: (5) these questions being answered, the important point remains to be determined as to whether it is possible to ascribe the same measure of truth-value to the knowledge of the Supreme Reality as is done to knowledge conditioned by discursive thought.

I

A distinction is generally drawn between what is called intuitive knowledge and what is ordinarily known as logical or conceptual knowledge. The former is characterised by a certain directness and immediacy, while the latter is essentially mediate and reflective in character. Intuition carries us into the heart of reality, and gives us a sense of a living contact with it, whereas in intellect we have only a mediate awareness of reality, and such awareness is expressed in terms of logical judgments or propositions. The essential characteristic of concep-

tual knowledge, as distinct from intuitive, lies in the fact that whereas the former is always expressed in the propositional form, the latter is non-propositional. The distinction referred to above is conveniently expressed by the terms the "that" and the "what", which respectively refer to bare immediate knowledge and knowledge expressed in propositional forms. Now whether there is a stage of bare immediacy, or whether in such a stage the conceptual factor is implicit, I shall refrain from discussing here and I shall confine my remarks only to the nature of conceptual knowledge. The great contribution of Kant to philosophic thought consists in the discovery of certain universal and necessary forms of thought whereby the understanding organises and apprehends experience. Human understanding is essentially a synthesising and relating activity: it applies its universal and necessary forms to the manifold data of sense experience and transforms them into definite and coherent knowledge. Logical or conceptual judgment, which is the unit of human knowledge, is the product of the imposition of these universal and necessary forms, by the synthesising activity of the understanding, upon the manifold data of sense intuitions. Judgments or propositions, then, as Kant showed, are the necessary forms in which conceptual knowledge is expressed. Even what we call perceptual knowledge is also essentially conceptual in character, and assumes propositional forms, although the reflective element may not be so conspicuously present in it as in purely conceptual judgments; the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, made nowadays, is only valid if included within the wider sphere of logical knowledge, and the only possible distinction between these two types of knowledge can be made according to the presence in them of conceptual elements in a greater or a lesser degree. Further, conceptual knowledge always involves the distinction between the true and the false, the real and the unreal. Such distinctions are due to the reflective and mediate character of conceptual thought. Whatever is given in conceptual thought is judged either as real as or unreal, true or false. Lastly,-

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conceptual judgments are universal in character and equally intelligible to all, and therefore the question of their validity can be easily made a subject of discourse.

II

The above analysis of the nature of conceptual consciousness prepares the way for the determination of the question as to whether such consciousness is competent to comprehend the Supreme Reality which is the object of religious experience. Pursuing again the analysis of Kant, we observe that the conceptual consciousness is essentially relational and discriminative in character, and is necessarily limited to the apprehension of sensuous experience. On the other hand, the Supreme Reality which is given in religious experience, is non-sensuous in character, and so transcends conceptual formulation. It is obvious that the conceptual reason, in so far as it is relational and discriminative, may be good enough for the apprehension of sensible objects; but, owing to its necessary limitations, it fails to apprehend *completely* the nature of Supreme Reality. Here I should explain my divergence from Kant. I do not hold with Kant that the conceptual apprehension of religious truths distorts their character, and involves us in contradictions. I believe, on the other hand, that the conceptual formulation does not falsify the genuine character of religious truths, however imperfectly they may be revealed to us in this manner. The adequacy of conceptual understanding may be questioned so far as the apprehension of religious truths is concerned, but it will be going too far to question its genuineness. The value of logical knowledge should be recognised only so far as it goes, and should not be allowed to transcend its legitimate bounds. The human mind would, indeed, be a poor thing if conceptual knowledge were the only kind of knowledge it had at its disposal. That this is not the case, and that religious truths are apprehended in a way altogether different from the way of logical mediation, and that adequately too, is abundantly proved by the testimony of religious people who claim the knowledge of such truths.

Truth is not the monopoly of discursive intellect, and there may be other channels of human mind through which the truth of the spheres other than the merely sensible may be reported to us. These considerations amply demonstrate the inadequacy of conceptual reason to apprehend the truths of religious experience, and therefore it becomes necessary for us to define clearly the nature of the other modes of knowledge which give such truths.

III.

The failure of conceptual reason to grapple with religious truths leads us to seek some other modes of knowledge whereby such truths may be apprehended. The problem as to how the ultimate truths are apprehended is very old, and different answers have been given to it by different philosophers. According to Plato the Ideas, which are non-sensuous in character, can be apprehended only by the *Nous* or Reason, which is distinct from the conceptual understanding, the application of the latter being limited to sensuous experience. For Spinoza, God and universe are co-extensive, and God is revealed to reason alone, and not to imagination and perception which are employed in the apprehension of the particulars of sense. By reason, Spinoza does not, evidently, mean the discursive reason, but a sort of intuitive understanding, which gives a synthetic vision of the absolute totality or whole. Kant recognised the necessarily limited nature of our conceptual reason, and held that God is revealed only to our practical reason or faith. In post-Kantian thinkers, the restricted character of reason is denied, its scope is extended, and we hear the possibility of the Absolute being known by a sort of intellectual intuition. Bradley, in more recent times, confesses the signal failure of discursive knowledge, and postulates a kind of experience which he calls the stage of higher immediacy wherein the Absolute is revealed to the human mind. The philosophers referred to just now, are agreed in acknowledging the inherent limitations of conceptual thought, and feel the necessity of seeking a different mode of knowledge whereby the object of religious

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experience may be apprehended. Such mode of apprehension has been variously described by philosophers as intuition, faith, feeling, ecstasy, etc. Without committing ourselves to the acceptance of any of these terms, for the present it suffices if we recognise simply the necessity of a distinctive kind of knowledge adapted to the apprehension of religious truths. That religious truth is revealed to a distinctive mode of apprehension, other than that of logical mediation, will be further confirmed if the experiences of religious men, such as saints and mystics, are considered. To the vision of the mystic the revelation of God is direct and unmediated, and His living presence at once compels the recognition of His reality. It is not necessary to dwell further upon this point. Both philosophers and religious men have acknowledged the necessity of a specific mode of knowledge, as distinct from merely discursive or conceptual knowledge, for the apprehension of religious truths; and the nature of such knowledge, as far as we have been able to see, is direct and unmediated; it is not limited to apprehending reality piecemeal and in a fragmentary way, as is the case with analytic or discursive reason but it aims at a synthetic vision of the totality or the whole.

IV.

It has been shown that the apprehension of the object of religious experience is immediate, and characterised by a vision of the perfect whole which gives a satisfaction that is completely absent in conceptual knowledge. Now, the problem to be considered here is as to whether religious knowledge is completely divorced from conceptual knowledge. It is generally held that these two types of knowledge are absolutely opposed to each other (e. g. Kant and Bergson). Knowledge of Reality, it is maintained, is veiled from the understanding owing to the latter's inherent limitations, and is vouchsafed to intuition alone, as urged by Bergson, or to a practical consciousness or moral faith, as held by Kant. As we have already suggested, we fail to be convinced by the logic of the view which postulates an absolute antithesis between religious and conceptual know-

ledge. It is no doubt true that the conceptual rendering of religious experience is fragmentary, inadequate and necessarily imperfect in character, but this does not warrant us in doubting its genuineness as far as it goes, and labelling it as essentially false. On the contrary, the conceptual expression of religious experience is a necessity of the human mind which defies evasion. As soon as the experience, the vision, passes away the mind is of necessity obliged to translate it into conceptual terms and render it permanent: and until this has been done, the mind is not satisfied. The gulf that separates religious knowledge from the conceptual is not absolute. The two modes of knowledge are distinct, but not absolutely opposed. They are complementary to each other, and the one supplies what the other lacks. Conceptual formulation begins when the experience ceases, and however inadequate such formulation may be, it is invaluable in universalising and perpetuating an experience, otherwise completely unique and personal. The very fact that conceptual expression can render truthfully the nature of religious experience proves that it is not absolutely divorced from religious knowledge, and the mere fact of its inadequacy and imperfection can not be said to prove its inaccessibility into the realm of religious truths.

Further, I believe that both conceptual and religious apprehension fall under the higher category of rational knowledge. Reason is not co-extensive with relational and discriminative understanding, although the latter is included within it. The term 'rational' can not be restricted to merely conceptual or ratiocinative understanding, and what is non-logical may also be rational, although it may be non-relational. We feel justified in such extension of the scope of the term 'reason' in view of the fact that it is not without precedent, and is exemplified in the Platonic use of the term 'Nous'. The recognition of the wider connotation of the term 'reason' is of immense advantage in so far as it enables us to explain the truth-value of religious experience which is otherwise inexplicable. Religious knowledge is, then, rational knowledge; that its claims to truth are undeni-

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able will be evident in course of the discussions that will follow in the next section.

V.

Truth is not the monopoly of discursive reason, or ratiocination, and is not invariably expressed in the forms of judgments or propositions. There are valid modes of knowledge, other than those of conceptual mediation, which defy propositional formulation. Aesthetic, moral, and religious apprehensions are such valid modes of knowledge, and their non-propositional character does not necessarily invalidate them or minimise their truth-claim. The validity of aesthetic and moral experiences was fully recognised by Kant, and there is no reason why religious experience should be debarred from similar recognition. The truth of religious experience is manifest in the moment of direct awareness, and does not depend upon a later logical confirmation, although such confirmation makes it valid to others. It is possible to use either the term 'intuition' or the term 'faith' to designate a mode of apprehension, immediate and non-relational in character, and adequate to the knowledge of facts of religious experience. But whatever term may be used in this connection, it should always be understood as distinct from discursive reason, and never as antithetical to reason and knowledge in a wider sense. Both intuition and faith are rational; only they are freed from certain discriminative and separatist tendencies which characterise discursive intelligence. Intuitive insight is not an unintelligible or a mysterious process, but is a deeper experience in which our intelligence is enriched and amplified. In intuition, reason abandons the piecemeal and fragmentary character of its apprehension, and rises to a vision of its object as a totality which is grasped by a simple act of immediate awareness. It is in this way that the object of religious experience is given to our knowledge. Here the knowledge does not cease to be rational simply because conceptual reason is transcended. Religious intuition or faith possesses the same measure of truth-value as any other experience, if not more. As Bradley says, "There

is nothing more real than what comes in religion. To compare facts such as these with what comes to us in outward existence would be to trifle with the subject. The man who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness knows not what he seeks." (Appearance and Reality, p. 449).

Religious experience is as real as the immediate apprehension of a sensible object; the only difference is that the former experience is infinitely richer, fuller and more perfect than the latter. The mystics, the saints, the religious poets, and, in fact, all truly religious persons testify to the truth of this view. In religious experience they are aware of the immediate and living presence of the Divine Reality, with whom they stand, as it were, face to face, and the sense of reality which such experience creates, is so vivid and compelling that it can be hardly distinguished from any sensible experience, and this is evident from their use of sensuous imageries to describe their experience of the Divine Reality. They seem to feel, see, touch and hear the God of their experience and converse with Him as they would do with their fellow-beings. The poets, in particular, translate their visions into sensible images. Such rendering undeniably proves the real character of their experiences and enables others to intuit, however imperfectly it may be, the glow, warmth and colour which such experiences possess in abundant richness. In moments of religious insight, the consciousness of the living presence of God carries with it an assurance of its reality which is unmistakable, and its value is manifest when it is seen to permeate our whole life and render it full of meaning. Here is such an insight embodied in poetic language:—

I knew. I felt.....

What God is, what we are,

What life is—how God tastes an infinite joy

In infinite ways—one overlasting bliss.

When the vision comes, it is, as I have said, unmistakable, and its cognitive value stands beyond doubt. Any one who has the slightest acquaintance with religious literature and the

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utterances of the prophets and seers embodied therein, will fully realise the truth of my statement.

VI.

In this concluding section, I shall further endeavour to illustrate the truth-value of religious experience by exhibiting its influence upon the life and conduct of persons who claim to possess it. Here the outward expression of an experience, otherwise inaccessible and beyond praise or blame, could be made an object of judgment, and the genuineness or the validity of the inward experience could be determined from its manifestation in external behaviour and conduct.

The criterion commonly employed to distinguish between veridical and illusory perceptions, consists in the fitness of such perceptions with the rest of experience. An illusory perception is rejected because it contradicts other parts of experience, whereas a perception is recognised as true because it coheres with the rest of our knowledge. When a veridical perception thus coheres with the rest of experience, its truth-value manifests itself in a consistent conduct which symbolises a smooth flow of life. Applying the same test of truth to religious experience, we find that its genuineness and validity cannot be doubted. An impartial observation of facts would reveal that a religious person is not constitutionally unfit for the various other occupations of life, such as, social, political, economic, etc. He is not, as is commonly supposed, an un-social being who is interested only in certain esoteric and mysterious experiences inaccessible and incommunicable to ordinary human beings, and is incapable of participating in the wider and larger spheres of social economic and political activities of mankind. Such a notion, is due to a current prejudice which unduly limits religious experience to certain transitory and fleeting moments of illumination, which fail to influence the life as a whole. To religious persons, on the contrary, the moments of illumination, in which they are aware of the divine presence, do not possess merely ephemeral value. They are not absolutely divorced from the rest of

experience; but they are permanent possessions and inform the manifold experiences of their lives. They are conscious in their lives of the abiding presence of God, and such consciousness, in as much as it constitutes the ruling principle of their lives, imparts to them a balance and harmony whereby their lives become transformed and acquire a new meaning. The consciousness of the perpetual presence of God harmonises their entire life.

The life of the religious person attains an order and a harmony of disposition which result in an inward peace and contentment of mind, and it enables its possessor to bear with perfect equanimity the sufferings of life. Having discovered a central principle to order his life, the religious person never fails to use it to interpret whatever falls within his experience, and discerns not only in things trivial, but even in those recognised as positively evil, the rational purpose of the Divine. Vacillation and hesitancy, which bespeak a disordered and sceptical mentality, are far removed from his life, and all doubts and perplexities being resolved, he moves about in the world with a freedom which hardly fails to impress others who become conscious at every step of their own limitations.

Further, the clearness of vision and the perspicuity of judgment which generally accompany an ordered and a balanced mind, are exhibited in an eminent degree in a religious person. He brings in a clarity of vision and a refined sense of judgment to the discernment of the most complex situations of life, and discovers even in its most commonplace occurrences and trivialities the potencies of future promise. These qualities which a religious person possesses, form invaluable assets in his practical life, and give him a distinct advantage over others in dealing with the concrete situations of life. The charge of unpracticality is, therefore, unjustly levelled against him. The disqualification of a religious person for being associated with the active spheres of life is often too exaggerated. The social reformers in all ages have been men of strong religious inclinations, and, conversely, all the great

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Religious prophets of the world have been the greatest social reformers. We may mention the names of Buddha and Christ only among a host of other names. Furthermore, there is no reason why political instinct should be incompatible with the religious insight. It is unintelligible why religious insight should be incongruous with political sagacity, and why a statesman or a king, because he is religious, should be disqualified from discharging in a satisfactory manner the responsibilities of his high office. The greatest of Indian monarchs was Asoka, and his embracing of Buddhism, instead of being a serious obstacle, proved to be of immense value in the wise and just administration of his subjects to which history bears ample testimony. The case of Asoka is a typical one, and similar instances are not wanting which would go to prove that religious equipment of a king or a statesman contributes largely towards a good and judicious administration of justice. This is why we feel the truth of Plato's statement that philosophers should alone be kings, and kings, philosophers. Of course, by the term 'philosophers' he evidently means one who not only possesses the knowledge of the Highest Truth, but has realised it in his life by undergoing a certain discipline and passing through certain stages of culture, and, therefore, the Platonic conception of a philosopher is not very much different from our conception of a religious person.

The above remarks suffice to prove that a religious person is not, after all, incapable of participating in the wider spheres of human life. If what I have said holds true in political and social spheres, I see no reason why it could not be said, with equal justice, to hold good in other spheres of human activities. There is no necessary antagonism between religion on the one hand, and science and wealth on the other. The cultivation of natural science and the study of economics can be legitimate avocations of a religious man. In the domain of art and morality, religion has always held an undisputed sway, and no one has ever questioned the capability of the religious man to be either moral or endowed with aesthetic sense.

From the foregoing considerations the validity of religious experience is evident. According to the test of truth we laid down, the validity of an experience depends upon its coherence with the rest of experience. Religious experience successfully stands this test. However distinctive or personal the nature of such experience may be, it nevertheless harmonises with the rest of human experiences. This is clearly demonstrated in the conduct of religious persons and their share in the various fields of human activities. My analysis of the various features of religious life has revealed its worth ; and the truth-claim of religious experience, in the face of the facts considered in this connection, can not fail to be recognised.

The Sankhya theory of knowledge in relation to some other Eastern and Western Theories.

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It is proposed in the present paper to expound the Sankhya theory of knowledge in detail and incidentally to discuss some of the kindred eastern and western theories by way of comparison and contrast. The enquiry will be confined to the purely philosophical issues and the aim will be to present Sankhya Philosophy in relation to World-Philosophy in respect of its contribution to the Problem of knowledge.

Notable amongst the Hindu theories of cognition besides the Sankhya are the Idealistic theory of the Vedantist and the Realistic theory of the Nyaya Schools. The Purvamimāṃsā realism represents an intermediate position—a sort of half-way house between uncompromising Vedanta Idealism of Pure Thought and the extreme realism of the Nyaya Philosophy. The Sankhya theory is of peculiar interest in this respect. Attempting at a synthesis of the irreducible given with self-pointing, self-revealing thought it combines in itself the weak points both of idealism and realism. But despite these inherent difficulties of its task, it tackles the knowledge-problem with a thoroughness and a conscious perception of the issues involved that will repay serious study even at the present day.

We shall preface our exposition of the Sankhya view with an account of Nyaya and Mimāṃsā theories and incidentally we shall also refer to the Vedanta theory and some of the kindred western theories as throwing light on Sankhya realism proper.

According to the Naiyāyika, cognition is a quality (*guṇa*) of the self as substance (*dravya*), a quality that originates under certain special conditions and has the character of referr-

ing beyond itself. Hence cognition is a non-eternal quality of the self, a quality which the self may be with or without and which appears only as certain special conditions are fulfilled. Cognition according to Nyaya is thus an in-essential attribute of self-substances ; it belongs to self-substances, and self-substances alone, but it does not constitute self-substances nor is otherwise essential to or inseparable from self-substances. As a matter of fact in the state of transcendental freedom (the Moksha state) the self becomes a pure substance (a *Shuddha-dravya*) and becomes free not merely from pleasure, pain and miseries of life (*Samsāra*) but also from all forms of experience including *Jñāna* or cognition. And even in the empirical life there are states of pure unconsciousness when the self becomes a pure substance devoid of all forms of experience. Cognition is not a constituent of the self, nor is it an inseparable attribute of the self as such though in the supreme self (the *Paramātmā*) it abides as an eternal quality, a timeless intuition of all things that are or may be. Cognition thus according to Nyāya is not a relation but a quality and a quality only of self-substances. It is related to the self by the relation of inherence and is not itself a relation but a quality. But as a quality inhering in the self, its nature is to transcend itself, to refer beyond itself, to reveal something other than itself. Thus cognition does not cognise itself but something different from itself ; it reveals the *vishaya* or object and not itself. It is related to the *vishaya* or object by the relation of *vishayatā*,—the relation of objectifying or making an object of it. Thus it is subject to a twofold relation : It is related to the self by the relation of *Samavāya* or inherence and it is related to the object by the relation of objectifying (*vishayatā*). The Nyaya view of cognition furnishes a contrast in this respect to that of the Rāmānujists who also conceive cognition to be an attribute of the self as substance. The Rāmānujists are idealists and regard intelligence as an essential quality of the self. (Cf. Shribhāshya, English Tr., 1,1,1.) “Nor can it be said”, says Rāmānuja “that this ‘I’, the knowing subject, is dependent for its light

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on something else. It rather is self-luminous ; for to be self-luminous means to have consciousness for one's essential nature. ...Analogously to the lamp, the self is essentially intelligent (kid-rupa), and has intelligence (kaitanya) for its quality. And to be essentially intelligent means to be self-luminous." (Ved. Sut., Eng. Tr. 1,1,1, pp. 58-60). The conception of intelligence being essential to the self is however repugnant to the Naiyāyika realist according to whom reality is wider than thought, the latter being no more than an accident, an ephemeral quality or function of a section or part of reality. Ramanujists contend that since the Absolute is an Omnipersonality i.e. an Inclusive Self or Atman of which intelligence is an essential quality, reality is essentially intelligent or self-revealing. But Naiyāyikas reject this idealistic conception of intelligence as constitutive of reality. Thought does not constitute reality, it is not even a constitutive or essential character of the self whose quality it is. As a matter of fact, there are states, both empirical and transcendental, in which the self lapses into pure unconsciousness, into the non-intelligent Being of a free self-substance. Naiyāyikas also repudiate the Ramanujist conception of intelligence as *svayamprakāsha* or self-revealing. Ramanujists hold that intelligence or consciousness is self-revealing in the sense that it reveals itself to its own substrate by means of its own activity. A stone, e.g., is not self-revealing as it does not reveal itself to its own substrate: it has being-for-another, no being-for-self. Not so however intelligence or consciousness. It reveals itself to its own substrate by its own being: it has being-for-self in and through itself at the time of its appearance. Thus a past state may be revealed to its substrate, the self, by another state, but is not so revealed either by itself or at the time of its occurrence. There is no consciousness without object, but this by itself does not deprive it of *svayamprakāshatva* in the above sense of being revealed to its substrate, the self, through its own being. Says the "Shribhāshya", "The essential nature of consciousness—or knowledge—consists therein that it shines

forth, or manifests itself, through its own being to its own substrate at the present moment". (Thibaut's Tr., p. 48). And it adds, "that knowledge is of the nature of light depends altogether on its connexion with the knowing 'I': it is due to the latter, that knowledge, like pleasure, manifests itself to that conscious person who is its substrate, and not to anybody else." Again (p. 63), "as the knowing self is eternal, knowledge which is an essential quality of the self is also eternal. Consciousness besides is an essential, and therefore eternal, quality of the self which is itself eternal, but knowledge "in itself unlimited, is capable of contraction and expansion.....In the so-called kshetragna-condition of the self, knowledge is, owing to the influence of work (karman), of a contracted nature, as it more or less adapts itself to the work of different kinds, and is variously determined by the different senses. With reference to this various flow of knowledge as due to the senses, it is spoken of as rising and setting" (p. 63). Thus according to Ramanujists knowing supposes both the knowing subject and an object known. And the knowing reveals both itself and the object to its substrate, the knowing self or subject. Further it reveals the object as *jada* or non-intelligent datum while it reveals itself as *ajada* i. e., as intelligent cognition of the non-intelligent datum. But it does not reveal itself to itself but only to its own substrate, the knowing subject or self which is also intelligent as knowing self as distinguished from the non-intelligent datum known. And further, according to them, knowledge owes its character of self-revelation-to-its-substrate to its connection with the latter: it is owing to connexion with the self-revealing knower which reveals itself to itself that knowledge reveals itself to its substrate. The knower would not be knower without knowing itself as a knower of objects known, and the knower would not know itself as such without intelligence. Intelligence is thus an essential quality of the self and is, like the self, eternal. The Naiyāyikas agree with the Ramanujists only up to a certain point. Cognition is a quality of the self, but not, as Rāmanujists think, an

essential and eternal quality of it. Nor does it necessarily reveal itself to its substrate in revealing an object different from itself. It reveals itself only in a secondary act of retrospection, and even then it reveals itself as an object known and not as subjective knowing. It is thus not generically distinct from other qualities as intelligent knowing (*ajāda*) from non-intelligent data known as Rāmānujists think. On the contrary it is generically of the same nature as other qualities; it is objective like the rest of qualities, only specifically differing from them as revealing objects and qualifying the particular set of substances called self-substances. Rāmānujists distinguish between intelligence as an essential, eternal quality of the self and the temporal-spatial limitations of intelligence in the self in its *kṣetragna*-condition. But no such essential eternal intelligence in the self as knower is admitted by the Naiyāyika realist according to whom cognition does not constitute, but only reveals reality. Further, as we have seen above, Naiyāyikas admit non-intelligent conditions of the self, states of suspended intelligence or consciousness, when the self becomes free from the trammels of experience. Against this Naiyāyika view however it is urged by the opponent that such existence without consciousness is not removed very far from dead materiality. Nyaya realism is therefore no better than Charvaka materialism. The Naiyāyika meets this objection by distinguishing between the self as spiritual substance and the atoms and their compounds which are material substances. But since the Naiyāyika can justify this distinction of substances only by a differentiation of their respective functions, cognition as a function of the self-substances must be allowed to constitute its proper substrate. This however the Naiyāyika as a realist is not prepared to admit.

Shankara-Vedantism is the antithesis in this respect to Nyaya realism. The Naiyāyika makes cognition dependent on reality: cognition does not make reality, it only reveals it. The Shankara-Vedantist, on the contrary, resolves reality to cognition, to the illumination of reality. Take away illumina-

tion, and reality is engulfed in darkness, in a blank void. Reality is illumination of reality; being is *prakāsha* of being—or rather being is nothing but *prakāsha* which is the light that reveals. Reality as a pure datum, reality as object of cognition and therefore as other of cognition, is an illusory fiction, an unreal projection of *māyā* (which is the principle of Cosmic Hallucination). The Self as knower is pure light of consciousness. The self as knowing subject distinct from pure consciousness, the Self as a being that illumines as distinct from illumination as such is an unsubstantial fiction, an illusory projection of nescience. Reality is illumination and the Self is real only as pure self-luminous light. Self as anything else than the light that reveals, self as substance or subject or being distinct from pure consciousness, is the other of reality and therefore unreality or illusory appearance. Nothing therefore is real except Pure Intelligence, undifferentiated self-shining Thought. The object of thought as the other of thought is self-contradictory and therefore indescribable. The subject likewise as distinct from thought as such is indescribable and inconceivable. What reveals itself in all thought is pure self-positing self-revealing thought. The world is the play of free self-positing Thought; it is the free Intelligence objectifying itself as a system of causally-linked appearances.

The Naiyāyika however repudiates the Shankara-Vedantist equation of thought and reality. The so-called identity of being and thought is according to him an idealistic delusion which the commonsense practical world of facts, does not substantiate. The world of practice is based according to the Naiyāyikas on an essential distinction between thought and reality, between cognition and the object it reveals. Thought is neither reality nor coextensive with reality as one of its essential or inseparable aspects. It is an ephemeral quality or attribute of the self, an attribute that is generated under peculiar conditions. The self becomes conscious only when there is a special relation of contact between the self and the mind and between the mind and a particular

cogitable content. Thought therefore is a function not of substances in general but only of self-substances or souls and of these only as certain peculiar conditions are fulfilled. It is a matter of common experience that this is so, and experience proves it as conclusively as it disproves the Vedanta equation of reality to pure thought. Thought thus is thought of reality and is not itself reality. It is the very nature of thought to point beyond itself, to refer to that which is not itself. Without the *vishaya*, the external object to think of, thought is an unreal abstraction. Thought thus always looks beyond itself, refers to an object different from itself. Its nature as a quality of the self is to reveal not itself, but an object as the other of itself. Thought thus does not think itself, but only the object which is not itself. In this way subjective thought transcends itself and comprehends the external, transcendent object.

How, then does thought know itself? Or does it never know itself? If thought knows only the object it thinks, is it anything entitatively different from its object? Is it other than the object or just the object thought? If thought is the object thought, how does the object thought differ from the object-in-itself? If thought is not itself the object, if thought is thought *of* or thought *about* the object, how does it differ *as thought* from the object of which it is a thought? Further how does the object-in-itself differ from the object thought of? What, in other words, does the object gain by being revealed to, or apprehended by, thought? The Naiyāyika answers these questions from the realistic standpoint. Thought is neither the object nor a phase or aspect of the object thought. Thought is thought *of* or thought *about* reality. All the same, thought does not think itself, but only an other of itself, a *vishaya* or object from which it is distinguished as *vishayin* or thought of the object. The very nature of thought as *vishayin* is to comprehend not itself but an object other than itself as *vishaya*. Thought therefore is the subjective activity of apprehending an object as an object. To know it in its distinctive character of a subjective cognitive act it must itself

be made the object of a secondary retrospective act. In other words the primary act of apprehension of the object must itself be apprehended in a secondary act of retrospection. Introspection therefore is retrospection : it is only the holding of the primary knowing act as an object to a secondary cognition. In this way we know thought as subjective apprehension (*vishayin*) of an object (*vishaya*) which it apprehends but does not constitute. It follows that thought adds nothing to the object. The object-in-itself gains nothing in the process of being an object thought. The new relation to an apprehending knowing act (*vishayin*) makes no difference to the *vishaya* or object. The Naiyāyikas repudiate the Bhāṭṭa conception (the Bhāṭṭas are followers of Kumarila Bhatta, a Mimamsaka Philosopher) of an apprehendedness (*Jñātatā*) accruing to the object in consequence of its being known. The assumption of an *apprehendedness* being generated in the object in consequence of its being subjectively cognised in a cognitive act will make the cognition of the past and the future impossible. The past is no more and the future is not yet. They are thus alike non-existent. If therefore the cognition of the past or the future object should generate in either a new property of apprehendedness, even the non-existent must be supposed to acquire new properties as existent positive characters. But this is clearly absurd. Therefore there is no such thing as an apprehendedness generated in the object in the process of being known. The object-in-itself is only the object out of relation to the knowing act. The object known is the object (*vishaya*) of the subjective apprehension (*vishayin*).

The Nyaya view of cognition as revealing not itself but the object is opposed to the doctrine of cognition as self-luminous, a doctrine which is common to the Prābhākara Mimāṃsā, the Sankhya and the Shankara-Vedanta Schools. The doctrine that cognition reveals only that which is not itself is according to the Naiyāyika a necessary implication of the realism that accords only a secondary place to cognition in the order of being. The Prābhākara here joins issue with the Naiyā-

yika and contends that realism does not necessarily commit one to any such view about the nature of cognition. In fact, the immediate evidence of consciousness establishes not merely a cognition of an other but also a simultaneous cognition of the cognition, an awareness of the awareness. An act of cognition may be said to be self-luminous in this sense. It points not merely to an object beyond itself but also, and in the same act, turns towards itself, apprehends itself as apprehending a beyond or other of itself. The Prābhākara develops this doctrine in connection with its particular theory of triune perception (*triputisamvitpratyaksha*) which he opposes to the Nyaya theory. According to him, an act of perception is at once an awareness of the object perceived, of the subjective perceptive act and of the subject perceiving. The object is perceived as the apprehended, the act as subjective apprehension and the subject as the apprehending or cognising agent. Each thus is apprehended in its own proper form, the object as the apprehended, the act as subjective apprehension, and the subject as the apprehender or cogniser. The Naiyāyika, according to the Prābhākara, has allowed his realism to impugn the immediate evidence of consciousness. The realistic doctrine of cognition does not require a denial of the self-illumination of consciousness. Consciousness may know itself without forfeiting thereby its capacity to know simultaneously an external, transcendent object.

The Nyaya and Prābhākara-mimāṃsā views are the parallels in this respect to the doctrine of some of the European realists of the present day. The Nyaya view of cognition as looking beyond itself has its echo in contemporary thought in John Laird's realistic theory of cognition. In his contribution to the "Contemporary British Philosophers Series", Prof. Laird, in expounding his theory of cognition, observes, "Our cognitive processes are, in their usual exercise, the processes *with* which (not *at* which) we look; and none of them, perhaps, can look at itself. It does not follow, however, that *another* (introspective) look cannot be directed towards, this process of

looking.....Even 'awareness of awareness,' then, is not impossible, and this conclusion is consoling, since if anything seems to occur, introspection does. What is there except observation to acquaint us with the difference between pleasure and pain, or between belief and repugnance." Prof. Laird, like the Indian Naiyāyika, thus holds to the conception of cognition as essentially self-transcendent, as always looking beyond itself. He repudiates the Bergsonian intuition of a neutral experience-flux wherein knowing coincides with the object known. The knowing act, according to him, necessarily points beyond itself to an other, to an object different from itself. The dualism of knowing and known cannot be resolved in a monistic experience-flux with which one may be said to be intuitively at one in the subliminal, infra-intellectual processes of life. The distinction between cognition and its object is no pragmatic fiction born of practical need; it is essential to the very nature of cognition, an integral part of its make-up as subjective apprehension of an object different from itself. Hence we cannot be aware of our awareness in one and the same specious present. We can be aware of it only in retrospection, i. e., in a secondary cognitive act which makes the primary act the object of its observation. Cognition therefore cannot be itself cognised except in a numerically distinct cognitive act enduring in a separate specious present. This, as we have seen, is also the Nyaya view. The Naiyāyika, as a consistent realist, objectifies the subjective cognition just as Prof. Laird does. Cognition can be cognised, but only as an object, as a datum presented to a secondary cognition. The Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā as we have seen joins issue here with Nyaya. Knowing cannot be unaware of itself in the act of being aware of the object. Therefore there is no cognition of an object which is not also a cognition of the cognition. But the essential distinction of knowing and known is not annulled thereby. Knowing knows itself as knowing (*samvit*), not as the known (*samvedya*). We do not know knowing as the known just as we do not know the object as subjective know-

ing. The Prābhākara distinction of the two kinds of knowing corresponds closely to Prof. S. Alexander's distinction of *enjoyed* and *contemplated* knowing. Like the Prābhākara Mimāṃsaka Prof. Alexander holds to an awareness of awareness accompanying every act of awareness of an object—an *enjoyed* awareness which goes with every awareness of an object contemplated. There is however in the Prābhākara conception of *self-illumination* an emphasis on the aspect of revelation in intelligence which we miss in Prof. Alexander's concept of enjoyment. Enjoyment is an inner sympathy, a one-ness in feeling as distinguished from contemplation from without. It thus does not import self-revelation in the Prābhākara sense of realisation in intelligence.

When the Prābhākara speaks of a cognition of cognition as being involved in every act of cognition of an act, he does not mean any logical mediation of subject-cognition and object-cognition. The triune character of cognition is, according to the Prābhākara, only a brute datum, a given fact of experience which we must accept at its face-value. The standpoint of the Prābhākara is empirical and *a posteriori*. We have to remain satisfied, according to him, with the given togetherness of the three different awareness in every single act of cognition. Beyond the bare togetherness we cannot go. We cannot say whether there is mutual logical implication besides the brute conjunction. It remains true at least, the Prābhākara argues, that the cogniser is not a self-luminous subject as is his cognition. As a matter of fact, the cogniser has states of unconsciousness in which it remains steeped in darkness. The same is true of the object cognised. The object is not the cognition of the object and may very well be without being cognised at all. The inseparability therefore is not an inseparability of the subject, the object and the cognition of the latter by the former. It is merely an inseparability of the subject-cognition, the cognition of the cognition and the object-cognition—the given togetherness of every cognition of an object with a cognition of the cognition and cognition of the cogniser. And this

inseparability is a brute conjunction which proves nothing as to any mutual logical implication.

The Naiyāyika and the Prābhākara agree in respect of their methods of approach. Both appeal to introspective evidence, to the immediate deliverance of consciousness, though they differ in their respective accounts of what consciousness really delivers. Cognition, according to both, is therefore to be taken at its face-value : it is what it presents itself as in actual experience. The realism of the Sankhya stands contrasted in this respect with Nyaya and Prābhākara realism. The Naiyāyika and the Prābhākara arrive at realism on the way of psychology through analysis of the actual report of consciousness. Cognition, according to them, does not present itself except as dependent on and therefore externally related to the *cognitum*, to a transcendent external object. The very nature of cognition as revealed to introspective analysis thus points to an independent reality-in-itself. This is how, according to them, we are assured of independent realistic objects-in-themselves. The Sankhya however follows a different method. From experience as given it argues to the not-given presuppositions of experience. Its method is thus metapsychological and transcendental as distinguished from the psychological methods of Nyaya and Prābhākara-Mimāṃsā. Cognition, according to Sankhya, can be understood fully only by going beyond and behind it to its transcendental presuppositions, its antecedent generative conditions. Empirical cognition, cognition as a mental event in time is a compound—a composite psychic process that results from the illumination of the Primal Matter which is Prakṛti as a pure datum, by the Transcendental subject which is Purusha as pure light of consciousness. Cognition as a temporal event is thus a transformation of Prakṛti resulting from Purusha's illumination of the latter. It is the pure intelligence imprisoned as it were in a temporal mode of Prakṛti as empirical psychic process or mind-stuff referring beyond itself to corresponding matter-stuff. The correspondence and objective reference to the mental content points,

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according to Sankhya, to a neutral matter of experience from which both the mental and the non-mental arise. This neutral experience-stuff is *Buddhi* which is a transformation of *Prakṛti*, the indeterminate transcendental object. This neutral experience-stuff or *Buddhi* is not given in experience: it is presupposed in experience and can be reached only by criticism and transcendental analysis. It may be presented also in a special intuition (cf. *Pātañjala Sankhya*) but cannot be given in our practical, relational experience. But even *Buddhi* does not explain experience fully: a neutral experience-matter differentiating into conscious mind-stuff and intelligible matter-stuff implies a union of intelligence as self-revealing light and a non-intelligent datum as that which gets revealed by self-revealing intelligence. Hence as the preconditions of a world of experience we must assume two ultimate metempirical principles—*Purusha*, the Transcendental Subject and *Prakṛti*, the Transcendental Objective Background. *Purusha* is the self-luminous Intelligence that lights up experience—the light of Consciousness in which objects reveal themselves as significant contents of experience. *Prakṛti* is that which gets revealed by *Purusha* into a concrete world of experience—the indeterminate Object-in-itself in which things as objects of experience materialise and dematerialise in the light of Pure Intelligence which is *Purusha*.

Neither *Purusha* nor *Prakṛti* are objects of experience. They are the Transcendental Presuppositions of experience as a world of significant objects, the antecedent generative conditions of a world of experience. Hence they are not themselves experienced facts, at least in the customary meaning of experience as the equivalent of our normal, practical consciousness of a world of objects subject to the relations of space, time and causality (cf. *Savichāra prajñā* which means cognition of objects as space-time-and-causality-determined—*desha-kāla-nimittāvachchhinna*). They are the not-given presuppositions of experience which we discover by analysis and criticism. The method of the *Sankhya* in this respect has a close

family likeness to Kant's transcendental, critical method : from experience as the given it works back to its not-given pre-suppositions. But in one aspect of it the Sankhya method is removed from the Kantian critical standpoint. Kant will not allow a positive knowledge of the Transcendental principles that make experience possible. Any assumption of a positive knowledge of these is inconsistent with the critical standpoint proper and implies a capacity of non-sensuous intuition which we do not possess. We have thus only a negative knowledge of these transcendental principles: We know them only as not given in experience, we do not know them in themselves except as an unknowable X. Sankhya however goes farther than Kant. Repudiating relational sensuous experience of these noumenal principles, Sankhya yet claims for them an infra-empirical, metapsychological intuition in Yogika realisation—an intuition which is free from the forms and relations of normal, empirical consciousness. We have thus not merely a negative knowledge of these transcendental principles, we have also a positive knowledge of these in non-relational, non-sensuous intuition below the level of our normal, relational experience of things through sense-given data.

The Sankhya conception of a non-relational, non-empirical intuition is an essential part of its theory of knowing as an empirical, temporal event. Empirical knowing according to Sankhya is a composite effect, a transformation of Prakṛti shining by the light of Puruṣa which is Pure Intelligence. But the given union of Prakṛti-Puruṣa in experience does not affect either their logical contrariety of nature or their ontological independence and disjunction of essence. In fact, Yogika intuition is a realisation of this essential disjunction and separation despite their actual commingling in experience—a de-realisation of the empirical connection involved in the realisation of their essential detachment and logical opposition. Empirical knowing, according to Sankhya, is thus rooted in an original unreason. Involving as it does a union of logically opposed and distinct principles, it points to a beginningless

non-discrimination (*aviveka*) at the source of the beginningless chain of experience which we call *samsāra*. It is this beginningless unreason that leads through *sānnidhya* or bare togetherness of Prakṛti and Purusha to that closer union (*samyoga*) which brings on a world of experience. *Sānnidhya* is a bare relation of presence which by itself does not explain the closer connection of Prakṛti-Purusha in experience. That connection involves a deeper unreason underlying it, a beginningless *aviveka* that causes Purusha's attachment to Prakṛti effecting the latter's transformation into a beginningless world of experience. Experience thus is grounded in unreason: aiming at the inherently impossible task of a complete resolution of the unrelated manifold to the pure unity of thought, of the indeterminate, non-intelligent Prakṛti to the significant unity of intelligence, it is destined for ever to move from form to form in ceaseless flow. And the Sankhya thus posits, as the highest ideal, the consummation of the true freedom of Intelligence by a snapping of the cord that binds it in unholy union with Prakṛti. It is unreason, the original beginningless non-discrimination that starts the process of experience. To negate the unreason by true reason, to remove non-discrimination by the realisation of Purusha's essential detachment from Prakṛti is to strike at the root of experience and reverse the whole process. This is the way to realise freedom, to restore Purusha to its original purity as free self-revealing Intelligence. Experience is a transformation of the indeterminate Prakṛti, a transformation that results from Purusha's illumination of Prakṛti. Hence experience entails Purusha's bondage—the imprisonment of the pure intelligence in blind, non-intelligent matter. It is Purusha's light that accomplishes the indeterminate Prakṛti into a world of experience. The union of Purusha and Prakṛti in experience is however incomplete and artificial. The formless Prakṛti, the indeterminate given manifold cannot be completely transformed into the free unity of thought. Nor can the self-revealing intelligence truly find itself in the shifting forms of non-intelligent Prakṛti. The

given, the merely real, in other words, cannot be completely resolved into pure self-revealing truth. Intelligence is pure self-revealing truth, and given reality cannot be merged into pure truth without a remainder. Hence arise the contradictions of experience, the miseries and sorrows of life, the disappointments and baffled hopes that darken mundane existence. Rooted in unreason it can produce only irrational longings, futile hopes, desires that can never attain their objects. To negate experience by negating the basal unreason is to recover Purusha's lost status as eternally self-accomplished Intelligence, to be free from the dominion of matter, to conquer material hunger.

The Sankhya theory of knowledge, it will be seen, rests on a distinction between Pure Intelligence and empirical knowing. Purusha is Pure Intelligence, eternally self-revealing light of consciousness. As the light that reveals experience, it is itself eternally self-revealing. As the Intelligence that accomplishes non-intelligent Prakṛti into a world of intelligible objects, it is eternally self-accomplished Intelligence. Purusha is thus the eternally self-accomplished truth that shines forth in experience, the self-positing, self-revealing Intelligence that reveals all things. Pure Intelligence reflecting itself into Prakṛti effects the so-called empirical cognitions of our temporal lives. An empirical cognition is a temporal mode of Prakṛti shining by the light of Pure Intelligence which is timeless and eternal. Empirical cognitions appear and disappear in temporal succession in accordance with causal laws and in relation to their respective objects. Pure Intelligence is unaffected by the process: it does not become with the becoming of its temporal ectypes. The eternally self-accomplished Intelligence is not itself accomplished in the history of a world which it itself causes to appear. There is thus according to Sankhya cognition not merely as a temporal event with a concrete empirical mould conformally to the shape of a corresponding empirical object, but also, and as the presupposition of the temporal knowing act, pure timeless Intelligence as that which illumines

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both itself and its temporal unfolding in experience. Purusha is this timeless Intelligence. As accomplisher of all things, it is accomplished in itself independently of Prakṛti. It is thus unlike its temporal ectype not merely as timeless and eternal but also as free self-accomplished truth. Empirical cognition is object-mediated cognition and is true only as corresponding in nature and form to the essence of the object. Not so Pure Intelligence which is the presupposition of empirical cognition. As accomplishing Prakṛti it is inherently self-accomplished, self-revealing light. It is thus eternally true in itself independently of the mediation of Prakṛti. Hence it is contradictorily related to its temporal duplicate. The latter requires the mediation of an object both in being and in being made valid or true. But Pure Intelligence is self-positing, self-validating truth and does not require the mediation of an other.

As transcendental presuppositions of experience, Sankhya thus posits Purusha as free self-shining Intelligence and Prakṛti as the indeterminate primal matter revealed by Intelligence. The parallelism here with the main results of the Kantian *Critique* are too obvious to deserve special notice. But despite the close parallelism there are important differences that must not be overlooked in a comparative estimate of the two systems. In Sankhya c. f. we have nothing corresponding to the agnostic conclusions of the Kantian *Critique*. Sankhya does not confess to a bankruptcy of the reason in its application to the transcendental principles, to a final despair of knowledge in respect of the ultimate presuppositions of experience. Purusha c. f. is not known merely as the logical implicate of our experience of a world of objects. It is also cognised as its ontological prius in non-relational, metapsychological intuition. Nor is Prakṛti shut out from knowledge by an unsurmountable barrier as are the Kantian things-in-themselves. A rational world of experience is Prakṛti affiliating itself, as it were, to the free, self-positing Intelligence. Through its affiliation to the self-revealing Intelligence, the non-intelli-

gent Prakṛti, the brute datum, becomes an intelligible world of experience. The ordered world, in other words, is the indeterminate manifold reflecting into itself the unity of pure thought, the blind Prakṛti shining by the light of Puruṣa's Intelligence. The givenness of experience as a relational system points, according to Sankhya, to an original affiliation of the given plurality to the not given unity of pure truth, a beginningless illumination of Prakṛti by Puruṣa. Prakṛti-in-itself, Prakṛti without relation to Puruṣa's Illumination is an unrelated manifold, an indeterminate plurality. Prakṛti as a determinate world is the indeterminate manifold affiliating itself to the self-determination of pure reason, to the self-accomplished light of Intelligence. The becoming of Prakṛti, the transformation of the indefinitely given manifold into the definitely given order of a significant world is no phenomenal appearance separating Prakṛti-in-itself from Prakṛti-in-experience by an unbridgeable gulf. The transformation is a real transformation of Prakṛti, an ontological becoming of the given plurality into the unity-in-plurality of an empirical world. It is out of the indeterminate, formless Prakṛti that Puruṣa calls forth a world of experience. Worlds are thus made and unmade in Prakṛti; they are the diverse manifestations of Prakṛti in relation to Puruṣa. They are not appearances, distorted reflections of Prakṛti in Puruṣa's Intelligence. Neither are they the projections of the free Intelligence, fictitious creations of self-shining self-positing thought. *Sankhya Parināma-vāda* as a doctrine of cosmic evolution is a repudiation not merely of monistic Vedānta Idealism but also of the Kantian dualism of phenomena and noumena. The manifested world, according to Sankhya, is a transformation of the primal matter and is held within the bosom of the latter. The dualism of appearance and reality, of a known world of phenomena and an unknowable noumenal reality that escapes phenomenal determination, is not admitted by the Sankhya. While agreeing with Kant in the main about the fundamental presuppositions of experience and their logical opposition,

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Sankhya yet allows a total transformation of Prakṛti as a consequence of its illumination by Puruṣa. The judgment of experience is thus according to Sankhya a predication of the given reality. The real subject of our causal, temporal and spatial judgments is Prakṛti manifesting itself in experience, the definitely given world as consubstantial with and held within the indefinitely given manifold. The judgment of experience, according to Kant, has valid application only in the domain of phenomena. The subject of the empirical judgment is, according to him, the phenomenal world which is only the appearance of the noumenal object to the antecedent generative conditions of knowledge. The forms of phenomena supply no clue to a valid knowledge of their noumenal antecedents. The categories, Kant tells us, cannot be employed except in reference to sense-intuited data. "(In the absence of sensibility) their whole employment, and indeed all their meaning ceases." Therefore we cannot claim to have a knowledge of noumena except only in a negative sense. A knowledge of them in the positive sense, a knowledge of noumena as objects of a positive non-sensuous intuition would require a faculty of non-sensuous intuition which we do not possess. Noumena, according to Kant, can therefore be known only negatively as mere limiting concepts, i.e., as what cannot be objects of a sensuous intuition and therefore cannot possibly be the subjects of our empirical judgments involving the application of the categories to sense-intuited data. They cannot be known positively as objects of a non-sensuous intuition for such intuition we do not have. Kant thus is led to insist on the existence of noumenal principles while yet denying all experience of them through the application of the categories to sense-given data. He fails to show however how if things-in-themselves must be postulated as existing, they can yet be beyond the reach of the categories which include the categories of existence and reality. The Sankhya theory however is free from these inherent inconsistencies of the Kantian phenomenalism. Phenomena, according to Sankhya,

are the noumenal realities shining by the light of Intelligence. The phenomenal world is thus the noumenal Prakṛti, transformed into a system of intelligible objects. The metamorphosis, the transformation which results from Purusha's illumination of Prakṛti, entails no absolute dualism of the manifested world and its generative antecedent. The world evolves in Prakṛti and is ontologically non-distinct from it. As its antecedent generative conditions it presupposes not merely Purusha's Illumination but also the primal formless Prakṛti of which it is a transformation. It is through Purusha's Illumination that the indeterminate formless Prakṛti becomes determined as a world of forms.

The Sankhya theory of cosmogenesis thus answers more nearly to the Aristotelian dualism of God and world than to the Kantian distinction of appearance and unknowable things-in-themselves. The world is a transformation of an original, primal stuff—a passage of potentiality to actuality or form. The transformation, the transition of potentiality to actuality presupposes a *materia prima*, a formless primal matter viz., Prakṛti which comes to form in the process. But the temporal unfolding of Prakṛti presupposes a timeless final cause, an unmoved mover. Purusha is this unmoved mover, the final cause that imparts meaning to the process and makes it empirically significant. And yet the free Purusha remains ontologically distinct from Prakṛti. It is Prakṛti that moves, unfolds itself in time. Purusha as self-revealing Intelligence reveals, accomplishes Prakṛti as a world of objects. It is not itself enriched in the process, i.e. accomplished in the accomplishment of Prakṛti into a world of experience. To accomplish experience it must itself be eternally self-accomplished. Hence Purusha is timeless, self-revealing, self-accomplished truth. Prakṛti is the given manifold temporally accomplishing itself in experience. Purusha is eternally free Intelligence. Prakṛti is the non-intelligent datum, the given indefinite that gets defined into a significant world through Purusha's illumination. Purusha is thus the logical opposite of Prakṛti.

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Being its logical opposite it is also ontologically distinct from the latter. Both Purusha and Prakṛti are presupposed in experience. Experience is not a self-explaining, self-justifying whole. It is a temporal process that points beyond itself to a non-empirical unity and an equally non-empirical diversity or plurality. The bare plurality is not by itself significant even as a plurality: as an unrelated plurality, a pure manifold, it is indeterminate and formless. It is only through the unity of Intelligence that the formless manifold becomes a significant plurality, a related system of objects of experience. The becoming is a becoming of the plurality, the bare plurality becoming a unity-in-plurality by self affiliation to the Unitary Intelligence. The becoming conceived as a becoming of the timeless Intelligence would render time itself meaningless and illusory. That experience involves the irreducible, the irrational surd that cannot be logically resolved into pure thought is what the Sankhya stresses in its conception of Prakṛti as the formless objective background. The concept of Prakṛti is, according to Sankhya, a conceptual formulation of the given indefinite, of the logically irreducible. It is presupposed in experience as a synthesis of *given* distincts, as the unifying of irreducibles. But the unity, the synthesis is not given in the plurality: it is the not-given unity of the pure Intelligence reflecting itself into the manifold that makes it into a unity-in-plurality, into the determinate plurality of an empirical world. Hence experience is a transformation of the given plurality, a transformation which is mediated by the not-given unity of pure Intelligence. The Sankhya here agrees with Kant in the main outlines of his teaching in the Critique of Pure Reason. But the Sankhya, repudiates Kant's dualism of phenomena and noumena approaching in this respect the Aristotelian conception of a monistic becoming of an original primal matter. The Sankhya theory in fact is metaphysics and epistemology in one, a theory of cosmogenesis which is also an account of the genesis of experience. The different stages of the becoming of Prakṛti represent, according to

Sankhya, the successive stages of a world coming into being. They are thus the generative antecedents of a cosmos and our experience of it, the stages of the transition of Prakṛti from metempirical formlessness to the form of a world of experience. The becoming of Prakṛti is thus a real, ontological becoming which also may be said to be the becoming of experience. It is not a becoming in experience, mere phenomenal becoming as Kant would say, it is the becoming of Prakṛti itself, Prakṛti's descent into empiricity and manifestation. Nor are the noumenal presuppositions of an empirical world beyond our reach as Kant contends. They are objects of a metapsychological, metempirical intuition even if they be inaccessible to the relational sense-determined intuitions of the empirical life. We have thus a positive realisation of them in Yogika vision besides a negative knowledge of them as limiting concepts. Yoga is the ascending movement of Prakṛti corresponding to its descending movement into empiricity. It is Prakṛti dematerialising itself into initial formlessness, the empirical individual and his world dissolving back into the transcendental, noumenal background. Yogika realisation is thus both positive and negative. It is a realisation of the transcendental principles of experience by the transcending of experience, the resolution of it into its original preconditions. It is, in fact, both objective and subjective, cosmic and individual. It is the world melting back into its original formlessness in the experience of an individual, experience negating itself, as it were, into its transcendental presuppositions. It thus culminates in a positive non-empirical intuition, a realisation of the transcendental principles together with a corresponding derealisation of their empirical transformations. A positive knowledge of noumena, according to Kant, is a Transcendental Illusion. A positive realisation of them, according to Sankhya, is no illusory fiction, but actually within the reach of Yoga.

Even the Sankhya however admits a Transcendental Illusion of the Unity of Intelligence—an illusory realisation of the empirical unity of the primal manifold as the fulfilment

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of the Transcendental Unity which reflects itself into it. This is e. g. the idea that underlies Vijnānabhikṣu's conception of a double reflection and *pratibimbasvarupabhoga* i.e. of *bhoga* or experience as a reflection of the manifested Prakṛti back into the unity of Puruṣa. (C. f. Pravachanabhashya I, 87). Vijnānabhikṣu urges this against the rival commentator Vāchaspati Miśra who will not allow this double reflection of Puruṣa into Prakṛti and of Prakṛti back into Puruṣa. Vijnānabhikṣu contends that experience as a unity-in-plurality becomes intelligible only as Puruṣa's realisation of its reflected unity in the given plurality of Prakṛti. This realisation is the true meaning of *bhoga* or experience. *Bhoga* is *Jñān* or knowledge and knowledge is realisation in Intelligence. Hence experience or *bhoga* involves Transcendental realisation in Puruṣa's Intelligence. And yet timeless Intelligence as the logical presupposition of temporal becoming cannot itself become in time in the strict sense. Hence we can speak only of an illusory realisation in the Transcendental Intelligence, an illusion of *bhoga* or fulfilment which does not entail Puruṣa's actual accomplishment in time. *Bhoga* is an illusory fruition in Puruṣa, an hallucination of *bhoga* involving an element of projection as in an echo (*pratidhvani*) or reflection, is in other words, a necessary implication of Prakṛti in evolution and transformation. It is this illusion of *bhoga* or realisation in Intelligence that gives meaning to the empirical unity of Prakṛti as an accomplished fact. To be sure, Vijnānabhikṣu argues, there are the Naiyāyikas who would repudiate an experience of experience, a knowing of knowing. Knowing, according to these Naiyāyikas, is a knowing of an object. Cognition is essentially self-transcendent and thinking regarded as a thinking of thinking, i.e., as a thinking of the subjective activity of defining out an object to itself, is an absurdity. Even the Naiyāyika however, Vijnānabhikṣu points out, indirectly confesses to a common form of knowing thereby admitting a knowing of knowing as different from the objects known. How otherwise can the Naiyāyika account for the

practice of designating widely different knowing acts (such as the knowing of a jar and the knowing of a piece of cloth) as instances of knowing? The Naiyāyika has thus to admit not merely a common form of knowing but also a knowledge of this common essence of the different knowing acts. Hence an experience of experience, a transcendental illusion of an empirical world in Purusha's Intelligence, is neither impossible nor absurd. It is, in fact, a necessary implication of experience as a transformation of the primal manifold through the reflected unity of the Pure Intelligence. Purusha's *bhoga*, in other words, is the last term in the process, that in which experience culminates as a significant temporal process in Prakṛti. But it is only *pratibimbavarupabhoga*, a transcendental illusion of fruition which cannot really affect the eternally self-accomplished spirit.

The conception of the Transcendental Purusha as many and as inducing a pluralistic transformation of Prakṛti into many different worlds in relation to the many Purushas is also another cardinal point of the Sankhya doctrine of knowledge which marks it off from Kant's theory. Kant never tires of emphasising the essential difference between the phenomenalism of his Critical Philosophy and the subjectivism involved in Cartesian realism and the sensationism of Hume and Berkeley. That the subjective or mental is itself phenomenal and presupposes as its antecedent generative conditions an affection of the transcendental self-in-itself by the noumenal things-in-themselves is what Kant urges against every interpretation of his teaching as a revival of the older subjectivism under a new name. Kant is thus drawn into the conception of a double affection—a noumenal affection of the noumenal self by noumenal things-in-themselves generating a noumenal manifold which appears through the interpretation of the synthetic activities of thought as a common world of experience and an empirical affection of the empirical individual by empirical objects generating the subjective private world of mental states. And the problem with which Kant

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is faced is to account for the appearance of this subjective private world which is the possession of a single individual mind, i. e., to explain the possibility of a class of objects which, while originating through the conditions of empirical objectivity in general, should yet be restricted to one single individual mind. Sankhya however with its conception of many Purushas as the necessary presupposition of empirical diversity is not faced with the inherent difficulties of the Kantian philosophy. It is Prakṛti that evolves into a world of experience according to Sankhya, and the transformation of the non-manifest noumenal Prakṛti into the manifested world is an eventuality which is determined by Purusha's illumination of Prakṛti. But as there are many Purushas we must suppose a pluralistic illumination of Prakṛti by the many numerically distinct Purushas, an illumination that calls forth not a single common world or universe, but a multiverse or *pluriverse*. By the world in the singular is meant thus the conceptual class of the many different worlds that appear in Prakṛti's bosom, the empirical multiverse that blossoms forth in the noumenal Prakṛti through the illumination of the many Purushas. In its conception of a multi-verse as following on a pluralistic illumination of the noumenal primal matter, Sankhya is thus able to provide for the individual, the personal aspect of experience without denying to it its impersonal, purely objective side. Kant, it may be noted, in stating the knowledge-problem, is led, under the influence of his mathematico-physical preconceptions, to overemphasise the objective, and impersonal factors to the detriment of its purely personal aspects. According to Kant, the problem of knowledge is virtually the problem of the possibility of self-transcendence in the subjective knowing act. "How are synthetic judgments *apriori* possible?" "How can the object be determined in advance in accordance with the forms and conditions of the thinking activity?" are Kant's manner of stating the knowledge-question with reference to its generative presuppositions. Kant is thus led to overestimate the universal and common

aspects of experience neglecting the unique, the purely individual character that also distinguishes it. Starting however with a fuller, more adequate conception of experience as the overindividual in relation to an individual, Sankhya is able to tackle the knowledge-problem more successfully without being committed to the Kantian make-shift of a double affection. According to Sankhya every world is an owned, personal world related uniquely to an individual empirical self. This *svatva-svāmitvasambandha*, this unique relation of ownership is what makes experience what it is, viz., the experience of a particular individual. There is, in fact, no purely objective, impersonal experience, no dehumanised, overindividual world which is nobody's world and is not related uniquely to some individual's mental continuum. 'Myself and my world,' 'yourself and your world,' this is the law of experience, the common form of an empirical world and our experience of it. This one-to-one ordering of experience, this universal dichotomy of life is the problem of knowledge proper, 'How is knowing as this one-to-one ordering of a world of experience possible?' is thus the question which the theory of knowledge must tackle, according to Sankhya. Every bit of experience is a personally owned experience. The pleasure of one is not the pleasure of all and one man's pain is not every man's pain. Within an apparently common world every man lives in a world of his own, in his own uniquely determined individual world. How is this individual, objective world possible? How is this personal, private relation to an objective, overindividual world possible? These are the epistemological questions proper, according to Sankhya—questions for the theory of knowledge to attack and solve. Kant was too much engrossed in the objective and the common to allow sufficient weight to the individual aspect of experience. Sankhya building on a broader empirical foundation is not driven to any of the Kantian expedients to fit the facts of experience into the structure of a preconceived theory. Experience, according to Sankhya, is the objective in relation to

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an empirical subject, a personally owned and individuated objective world. It thus points beyond itself not merely to a noumenal objective manifold but also to an Individual Transcendental subject. The individuality of experience, its personal and individual character, in other words, points to a beginningless relation of ownership between every individual Purusha and the noumenal Prakṛti. A pluralistic noumenal illumination is thus a necessary presupposition of experience as this one-to-one relation between an empirical individual and his particular world.

There are obvious difficulties in the Sankhya theory that call for criticism. The Sankhya theory does not account for the individuality of a Transcendental Subject or Purusha. It does not tell us how one Purusha is distinguished from another even though each is nothing but pure, self-shining Intelligence. The individuality of a Purusha as pure Intelligence is thus a brute datum that contradicts its very nature as self-luminous light. Nor is Sankhya more successful in explaining the fact of a socially shared, common world of experience. Experience as the over-individual in the individual, the objective in relation to an empirical subject does not necessarily connote a shared common world which is a precondition of social life. Even Vijnānabhaṭṭa's connection of a *samashti-Buddhi*, a common or overindividual *Buddhi* as the precondition of cosmogenesis or *śṛṣṭi* (cf. *Pravachanabhashya* 1, 63) does not account for a mutually shared, intersubjective, independent world. Since every individual is cut off, according to Sankhya, from every other by an unsurmountable barrier he may transcend himself so as to embrace the objective independent world in himself, but cannot possibly enter the experience of another and share it in common with the latter. The impossibility of a common, mutually owned world is thus a necessary corollary of the Sankhya conception of the individual as exclusive and absolutely isolated. Despite however these obvious defects of the Sankhya theory, it cannot be denied that the Sankhya statement of the knowledge-problem has the merit of a fullness

that we miss alike in the Kantian and the Pragmatist formulations of it. The problem, as Kant states it, has the advantage of an objectivity which is secured only at the cost of the individual and personal side of experience. The defect of the Kantian starting-point comes out never so clearly as in the Idealistic development of it in Hegel's system wherein the individual including the unique and the contingent is sought to be deduced out of the Absolute Idea by necessary logical process. Nor do the usual pragmatist formulations of the problem fare better than the Kantian statement in this respect. They represent the other extreme, emphasizing the individual and persona. in experience to the prejudice of its necessary and universal side. Compared with either of these, the more carefully-guarded Sankhya formulation of the problem is certainly more adequate and much nearer the actual facts of the case. One need not accept the Sankhya answer to this all important question of philosophy. It need not be supposed either that Sankhya has said the last word on the subject. But it remains true that Sankhya has at least smoothed the way to a right answer by a fuller statement of the problem to be solved and the issues tackled in a theory of knowledge proper,

Two presuppositions of the problem of the One and the Many.

Dhirendra Mohan Datta.

The problem of the one and the many is a veritable 'serbo-nian bog' in philosophy, where 'armies whole have sunk' without coming to a decisive conclusion. Some philosophers have again and again come to maintain that reality is one, whereas others have as persistently asserted that it cannot be one, that it is a mere aggregation of many independent reals or that it is one in many or that it is both one and many (from different view points). But few have acknowledged the necessity of determining, before they hazard a reply, the exact meaning of the word 'one' and the corresponding meaning of the word 'many'. As a consequence, the replies have often remained as vague and uncertain as the question itself. In this short paper we shall try to analyse the different meanings in which the word 'one' is used in different contexts and try to point out the extreme necessity of ascertaining the exact sense in which the word 'one' and consequently the word 'many' is to be taken.

- (1) An isolated 'atom' or 'electron' is called 'one'.
- (2) A heap of stones is called one.
- (3) A machine, a building or a picture is called one.
- (4) A family, a nation or a society is called one.
- (5) An organism—a tree or an animal's body—is called one.
- (6) The mental states of a single individual taken as a whole is called one mind.
- (7) A person manifesting itself through different states (walking, running, sleeping etc.) is called one.
- (8) Lastly, one thing posited through the negation of many things is also called one.

These are some of the many important senses in which

the word one is used; there may be some more. But what is to be noted is that the different senses are so widely distinct that unless a particular sense is selected out and agreed upon the metaphysical question viz: 'Is reality one or many?', carries little sense, and the reply that it is one or many, or one in many or both one and many, still less sense.

In the first case, given above, one atom or electron is one of the many isolated units which are either quantitatively indivisible or qualitatively unique or both indivisible and unique. And here the one cannot be resolved into the many.

In the second case (namely one heap of stones), one is composed of the many into which it can again be resolved. A heap of stones is as much one heap as it is many stones. So what is one from one standpoint is but many from another standpoint. Besides, one heap can be divided and turned into many heaps, just as one piece of chalk can be broken and made into many pieces of chalk.

In the case of one machine or picture or statue also the one is composed of the many. But the many are here put together according to a definite plan to harmonise together and produce something that will serve certain *one* purpose or reveal certain *one* idea. And though here also, the one is as much many when looked at from the point of view of its component parts, the parts here are more intimately connected, so that the whole, the one, can be divided into the many, only at the expense of the purpose or idea which the whole could subserve. An automobile broken into two pieces cannot be treated as two automobiles any more than a statue hammered down to two pieces can be looked upon as two statues.

In the case of a family, society or nation, the one is composed of the many who are free agents and more or less voluntarily associate together to form one body. In some cases they can dissociate themselves to form new groups, in some cases they may not. But here also, what is one is also many from a different standpoint.

In the case of an organism, the relation between the many

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parts is very intimate; each part discharges some function for the growth, maintenance and decay of the whole and it can scarcely be removed without detriment to the career of the whole. But even one organism can be looked upon as many from the point of view of its limbs or parts.

In the case of the mind, it is called one in view of its integrating activity through the diversity of its aspects or states. The unity of the mind cannot be split up except in the pathological and abnormal cases like multiple personality. Here also what is one from the standpoint of the whole is many from the point of view of its many states.

We have considered so far only the static aspect of unity. That is unity in a diversity of co-existent states, parts or aspects. But there is a dynamic sense of unity too. For instance we look upon an object passing through varying successive stages (e.g. a man walking, running, sitting or lying) as the one and the same object. In many cases even if the object loses some of its parts (as a tree with its branches hewn down) or acquire new ones (as a tree growing new branches and leaves) it does not cease to be treated as one object. The only ground for the use of the word 'one' in such cases, is a belief in the persisting identity of the object through its various changes. It is to be noted here that while in the former cases the many that are the parts or aspects when put together make a whole that is the one, in the cases of dynamic unity, the one is never got by putting together its successive phases. It is not by putting together Rama lying, sitting or walking that we get Rama as the one person. In such cases each one of the many states reveals the object as a self-complete whole. The wonder of it is that though each state is complete and also different from every other state all states are treated as one. This is possible only because we choose to neglect the differences as altogether non-existent for the purpose for which the object is considered one.

But there is yet another type of cases where the word 'one' is used in a different sense. In an indeterminate perception,

say of a distant object, X, it seems to appear as A, B, C, D, alternately. But on near approach when the perception is made determinate, we find that it is neither of them singly or collectively that it is, altogether a different thing and the one and the same with X. In this case one is posited through the negation of the many.

In Philosophy, as everywhere else, we scarcely coin the meaning of a word anew, a word is applied in one of the various meanings which it may possess in popular use. When therefore we ask the question "Is reality one or many?" or we reply that it is one or many (and the like) we must have (if our questions and replies have any definite sense) a clear apprehension of the particular popular sense of the word 'one' or 'many' in analogy with which the word is being used in metaphysics. If the particular analogy which from the back of the mind regulates the use of the word be not brought to light, I may have the picture of the world as an aggregate and call it one and a friend may have the picture of the world as an organism and call it also one; and consequently both the theories may come to be characterised as 'monism' though there be little in common between them. In Indian philosophy this confusion has been partially avoided by a qualifying 'monism' with suitable adjectives and we thus have advaita, viśiṣṭādvaita, śūdhādvaita etc. But in western philosophy no such attempt has been made.

The best way, however, of putting an end to all confusion would be to select for philosophy one particular meaning of the word 'one' (and correspondingly of 'many') out of its various meanings and stick to it in all connections. This would of course require a preliminary settlement of the question, viz. "What degree and kind of unity is to be accepted as sufficient in order that reality may be called one?"

Prof. Perry asserts that since parts of reality can be *known* individually, so it follows that parts are self-sufficient and consequently reality is plural. One might argue against it from the very same data and as equally assert that though

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parts are *known* individually, since there is one aggregate or whole without which the very word part is meaningless, reality is one. From this it would appear that with the same facts before them philosophers may argue against each other without coming to any conclusion and without making any material progress, only because they are not agreed about the particular degree and kind of unity or diversity that the word 'one' or 'many' should connote,

When the ambiguities about the meanings of the term one and many are removed, we shall be in a better position to answer the problem namely, "Is reality one or many?" But still another source of uncertainty has to be removed, before the answer can be made absolutely secure. And it is the question of the stand-point from which reality is judged. In the examples that we have cited above to illustrate the different uses of the term, 'one', we find that 'one' is either (1) 'one' of the 'many' or (2) one composed of the 'many' or (3) 'one' revealed through the 'many' or (4) 'one' negating the 'many'. So that, "one" and "many" are found in all the cases to reside in the same locus at the same moment or at different moments. If so there is no reason why in such a case the object should be considered either as 'one' or as 'many'. It can be characterised as one or as many, only if we speak from a particular stand-point which reveals only one aspect of the object and eliminates the other. The same object is treated sometimes as one tree or as many leaves, branches and roots, according as the object is viewed synthetically or analytically. Whether attention directed towards a particular object will be synthetic or analytic does not depend at all on the object but on the mood of the person viewing it. Similarly reality need not and does not appear the same to a poet, a scientist and a religious man, with their varying moods and ways of looking at the world. As we gaze at a beautiful landscape with rapt attention and lose ourselves in admiration and joy, we often have one whole of undifferentiated experience in which the different elements of the scene—the clouds and the hills, the rivers and

the trees do not stand apart as distinct individuals but mingle together in the harmony of the whole and even the self does not draw itself up to oppose itself to the not-self but the two are merged into the unity of the whole. But when this happy poetic mood passes away and leaves us to criticise the experience we have had a moment ago, we analyse the different elements, and the multiplicity of the objects and the distinction between the self and the not-self then replace the undifferentiated experience of the previous moment. The intellect may again integrate the differentiated elements and form a synthetic picture of them. Attention will then pass from the parts to the whole and from the whole to the parts so that the parts will be viewed in relation to the whole and the whole in relation to its parts. But on further reflection this discursive attitude of the mind may be looked upon as marring the joy derived from the first attitude and a deliberate attempt may be made to slide back into that joyful mood by withdrawing the attention from analysis and criticism of the contents and setting it to the contemplation of the whole. If this attempt succeeds distinctions will once more cease to be noticed, they will be merged in the unity of the whole. If such variations of attitudes leads to the shifting of stress and attention and consequently present diverse pictures of a portion of reality the same does happen to the apprehension of reality as a whole. As a matter of fact different trends of philosophy have been swayed by these different attitudes towards reality. Corresponding to the few attitudes we have distinguished above, we may instance respectively the philosophy of Bergson, that of the critical realists, that of Hegel and that of Sankara. If then, we admit the fact that the texture of reality appears different from different standpoints, then accuracy demands that before we answer the question whether reality is one or many we should ascertain the standpoint from which the question is asked. Without such a specification of the particular standpoint the reply, be it affirmative or negative, will be neither absolutely true nor absolutely false—but will remain vague.

But an objection may be raised against this suggestion. It may be said that philosophy has got its own standpoint which differs from those of poetry, science and religion; and it is no business of philosophy to take into consideration any other standpoint but its own. So that in every philosophical question and reply the standpoint implied is always the philosophical standpoint which does not, therefore, require to be specified afresh in particular contexts. Against this objection we have to say, first, that it is not a fact that philosophy has any universally accepted standpoint. It is true that philosophy has always been an attempt to understand reality through the intellect. But notwithstanding this fact, the intellect has almost always been swayed by the poetic, the scientific or the religious attitudes which have created different standpoints in philosophy itself. Secondly whatever be the standpoint of philosophy it has always claimed as against the special sciences, that it tries to give not a mere partial, incomplete idea of the universe, but a complete and a comprehensive one. If this claim of superiority is to be maintained, philosophy can by no means neglect to consider how reality does appear from different standpoints. Without such an width of outlook philosophy can at least aspire to be a dogmatic, one-sided consideration of reality. The discursive intellect, which is the main gate for philosophy, itself points out the possibility of other ways of knowing reality and demands at least an intellectual consideration of the results of those methods, also. Some realists of the present day hold that the standpoint of philosophy is the standpoint of reality or the objective standpoint. They protest against the methods of idealists which they consider to be subjective and sophisticated and they seem to think that if reality be approached with an unsophisticated mind free from metaphysical prejudices, reality will speak for itself and reveal its own true nature. But the wish to occupy the standpoint of reality is something quite absurd. It can be fulfilled only when the philosopher has himself become reality and when that is attained philosophising also will come

to rest. The Realists have come to hold that reality is plural. But in doing so they have only adopted one of the many subjective standpoints inspite of their loud protests against subjectivism. The verdict of an unsophisticated mind is no less subjective than that of a sophisticated one. So far as our present problem is concerned we may say, that reality from its own standpoint, that is for itself is neither 'one' nor 'many'. It is only for the knowing mind that such predicates as 'one' or 'many' have any sense and objectively they are meaningless.

In conclusion, we may sum up the results of this short paper. An unambiguous reply to the question namely—"Is reality one or many?", presupposes at least two things:—first, the ascertainment of the degree and kind of unity or diversity that is connoted by the term one or many and secondly the specification of the particular attitude towards reality implied in the question. Without a preliminary settlement of these two questions the reply is bound to remain vague. It is perhaps necessary to ascertain equally the meaning of reality. But that will require lengthy discussions on the nature of reality and we have consequently omitted that point in the present paper which is meant to be brief.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Foundations of Living Faiths.

I.

H. D. Bhattacharyya.

There are those, unfortunately too many of them in our country, who, forgetful of other characteristics, imitate the apparent and occasional violence of Jesus and imagine that the secret of all evangelistic success lies in vilifying the convictions of other men.—P. C. Mozoomdar, The Oriental Christ.

The object of the present discourse is to study the elements that in some shape or other have gone to make up the faith that sways men's minds in relation to the supernatural. As such, it will not be an investigation into the dim origins of religion in animism, fetishism and other kindred phenomena in primitive culture, of which we have now a large and interesting literature. There has been a long succession of distinguished and selfless workers in that fascinating field of study, and the results have been gathered as more or less faithful descriptions of facts without any spirit of adverse criticism. The same, however, has not always been the case when the field of investigation is not primitive faith but the positive religions of advanced people professing a creed not our own. There is no reason, however, why a comparison of religious tenets should not be as severely factual as a description of primitive beliefs is. But what we generally find is that a comparison of living faiths is made in

**Religion, Positive Religion
and Philosophy of Religion.**

the interests of a particular religion, and as it is not unoften that the information is meant for the benefit of the missionaries of that religion, the description has always an eye upon the weak spots of other faiths as providing the most vulnerable points of attack. But it is evident to common-sense that the great religions that have survived up to the present day and claim as their adherents a large number of sensible and educated people must contain elements that satisfy not only the emotion but also the intellect of their devotees. The spread of the doctrine of relativity in the positive sciences may act as a helpful corrective in the field of positive religion. Even if it be granted that truth is one, it does not necessarily follow that a particular religion is the only mode of getting at that truth and that the knowledge of that truth is determined by the 'all or none' principle. We have long outgrown that mode of thought according to which the various non-christian religions were regarded as inventions of Satan to draw men away from the true God. Nor do we believe that the present religions are falls from a pure faith given to man in an original revelation at a remote past. The philosophers of history and religion have joined their hands with the evolutionists here and have endeavoured to justify each faith as it arose in historical times. But a greater justification is yet to come when it will be fully recognised that religion is not philosophy and that just as in the economy of nature there is room for all types of living beings so also in the economy of religious life there is room for different types of living faith. In so far as the best minds of different races and creeds agree upon certain common doctrines, they to that extent build up not a new positive faith but a philosophical theory of God and his relation to nature and man, not always however to the advancement of a direct religious experience on which the lives of the ordinary laity are based.

For, it must be noted that positive religion is identical neither with religion nor with philosophy of religion. In our own times we have a large number of people who are loath to

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subscribe to the dogmas of any particular religion and yet whose free thinking does not land them either in a religion of humanity or in downright atheism. These men are religious in the sense that they believe in God and are inspired in their daily lives and social intercourse by the emotions which that belief necessarily engenders. They do not belong, however, to any church, although the accident of birth may entitle a particular religious institution to claim dominance over them and compel a certain amount of lip-service from the less courageous who have to seek its help in certain social matters, such as the solemnisation of marriage. But the gradual encroachment of the civil law upon many realms of the ecclesiastical law is a sign that the claim of individual freedom in matters of religion are not being overlooked and the state is gradually coming to see that the proper field of religion is encompassable within narrow bounds. The secularisation of certain originally religious practices amounts to an admission that it is not obligatory to bring in the question of an established positive faith in matters of social intercourse. It is also an admission that a man is not bound to subscribe to any positive creed in order to be called religious. Religion, after all, is a personal relation with God and a living experience of communion with Him. As such, it may be as diverse in its modes as human nature is, and is independent of that fixity of formulæ and practices without which a positive religion is unthinkable. The more the congregational idea in worship grows at the expense of the personal, the greater is the rigidity of practices, with the effect that the social value of the church grows at the expense of the religious, and devout minds feel the necessity of supplementing congregational worship by private communion.

But while we must acknowledge the rights of private faith we are not blind to the fact that the collective consciousness of the community is what has a continuous history. In so far as the private faith of a single individual is accepted by his followers, it becomes the nucleus of a positive religion. Such.

is Christianity ; such is Mahomedanism ; such is Buddhism. This is true even though in certain ethnic religions, such as Hellenism and Brahminism, the founders are not known by their names and the religion appears as the expression of the collective consciousness of the tribe or the race. There is this advantage in positive religion that it serves as a conserving force of noble experiences on which successive generations may make additions and improvements and that as the common rallying point of many minds it forces attention to itself and serves to knit together a number of people in common faith and practice. As one of the strongest social ties, positive religion has never lost its footing in the minds of social, political and religious leaders, and even those who have themselves lost faith in the creeds have not lost faith in the social utility of religious dogmas. This pragmatic justification of positive religion is to be found in both ancient and modern literature. In the history of religions, again, it is this social solidarity that is at the basis of much religious iniquity. The days of the inquisition and auto-de-fe are over, but excommunication still holds its sway as a potent instrument of social oppression. The infidel, accordingly, is more tolerable than the apostate for society has no pardon for one who breaks its solidarity. The fates of prophets and saints who died as martyrs to their conviction can be explained only on the supposition that they were regarded and condemned as breakers of the social solidarity and of the established order. In this matter a religious community has taken for its motto the words of Christ that he who is not with it is against it. The reasons for this attitude is not always easy to put forth in a coherent logical form, but probably there is an unconscious idea that a common faith provides that minimum standard of uniformity in social decorum and justice without which the commerce of men would cease. Contact with other creeds and different cultures; has not, however, tended to confirm that attitude of suspicion for international dealings have proved that decorum and justice are not the monopoly of any particular nation or creed

and that the truer basis of social propriety and mutual understanding is provided by an enlightened culture which takes very little help from any definite creed. The almost unanimous testimony of anthropologists about the moral dealings of savages with people of advanced culture should give a quietus to those who think that moral virtues are the peculiar possession of advanced races only. It may be freely admitted that to the advancement of culture religion has made not a little contribution ; but in as much as, in spite of diverse religions, the cultures of nations have developed a marked similarity sufficient to provide the basis of mutual understanding and mutual appreciation, it may be admitted that culture and positive religion are, to some extent at least, independent variables. It is not, therefore, to provide a common meeting ground that a particular religion is wanted in dealings between man and man: it is wanted rather to bring about a degree of intimacy in those dealings which religion alone provides,—and that intimacy comes not from the rational factors contained in it but the irrational emotive elements that lie at the root of all herd and crowd psychology. In proportion as the the feelings and sentiments preponderate in our relations the intimacy becomes greater: this explains why the family and the tribe have such cohesive force latent in them. If, further, it be admitted that there are racial types, each with its peculiar instinctive and emotional endowment, we can see why certain religions never ceased to be ethnic and never rose to the status of a universal religion. It is only when a religion was born of the contact of different cultures that it assumed catholicity, but then in proportion as it appealed to men of different racial types it ceased to be pre-eminently emotional and began to be philosophical. Man agrees with man in his reason but types are fixed by irrational factors, and religion, in proportion as it becomes the possession of a type, ceases thus far to be universal. It may, therefore, be regarded as a matter of serious doubt whether the missionary hopes of any positive religion will be realised in spirit

and in truth, except in so far as that religion ceases to be merely religious and develops a philosophy of life in which all can share. But the spirit of compromise and barter, so essential to catholicity and universality, is dangerous to the distinctiveness of a creed, and in proportion as a religion, founded in an ancient intellectual, social and moral environment, liberalises itself by exegetical interpretations to keep pace with advancing culture and widening dominion, it tends to lose that immediacy and coherence which gave it an irresistible force at the time of its inception. And this is only natural, because with advancing culture society ceases to be theocratic in its ideal of life—abandons the theological stage, the Comtists would say—and to think that all social conduct must be permeated by a religious consciousness to form a coherent social group. If, then, religion comes to be regarded as only one type of experience restricted to a particular object, its influence on other modes of experience becomes remote and indirect. But if it be desired that religion should govern the whole life, religion has to be rationalised to be universally acceptable, and with rationalisation comes inevitably a weakening of immediate experience and social fervour that characterise the faith of the original adherents of the creed. In short, religion tends to be philosophical.

But positive religion is as little identical with philosophy of religion as with individual religion. A positive religion is generally the product of the collective consciousness of the community, tribe or race, but a philosophy of religion is originally the reasoned opinion of a single individual or of a few individuals. Again, as a social product, a positive religion does not originate the elements of faith by conscious reasoning but simply finds that it has developed them unconsciously with a good many emotional ingredients thrown into the operation. It is only when a religion seeks to be self-conscious that it becomes philosophical and as such, as Hegel pointed out, philosophy of religion presupposes the existence of a religion to be philosophised and never presumes to produce a religion

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in one who does not already possess it. As an illustration, reference may be made to the very large number of christological speculations in the Christian Church, each trying to define in terms of high-sounding philosophy the simple fact that a good man felt a divine inspiration to preach the message of a loving God and styled himself, appropriately enough, the Son of God. Now, the characters in history (including religious history) are all unique men and women. But when they are made to stand for principles, much may be gained in intelligibility but much again may be lost in emotional value. A religion that aspires to be philosophical has to show at least three characteristics, namely, internal coherence, historical origin (including resemblance to other faiths, wherever possible) and congruence with other types of human experience (including scientific facts). Now, the last trait has always been difficult to establish, as most (if not all) faiths have included much that science has not established beyond doubt and much that science refuses to accept as true. So from very early times persistent efforts have been made by theologians to claim for faith an extra-scientific or supra-rational dominion at the cost of its philosophical character. In proportion as a faith arrogates to itself the right to dictate not only what is spiritually valuable but also what is naturally true it runs the risk of being challenged as a whole and standing in the way of scientific advancement. Much of the conflict between science and religion owes its origin to the attempt of religion to usurp the place of science. A philosophical religion will either have to admit that the non-scientific events recorded in its scriptures (miracles, for instance) are either not true or not yet established by science and are therefore only matters of faith. But religion has to reconcile itself not only with science but also with other types of knowledge and behaviour. As such, religion comes into intimate contact with every aspect of life and transcends the narrow bounds of a mere faith or a personal relation to God. This means that a whole philosophy of life is behind a positive religion which must therefore cons-

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tantly go forward to explicate its latent assumptions and rise to a philosophy. But there is this danger that the first formulations of a creed generally burst their bonds to universalise themselves and what we get is not the old religion but a new philosophy.

A philosophy of religion, again, finds itself obliged to transcend the limits of a single religion. In order to show that a particular religion is not a subjective or tribal fantasy, it has to be proved that its roots lie deep in human nature so that it loses nothing by expansion. This has taken the forms of comparative religion and historical evolution. A careful comparison of different religions has shown that certain concepts are very wide-spread, if not universal. For example, the story of the Deluge is to be found in Greek, Jewish, Indian and Assyrian mythologies alike. The concept of Trinity is still more wide-spread, and so also certain religious festivals associated with the solar cult. In investigating the beliefs of a particular religion we may find that some ideas are common with those of other creeds although there is no evidence of borrowing on any side, while some others have been directly borrowed either in an unmodified or in a disguised form from other religions. The later a religion the greater the chance of borrowing. A comparative and historical investigation may, therefore, show that much of any religion is not unique or peculiar to that religion alone, and may thus invest it with a certain amount of eclecticism which takes away from the distinctiveness of the creed. It is indeed true that, in spite of its eclecticism, every religion is unique because of the special synthesis it effects of the elements borrowed from different sources just as bees may collect honey from different flowers and yet synthesise the whole into a homogenous composition. Still, there is no doubt that the filiation of one creed to other creeds has a damping influence upon its uniqueness and tends to weaken the unflinching faith of its adherents, because it proves that its elements have been taken bodily over from other creeds which, to the extent of their contributions, must

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therefore also be regarded as true. If, as is generally held, the Christian Trinity has been taken over from Neo-Platonism, it would seem unreasonable to claim truth for the Christian doctrine and deny it to the Neo-Platonic. A sense of similarity and of borrowing may prove the basis of toleration but is fatal to that active faith without which a positive religion cannot exist. So, many religions have preferred to retain their integrity and uniqueness by disallowing all theoretical speculations into their origins and similarities with other religions, and based their claim to distinctive existence on a new revelation from God.

But the most essential requirement of a religion is that it should be consistent with itself. The presence of contradictions is fatal to the truth of any statement, secular or religious. A religion that owes its origin to a single man, e. g. Mahomedanism, Christianity and Buddhism, is under a special obligation to be consistent. Not so the religions that have had an evolution in time, such as, Judaism and Brahminism. In proportion as scriptural texts are capable of contradictory interpretations, they sow the seed of dissension and schism, and thus far lose that unflinching devotion which a positive religion always demands. Collation of texts and reconciling apparently contradictory utterances have been found necessary by some religions, and some reason or other has been forwarded by interpreters to smooth the contradiction of different texts. The more eclectic a religion is, the greater is the possibility of looseness in texture and organisation and the greater is the need of a philosophical justification of faith. But these theological speculations have a tendency to show up the patchy character of a religion and to detract from its living unity. It is fortunate for any religion that the majority of its adherents do not have either the equipment or the time for a critical examination of their faith. The rise and fall of religions, which historical investigation discloses, have always a disquieting effect, for they engender a belief that faiths have their day and pass away into comparative insignificance as the history

of the world advances. Hegel, therefore, treated all definite religions (in fact, religion itself) as transitions to philosophy although he claimed for Christianity a certain amount of pre-eminence. He has, therefore, been severely dealt with by religiously inclined philosophers. And yet the transition to philosophy (not necessarily to agnosticism or atheism) is inevitable if every positive religion were to discard all non-rational elements in order to universalise itself.

Let us pass on now to a consideration of the main characteristics of the living faiths of the world.

Positive Religion as revealed. In order to justify their claim to the reverent attention of men almost all religions

have claimed a supernatural origin, that is, have called themselves revealed. A revealed religion implies that the truths preached are not of human origin and, as such, not liable to decay like all human products. If it is the will of God that is revealed to man in a scripture, then that scripture has an eternal value, being as immutable as the divine essence itself. In as much as the Supreme Being is the repository of all wisdom and all goodness, his message to man can never admit of variation or improvement. Each religion, therefore, in so far as it claims to be revealed, has an unflinching faith in itself and claims to be in sole (at least, the largest) possession of all spiritual truths.

Now, revelation may mean one of two things. It may mean either that a particular person is so imbued with divine spirit that at the moment of uttering spiritual messages he has laid aside the imperfection of finitude and made himself the transparent medium of divine will. He is permeated through and through by divine energy and what he utters at the moment of inspiration have a strange superhuman ring. The words he utters may be his own and the language he speaks may be the language of his nation, but the dynamic energy of his speech comes from without and uses him as the tool of its own manifestation. So, it is not the speech but the speaker that God chooses to make his will known to man. The sacred-

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ness attaches primarily to the person and only secondarily to his speech. Concomitantly with this belief, there may or may not be the further belief that all through the centuries God is manifesting himself through a succession of more or less inspired persons. If then we do not have as many religions as divinely inspired prophets, it is either because the majority have chosen to lead a holy life rather than leave a record of their experiences or because their inspirations have not touched a sufficiently large number of social and religious aspects to form the basis of a positive creed. It would be strange indeed if a particular positive religion were not to admit that besides itself there might be imperfect revelations of divine will through other prophets; and, as a matter of fact, we do find that all religions have conceded that they are not the sole repositories of all truths although some have been uncharitable enough to think that truths in other religions are not divinely inspired and as such are only accidental conformations to divine will. A creed that grows up in isolation is more likely to claim a monopoly of divine inspiration than one which is conscious of its origin in historic times and filiation to other creeds.

But a revealed religion may make further claims. It may claim for its scripture not only divine inspiration but divine origin. Such, for instance, is the belief of Mahomedanism, according to which the Quran was sent down in a complete form by God to the lowest heaven, thence to be communicated to Mahomet by the angel Gabriel as occasions should arise. The words of the Quran are the words of God himself and, as such, are eternal and do not suffer from the imperfections which affect all human compositions. Such, again, is the belief of the Hindus in the revealed character of their Vedas. The Vedas are eternal and the sages with whose names the various hymns are associated are not the composers of those hymns but only their seers (Mantradrastṛ). In one sense the orthodox Hindu belief goes beyond the Mahomedan, for, whereas the latter thinks that the words of the Quran are the words

of God, the former holds that the Vedas have not been actually uttered by any God. According to a peculiar belief of the Hindus, when the cycle of existence is over there is an involution of all creation into its primal undifferentiated condition. But, the Vedas do not cease to exist even then and as soon as a new creation issues forth the Vedas make their reappearance. The deity only manifests (*prakāśa*) the Vedas and does not inspire or dictate them. The orthodox Jaina belief is on similar lines, for it too ascribes the repeated revelation of the eternal Jaina religion in succeeding cycles of existence to the Tirthankaras. The sacred literature of the Parsis is supposed to owe its origin to the conversation between Zarathustra, the prophet of Iran, and Ahura Mazda, the beneficent spirit to whom we owe all that is good in creation. Ahura Mazda is supposed to answer the questions put to him by Zarathustra and thereby reveal the truth, just as in the Upanishad literature of the Hindus (in the *Kāthopanishad*) Yama is seen answering the questions about ultimate verities put to him by Naciketas, or, as in Buddhistic literature, Buddha is seen answering his enquirers or Nāgasena is seen answering the questions of the Greek King Menandar. It is evident that the obligatoriness of a revelation on human conduct will be in proportion to its freedom from human elements, and its purity or immutability is likely to be defended with greater tenacity the firmer the faith that the words are the actual words of God. Much of the sanctity that attaches to scriptural texts of different religions owes its origin to this belief that the words are superhuman in their origin. Much of the lifeless repetition of texts and formulae in divine service owes its origin to the same source, for manifestly it is presumptuous on the part of man to try to improve upon divine utterances.

A philosophical speculation into the nature and attributes of God has in some cases strengthened the belief that revelation is an eternal phenomenon. We need not refer here to the philosophy of Hegel according to whom the nature of the

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Absolute Spirit is such that it cannot but manifest itself in the world and in the consciousness of finite spirits. Even early theological speculation, both christian and non-christian, connected God with word or speech and came to the conclusion that God revealed himself through speech from all eternity. In Hindu religion Brahma has been called sound (śabda). The Mahomedans believe that, in addition to life, knowledge, power, will, hearing and vision, God possesses the attribute of speech which makes the Quran an eternal manifestation of the divine message—a view which the free-thinking Mutazilites rejected, as they did not admit that the divine attributes were co-eternal with the divine essence. The Christian doctrine of the Logos led to the same conclusion, at least, in the writings of some of the early Church Fathers. If the word is with God and the word is God, as St. John taught, then the divine manifestation through the Logos in the person and teachings of Christ must be eternal like God himself. This led Origen to make a distinction between the eternal and the historical Christ. The Jesus of Nazareth as the son of Mary was born in historical times, but Jesus as the Logos existed from all eternity and his message of truth was eternal. This is the way in which Origen tried to explain how the existence before Christ of good man destined for a blessed hereafter (men like Socrates and Plato) could be reconciled with Christianity as the sole revelation of God. The good men before Christ, although outwardly professing another creed, were really believers in the eternal Christianity and were, therefore, Christians before Christ. The Buddhists who did not believe in any divine revelation tell, however, a curious mythological story that after attaining the supreme enlightenment Buddha went up to the Trayastrimśa heaven to preach his message to his dead mother.

Underlying all these beliefs there runs a common idea that a religion is not to be judged by the lateness of its historical appearance. The novelty of a creed may stand in the way of its acceptance by mankind ; for it may be asserted

that if men could be saved before the new message arrived, there is no reason why men should not continue to be saved without accepting this new revelation. If it be asserted that the acceptance of a particular revelation is a *conditio sine qua non* of salvation, it stands to reason that it should be available from all eternity, unless we are prepared to impugn the impartiality and mercy of God and assert that God reserved only his later creation for salvation and misled his earlier creation by withholding the truth and allowing false creeds to dominate men's faith. A progressive manifestation of divine will and intelligence—the concept of a developing God—in which Hegel believes is alien to the ordinary idea of God which invests Him with an eternal perfection. Hence, if the divine will is supposed to be perfectly revealed only in a particular scripture, the fault has been laid not at the door of God but at the door of the medium through which it has been manifested. In other words, the prophets, anterior to the particular prophet in which one believes, are regarded as only imperfectly inspired and, to that extent, as preaching a defective religion. But once the true and perfect revelation has come there is no justification for sticking to an older creed which the perfect revelation may be supposed to have superseded. This belief does not settle the question why the perfect revelation should not be eternal, but it obviates the difficulty of admitting an eternal aspect in connection with an historical religion and frankly accepts the view that a perfect revelation may come in its own time or when God so wills it. It makes it possible also to admit that all past religions are not falls from a true faith but are true in their own way although in different degrees of perfection. The Shiah Mahomedans, for instance, while believing that Mahomedanism is the only perfect faith, admit nevertheless that the Parsis, the Jews and the Christians are also in possession of divine revelation.

But the difficulty is not only with regard to the past but also with regard to the future. Every positive religion has an interest in claiming infallibility but, as a Sanskrit poet

puts it, time is without an end and the world is exceedingly wide. What guarantee is there that time will not bring into being another faith with greater pretensions to truth and perfection? If the religions of old have prepared the way and made room for a particular positive religion, can we not by a similar reasoning conclude that it itself forms only a passage to a newer and better faith in the future? This is a contingency of which every religion has fought shy and naturally so for a confession of this type inevitably brings a half-heartedness in championing the cause of any creed. Hence every positive religion is interested in proving not only that its infallibility comes from its origin in divine revelation but also that that revelation is incapable of making a more perfect manifestation. As compared with the extravagant pretensions of some religions, the claim of Hegel that the Absolute Spirit has completely realised itself in his philosophy and that therefore philosophy cannot rise higher seems modest indeed; for while Hegel claims to base his theory of truth and reality on an exercise of reason, the same cannot be said of these positive religions which contain in them much that must be taken on trust. Christianity, for instance, claims that Christ was the only begotten son of God and, as the co-eternal principle of revelation, manifested unto all times the truth about the essence and attributes of God. On the other hand, we have got Mahomedanism making a similar claim, asserting that while Abraham, Moses and Jesus were prophets of a kind (Nabi) Mahomet was the last of the prophets (Rasul) and the most perfect one. Each religion may be pardoned for its blind veneration and childish pride, but a seeker after truth finds himself in an awkward predicament when there are rival claimants to infallibility.

If then we have a number of creeds, each claiming to derive its origin in divine inspiration or divine authorship, how are we to know which one, if any, is the true religion? It is inevitable, therefore, that in estimating the value of any creed, as

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also to determine whether it is revelational, we shall have to bring in external criteria. It is not by its claim but by its ability to justify that claim that a religion can be called revelational. It has, therefore, been rightly urged that nothing can pass unchallenged at the bar of human reason and religion is no exception to this rule. If then a religion is revelational only in so far as it stands the test of reason, we are thereby making one great assumption, namely, that the God who is the source of revelation is at the same time the supreme reason. This God is, therefore, incapable of sending down to man anything that cannot stand the scrutiny of rational thought just as he is incapable of creating anything whose existence cannot be rationally justified. Both in the realm of thought and in that of being there is nothing that is irrational, although much may be obscure at present owing to the immaturity or imperfect use of the reason in man. If the human reason is modelled on the same pattern as the divine, the doctrines alleged to have been received from God ought to be clear to human understanding and consonant with the highest ideals of perfection put forward by human reason. The more a positive religion takes refuge in mystery and the more contradictions it harbours within itself the more it forfeits the right to be called revelational. The mediaeval quarrel about the will and the understanding of God is to the point here. If the divine will can decree anything as true or good which the human reason is bound to accept as such, then, if it be not admitted at the same time that that will is immutable in its operation all through history, there will be the possibility of God dictating contradictory messages for man through different prophets or through the same prophet at different times. This is in fact the basis of the peculiar power of abrogation which Mahomet claimed for his Islamic revelations. In Mahomedanism submission to the will of God is the supreme article of creed and it is presumptuous for man to ask why that will should manifest itself in contradictory fashions at different times. So Mahomet claimed that God abrogated

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certain earlier revelations sent through him by certain later revelations. This may be consistency in a way but it does not satisfy the human reason (as in fact no whimsical action can do) as to why God should so quickly change his mind. The other theory that holds that understanding is the supreme attribute not only in man but also in God can insist on a rigorous consistency on the part of God all through the centuries. A missionary religion that hopes to establish itself as the universal religion can make no other appeal but the appeal of conformity to reason. Unfortunately, when a particular creed is launched forth into the world it takes its colouring from local and contemporary beliefs, and in the process of its transmission and migration, before it settles down into a written religion, it absorbs much that is mysterious and spectacular and as such contains a lot that the human reason can not countenance. When, again, we remember that none of the great religions (except perhaps Buddhism) owes its origin to a critically trained philosophic mind or conceived at a time when credulity and superstition were at their lowest, it is inevitable that each religion should contain much that human reason will never be able to justify. If any religion should therefore claim universality on the score of complete rationality, it is bound to be disappointed. Of the rival creeds the one that succeeds most with thinking minds (no reference need be made to the creeds that spread with the help of the sword or any other non-rational agency or that gain currency among illiterate or unthinking population) is the one that can show not absolute but the *greatest* amount of rationality. If any other type of creed should possess a wide following, it is because every positive religion is primarily a social possession and people are at first born into a particular creed before they can possibly (if at all) choose another by the unfettered exercise of their reason. A man's faith, again, is determined not solely by rational considerations: tradition and superstition, advantage and social convenience, idleness and cowardice, and such other irrational

factors play a great part in the perpetuation of inferior creeds. What, however, keeps up the missionary faith and zeal is a pragmatic assumption, or an optimistic anticipation, of the day when mankind as a whole should work off the unreason in itself and accept a faith that appeals to reason and reason alone.

But, as has been observed before, a danger lurks in this procedure. The peculiar flavour of a positive religion comes from the non-rational elements contained in it and it is a pertinent question as to how far it can admit of rational treatment. A distinction may, indeed, be drawn between giving a rational explanation of the main beliefs of a particular religion and the philosophising of the religion as a whole, and what the positive creeds have done is to adopt the former procedure. But in so far as a religion is a well-knit system it can not be defended and abandoned by reason in parts and the attempt to defend the whole results in admitting that the religion in question embodies at the same time a true philosophy. This is why Hegel considers religion as a passing phase of human experience, destined ultimately to merge in philosophy.

A more potent danger is, however, that religion may be attenuated to such an extent in the process of rationalisation that it ceases altogether to fulfil its function. Reason has, therefore, been regarded by Faith as a dangerous ally. It insinuates itself into the graces of faith by championing some of its dogmas, but, when once securely established, it turns against faith itself and ends by denying the basis of its existence. There are three consequences of the application of reason which every positive religion dreads, namely, scepticism, agnosticism and atheism. A comparison of creeds may lead one to think that, in the absence of substantial agreement, truth is probably possessed by none and that a wise man should suspend his judgment and adopt an attitude of 'wait and see.' In the presence of conflicting testimonies it is hazardous to pin one's faith on any creed and one should sit on the fence

when any religious question crops up. A few bold spirits, however, do not like this attitude of caution or this spirit of vacillation. They think that it is impossible to prove the cardinal doctrine of faith, namely, the existence of God, by the exercise of reason. God cannot be proved to exist either deductively from a higher premise for the very simple reason that God is the highest principle, or inductively from this world of finite things because inductive reasoning holds between objects of the same type and not from finite objects to the infinite which is unique in its character. Agnosticism, therefore, is the inevitable result of applying reason to faith. Some orthodox theologians have unconsciously played into the hands of these agnostics, as a reader of Flint's volume on *Agnosticism* can see for himself. If reason is incapable of proving the existence of God, should we not appeal to our immediate experience and say that if God be not in our head he is in our heart? Thus, by withdrawing the apprehension of God from the domain of reason and planting it on the shifting basis of individual immediacy, the theologians bring in a mysticism into religious experience which is not far removed from agnosticism. When to this position is added the incomprehensibility of divine nature and attributes, in which some mystics believe, the identification with the agnostics becomes almost complete.

(To be Continued).

The Identity of the Self.

R. Das.

The problem of the identity of the self is very important from all points of view. All our experience, of whatever sort it may be, hinges on the fact that there is a self which remains the same throughout the process of its experience. There is no experience in which there is no experiencer. But if the experiencer lasts only for a moment, there will be no experience in the proper sense of the term. We live through our experience and this would not be possible, if we were endowed only with momentary existence.

In practical life, the identity of the self is very rarely doubted. It is taken almost as a given fact. Nobody ever thinks that he is to-day a different man from what he was yesterday. Even if he says that he is different, his friends and relations, at least his creditors and the courts of law will not take him at his word. When I remember certain things which I did in the past, I know at the same time that I am the very same person who did them. Otherwise there is no meaning in remembering or thinking that I did them. By memory of this sort, which is accompanied by recognition (*Pratyabhijna*) of the past self as identical with the present one, we seem to be acquainted with an undoubted fact—the fact of the identity of the self. Philosophers have admitted the fact as well as the validity of recognition. It is accepted of course in implicit faith in everyday life. Still there are certain difficulties, which make the fact appear as a thing of doubtful validity. There are undoubted differences between our past self and the present one. And if there is to be identity in spite of these differences, we must be able to point out wherein that identity lies. When we look out for the point of identity between the past and the present self of

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a man, we find that it is not very easy to discover it. In what point is a child identical with the old person that it comes to be in course of time? The body has become totally different. The empire of cells which constituted the body of the child is altogether absent from the body of the old man. The thoughts and fancies of the child are quite foreign to the mind of the old man; they are perhaps not even remembered by him. If the body and the mind constitute the concrete self of a man, and if they both become totally different, how can we say that the person still remains identical with himself?

One solution of the difficulty will be the supposition of a soul-substance which does not get itself involved in the vicissitudes of its body or in its mental experience. It is a common saying in India that there is no old age or decay for the soul. The soul of a child is not young nor is the soul of an old man old. Growth and decay belong to the body which is only the outer garment of the soul. The soul itself remains unaffected by the changes in the body. It is eternal and immutable, its nature is such that it can not suffer any change.

If the self of a man is really of this nature, then we can conceive, without much difficulty, how the self of an old man may be the very same self of his childhood. The body and the mind may have become different. But the self which animates and illuminates both body and mind remains the same. This hypothesis therefore seems to explain the problem of personal identity very clearly. But it does so only by rendering the rest of experience inexplicable and by giving rise to a host of other problems. It is of course our common experience that we know things, feel joys and sorrows and do acts of various sorts. So some of those who believe in the unchanging nature of the self, think that the self really knows and feels and acts (*Jnata, Bhokta, Karta*). Some say that it does not act but only knows and enjoys (*Jnata, Bhokta*). Others think that it neither acts nor enjoys but it only knows things. It is easy to see that if the self really acts or enjoys, it can not remain immutable. We can not think of any activity or enjoyment

in which the actor or the enjoyer does not undergo any change. To be active is to subject oneself to some change. Really to enjoy means also to court change. So we see if we accept real activity or enjoyment for the self its immutability will suffer and the problem of identity will not be solved by it.

Coming to the third theory also (the self only know^{er}) we find that if by knowledge we understand accumulation of experience, if i.e. we believe that new knowledges are produced in the self, the self can not remain altogether changeless. The self with a particular knowledge is certainly different from the self which was without that knowledge. If the knowing self is to remain absolutely identical with itself, entirely unaffected by the objects that come to be known or remain unknown by it, we must understand the nature of its knowledge a little differently. In the first place we must understand that no new knowledge is produced in it. There is no new or old knowledge ; knowledge is ever the same. The knowing self is to be conceived after the manner of a self-luminous substance by which things are enlightened. But the number and the quantity of the things, that are lighted up by it, do not affect or add anything to the nature of illumination as such. Things appear and disappear in the field of its vision but the vision itself is not affected by the appearance and the disappearance of objects. Such is the nature of the unchanging subject which knows but does not act or feel.

But if the nature of the self is such that it can not be affected by anything in the world, how will it have any experience at all ? If the experiences are not to bring about any change in the experiencer, we do not know in what sense they are to belong to him. They remain external to the supposed experiencer ; they might be his as well as anybody else's. In other words we can not say that they are specially his. Experiences are not denied by any philosopher. But they must be owned by some experiencer. If the self, which is supposed to be the experiencing subject, can not own any experience, we are reduced to the position of supposing that there are no

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experiencers. This is as good as to say that there is no experience. But this is absurd.

Even if we waive this objection, there will remain other difficulties. We have seen that if the self is to be considered really immutable it can be so considered only in the sense of a self-luminous substance to which all activity and all enjoyment, either joy or sorrow, are quite foreign. There is not the slightest disturbance in its being or knowledge. The steady light of its knowledge never flickers. There is not the slightest tendency or inclination on its part to appropriate any object by knowledge. The object appears or disappears from its knowledge whenever it listeth. It remains supremely unconcerned in all the events that ever happen. There is no movement in its eternal rest. There is no wink in its eternal gaze.

When the self refuses to accept any characteristics which may mark some change or difference, it is no wonder that it must ever remain identical with itself. But it is doubtful whether there is any such self in reality. Even if there is, our problem will not be solved by it. Our problem is not whether anything in the world is identical with itself but whether we remain identical with ourselves. This problem will be solved by this theory of the self, when and only when it can be shown clearly that we are in reality nothing but this self-luminous self. This however can not really be shown. By sheer dogmatism and faith, I may assert the proposition that I am immutable and eternal. But neither in theory nor in practice can I demonstrate that it is really so, and the reasons for this are obvious.

We have the clear consciousness that we act and feel. There are undoubted acts for for which we ourselves are responsible and no one else. Activity on the part of the self appears undeniable. At least it cannot be denied that we feel happy and miserable under different circumstances. There may be some difficulty in understanding the nature of activity, and philosophical doubts may arise as to how and in what sense we can be active. But there can not

be any such doubt or misunderstanding about our pleasures and pains. They are given most directly in our experience. Their being consists in our experiences of them and such experiences can never be denied. We have the experience of pleasure and of pain ; we ourselves feel happy or miserable. There can not be any happiness or misery without any body being either happy or unhappy. And if anybody is to be happy or unhappy it is the self which must be so. But if the self is really immutable it cannot be happy and unhappy under different circumstances. Here we have got a manifest contradiction—a contradiction between the demands of the theory, which says that the self is immutable, and the patent facts of experience. Since the facts of experience can not be denied, it stands to reason that the theory should be rejected.

There is one and only one way of defending this theory in face of these facts. We may suppose that the self which is immutable and cannot really be happy or unhappy supposes through mistakes that it is so.

It is a perverse illusion that makes the self appear to itself as happy or miserable, although in fact the nature of the self is such that it can not in the least be touched by joy or sorrow. This theory of illusion is always the necessary pendant to the theory of the pure self, which is supposed to remain unaffected by the joys and miseries of mundane existence. This is the only defence that can be offered in support of the supposed immutability of the self. We shall see just now how even this defence breaks down before legitimate criticism.

A mistake or an illusion is possible when a thing is taken to be other than what it really is. The thing in fact must be different from what it is taken to be. There can not be any illusion of a thing which is always identical with that for which it is taken—whose being i.e., is identical with the being of that which appears in knowledge. There can not be any mistaking about it. Now the being of pleasure consists in

its being experienced as pleasure. We can not conceive of any pleasure which is different from our experience of it as pleasure. We are happy when we feel happy. The feeling of happiness is the being of happiness. So it appears that it is not possible to have an illusory experience of happiness. We may be led to feel happy by some false information but the resultant happiness will not be false. It could be false only if one could be happy without feeling any happiness or could be miserable even when in the enjoyment of highest happiness. Such however is never the case. So the hypothesis of illusion does not seem to apply to our experiences of pleasure and pain. When we are passing through some pleasurable or painful experiences, it can not be said that we are having an illusion of them. Illusion of them being impossible we have to admit that in passing through such experiences we are really made subject to favourable or unfavourable changes.

Moreover the self, according to the theory we are considering here, is a self-luminous substance. It is not involved in any affairs of the world. Apart from the function of shining and illuminating objects, it has no other function to perform in the course of nature and history. Even this shining can not be called a function in a real sense of the term. It is its nature (*swarupa*). We may call it only the self-shining light. But when it does not appropriate to itself any object by knowledge, when, that is, it does not take any thing for anything, how can it commit any mistake? Apprehension and misapprehension are not possible without some active tendency. When the self does not take any active attitude towards anything, it seems evident that mistaking is a phenomenon which from the nature of the case can not be associated with it. When further we remember that the self is of light all compact, that it is the very centre and substance of all knowledge, we realise how impossible it is for such a self ever to come to be under any illusion.

When we find that there are some experiences about which there can not be any illusion and we also see that the nature

of the self is such that it can not suffer from any illusion, it appears absurd to suppose that by illusion the self attributes those experiences to itself. It is only by a further illusion that we can seriously maintain that there has been an illusion on the part of the self in thinking of itself as either happy or unhappy.

Let us suppose that somehow there is a transcendental immutable substance which remains identical with itself. This self-identical substance is the self which is the ground and explanation of its feeling of identity. Now this self-identical substance is supposed to explain the problem of identity of the self because it remains absolutely identical with itself. But if it remains absolutely identical how does the problem of identity at all arise? It may be supposed that although it remains identical with itself, it is found in different contexts, and so the problem arises whether it is really identical. But if it is found in different contexts, it must be related to those contexts. If it were not related to those contexts, what sense is there in supposing that it is in those contexts rather than in others absolutely unrelated to it. But if it is related to different contexts, will not its relation to different contexts result in a like difference in itself? It seems it will. If it does then it itself becomes different and can not be the ground of identity. So we see if the substance is absolutely identical with itself, the problem of its identity will not arise. If there is a real occasion for the rise of the problem, the self ceases to remain absolutely identical with itself and thus ceases to be the explanatory ground of its identity. So either the problem of its identity will not arise or the supposed ground will not be its explanation.

Let us suppose that the problem has somehow arisen. Will not a self-identical substance explain the problem? Now if the substance is absolutely identical with itself, how are we to assert the relation of identity in it? A relation always subsists between two things each of which must be an other of the other. This requires some room for difference which the

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absolute identity of an immu'able substance can not provide.

This should be enough to show that a transcendental immutable self identical substance can not give a satisfactory solution of the problem of personal identity.

But although we may give up the hypothesis that the self is a transcendent substance, we may try to solve the difficulty by supposing that the self is an immanent substance. The self need not be transcendent to all its experiences, qualities and states. It may be immanent in them but the very conception of the self as a substance will help us, it may be contended, to get over the difficulties presented by the difference of its states and qualities. It may be supposed for instance that a substance is a unity of its qualities. This means that one and the same substance can possess different qualities. This further implies that the identity of a substance is not affected by the difference in its quality. If this is so, then we need not suppose that when there has been a change in the qualities of a substance, there has necessarily intervened a corresponding change in the identity of the substance also. The substance which goes by the name of the self may exhibit different qualities at different stages of its existence but from such difference in the qualities, one can not argue that the substance itself has become different.

Moreover it may be argued that a substance is different from its qualities. If the substance were non-different i. e., absolutely identical with the qualities, we should suppose either that there is the substance or that there are the qualities but not that there is the substance with its qualities. The substantiality of a substance, i. e. the character of a substance as a substance is different from its qualities. So a change in the qualities of a substance can not mean a change in its substantiality. And the identity of a substance means the identity of its substantiality.

Let us see if this is a satisfactory solution of our problem. A substance may be in a sense the unity of its qualities. But its unity is constituted by its qualities, that is to say, its

unity is the concrete unity of its particular qualities. If the particular qualities, which constitute the unity of a substance, become different, will the substance remain the same? If the particular qualities exhibited by a self in its early childhood are not present in its late old age, how are we to say that the self in old age is the very same self that was there in its childhood? When a thing is supposed to remain the same in two different states much of what is found present in it in one state is found to be there in it in the other state also; so we may say that it has so far remained the same. But no such sameness is easily to be found out throughout the lifetime of a self.

Identity can not also be based on mere substantiality. If we take substantiality in an abstract and general way it will be found to be the same in all substances. This will give the identity of all substances and not merely the identity of a particular substance with itself in its different states. If we take substantiality concretely, we shall find that the substantiality of a particular substance means nothing else than the possession by it of a particular group of attributes. When the particular group of attributes constituting the particular concrete substantiality of a substance becomes changed, its substantiality also changes, leaving us, thereby, no ground for our assertion of its identity. We need not believe in a substance a change in the qualities of which does not mark change in itself.

Thus we find that the conception of the self as a substance, either transcendent or immanent, can not by itself explain the identity we seem to find in it. Even those who believe that the self is a substance do not seek to explain its identity merely from the fact that it is a substance. They rely rather on the unity and the continuity which in their opinion are discoverable in the life of a self. Let us now consider whether and how far unity and continuity can account for the identity of the self.

It may be frankly admitted at the outset that unity and

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continuity do really supply some very plausible arguments in favour of the identity of things. Without some unity we can not say that α thing is there. If we do not find any unity, we have no right to say that there is one thing rather than two or many. Conversely if we find some unity in some terms, we conclude that they are members of a single whole. The whole is the same whole which has each different member as one of its parts or aspects. From the unity of the parts we pass on to the identity of the whole which shows itself in them. Prof. Laird has for instance, maintained that the self is a substance or a whole which has experiences for its parts. When we see some characteristic unity in experiences, we may conclude that it is based on the identity of the self of which these experiences are the parts. Similarly we may conclude to the identity of a thing when we find some continuity in it. If there are to be two different things then one of them must cease to exist where the other begins. There must be a break in the middle. If there is no break, if i. e. one has not ceased to exist, we feel justified in saying that it is the samething which has continued. Such arguments are not perhaps vitiated by any palpable fallacy and it is natural for us to suppose that there is some identity at the root of all unity and continuity. Still we shall presently see that unity and continuity do not satisfactorily explain the difficulties of personal identity.

Is there any unity at all in the self or its experiences? It is said there is. "And there are general arguments which go to prove that any experience, to be an experience at all, must imply a considerable measure of unity. The most famous and the strongest argument on this head is Kant's deduction of the synthetic unity of apperception" (Laird—Problem of the Self, Page 218.)

It may be true that in any experience there must be a considerable measure of unity. But this unity is confined to particular experiences. If there is to be any experience, there must be some unity in it, but the unity need not go beyond

the particular experience concerned. So far and so long as some synthetic function is exercised, there must be some unity but not beyond that. If from such unity we are to infer the identity of the self, the self will be identical with itself only so long as one particular experience lasts. If there is to be the same self in different experiences, it must be proved that the different experiences are bound by some unity. And this probably is not proved by Kant's argument. If we are to be justified in our belief that it is the same self, which is present in all the experiences, that are ascribed to a man from his birth to his death, and if we are to rely, for this purpose, on arguments from unity, we must be able to show that there is some unmistakable unity in all such experiences. And this is very difficult to show.

It is not at all easy to discover any running unity in the lives of many persons. People have their own whims and eccentricities. Some are expressly recognised as whimsical or capricious. A whim or a caprice is that which does not fit in with the plan of one's character. A whimsical person is one whose conduct is not regulated by a unitary plan. But to be capricious is not the privilege or misfortune of a few rare individuals. There is a streak of caprice in every one of us. It is the element of irrationality in human lives and no one can ever pretend, not even the greatest among us, that his life from beginning to end is completely rational. There are acts and incidents in the life of every man which are not in strict conformity with any principle that is supposed to regulate the other parts of his life. Says Prof. Laird—"The lives of many of us show a wanton disregard of unity. Traits of character appear which seem totally out of keeping with the general trend of the life and often it seems impossible to say that a particular life has a general trend at all" (217). If there is no 'general trend' no closely knit unity in the life of a self, how are we to be sure, basing ourselves on the criterion of unity, that it is the same self which has lived the life?

We do not seek to maintain that there is no unity at all

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in the life of a man. We admit with Prof. Laird that 'there is a closely knit connection in many particular strands of a life.' But we say that all the unity that we can discover is of particular strands only. There is no strict unity in the fabric as a whole. Even Prof. Laird says that "The unity of the self from the cradle to the tomb is less than the unity of many particular strands of its experience." (361). When it is said that the unity of the whole is looser or less than the unity of many particular strands, it seems to be recognised that when we regard any life as a whole we find many elements which do not strictly form part of any unity at all. Otherwise why should the unity of the whole be looser than the unity of its parts? Now if there are experiences which do not form part of any unity and if unity is the proof of the identity of the self, then these experiences along with others which fall within the plan of a unity can not be ascribed to the very same person. They will belong either to momentary personalities or to no person at all. But since it is not possible to have any experience without an experiencer, it is more likely that they will belong to persons with momentary existence. But if the life of a man were to be interfered with by the appearance and disappearance of such foreign personalities, there would be no real continuity and unity in the life, and consequently, it would not be true to say that the whole life belongs to one and the same man.

It may be contended that the whole life of a man is not altogether devoid of all unity. There is some unity, but the unity of the whole life is less marked or close than the unity of its many particular strands. But if the unity can be more or less, then the identity which is marked or judged by it will be also more or less. And personal identity, as Bradley says, will be 'mainly a matter of degree.' But is it really so? If identity means sameness, can we have identity between things which are not really the same? If they must be the same, can their identity be more or less? In any case when I assert that I was there, do I really mean

that I am more or less the same person who was there and the very person who was there can not now be found at all? If I am not exactly the same person who was there why do I say that I was there?

Moreover there is no one single unity in the life of a man; there are many unities. A man generally belongs to a group for his religion, to another for his profession and sometimes to a third for his pleasure. These different groupings mark more or less well-defined unities in his life. There does not appear to be any special unity which coordinates all these unities under it. There is no particular unity between a golfer and a catholic or a dealer in hides. Again unity is found not in the life of one person, but it can also be found in the lives of many different persons. Persons coming from a particular locality, or belonging to a particular profession or faith exhibit some characteristic unity in their lives. The unity can not be overlooked at least in a family, where all different members are bound together by harmonious relations. If this is so, and if unity is our criterion for identity, then we shall be obliged to admit that what is generally supposed to be the life of a single man is in fact the lives of many different persons and the so called different persons again are nothing but parts of a composite personality. From this it is evident that mere unity can not throw any clear light on the problem of personal identity.

Even if we suppose that there is some characteristic unity in the life of one person which is not available in the lives of many and that this unity is not the unity of its particular strands we shall find that unity is not sufficient to account for identity. 'This self' says Prof. Liard "it is plain, consists of experiences and identity is of the experiences" (p. 245). If the self consists of experiences, the identity of the self should mean the identity of its experiences. But have we got the identity of experiences when we are talking of their unity only? Two or more terms may be the constituents of a single whole and on that account there be some unity in

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them ; but that will never guarantee any identity between them. If the experiences of a child are not the experiences of an old man, they are not clearly identical, although they may be unified under the conception of a long life. If then the identity of the self is the identity of its experiences, the self of an old man is not clearly identical with the self of the child. The unity of experiences may at best signify that they are parts of a single life or a single self, but it can not show that the self is the same at different stages of its life or in its different experiences. For the self as constituted by all its experiences is not clearly available in any of its particular experiences and so there can not be any significant judgment about its sameness. When I say I am here or I was there if by the personal pronoun 'I' we mean a self, we do not take the self to be constituted by all its experiences. For the self with all its experience can be neither here or there. The problem of the identity of the self does not refer to the identity of a supposed self, which consists of all its experiences but to the identity of the self which is here now and is supposed to have been there sometime back.

When we come to consider continuity, we find ourselves confronted with similar difficulties.

Consciousness seems to be essential to the self. The self would be no self if it had no consciousness. And the continuity of the self should include the continuity of consciousness. But it is open to serious doubt whether there is any continuity in the consciousness of the self. By sleep, and sometimes by swoon, the self is deprived of its consciousness. These are supposed to occasion undoubted gaps in its consciousness. How can we then maintain that there is any continuity at all in its consciousness ?

It may be supposed that the self is not mere consciousness, it is body as well, and there is no break in the continuity of its body and this accounts for its identity. But it should be remembered that when I pass any judgment of identity about

myself, I do not do so after realising the fact that my body has all along been continuous.

If continuity were the ground of identity, I should be identical not only with myself but with anything in the world. My body is continuous with the whole world. There is no intermediate gap between my body and the rest of the world. So in a sense I may be said to be continuous with every thing else. My thought too is continuous with the thoughts of the past. There have been contacts between the things of different peoples in the past. Thoughts of my predecessors as well as of contemporaries have helped to mould my thought. But in spite of this continuity I do not feel any identity of selfhood with the rest of the world.

Continuity may justify the unity of a series but never the identity of its terms. A compact series of numbers may be continuous but this does not mean that any two of its terms are identical with each other.

Mere continuity is not thought sufficient to guarantee personal identity. As Bradley has pointed out, qualitative sameness also is necessary. "As far as I can judge it is usual for personal identity to require both continuity and qualitative sameness." The question is whether we find any qualitative sameness at all. Not only is it not certain that in any case there is qualitative sameness along with continuity, but it appears even doubtful whether with qualitative sameness, we can have any continuity. If there is qualitative sameness, how can we know or mark that there has been any transition and without transition how can we speak of continuity at all? From this we get the more fundamental question whether any continuity is at all compatible with identity. In the case of real identity we are left with what is essentially one and the same thing. In what is it to be continuous? It is not very usual to speak of one and the same thing as continuous with itself.

Thus we see that it is very difficult to find any valid ground for our belief in personal identity. But we showed at the

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outset how universal the belief is and also pointed out its importance for a right understanding of experience. So before accepting the belief as true or rejecting it as false we should make clear to ourselves the sense in which the belief is actually held and in which it seems to be essential to a rational interpretation of experience.

We do not believe that the self taken concretely as the unity of its mind and body remains absolutely the same throughout its whole life. If it were absolutely the same it should preclude the possibility of all change in the life of the self. But as we have seen, all our endeavour to improve ourselves, morally or otherwise, is invariably accompanied by the belief that it is possible to make change in the self. The very experience which requires that the self should remain identical with itself also requires that the self should be subject to change. So it is certain that we do not believe in the pure identity of the self. It is no use trying to find basis for a belief which is not there.

But even though the self may not be absolutely identical, yet if any identity is there it must be a real identity. That is to say, although the self as a whole may not be absolutely identical throughout its life, there must be some element in it which remains absolutely identical. There must be a respect in which the self is wholly identical. Let us see if there is any element in the self which remains identical.

We have said that if there is to be any experience at all, there should be an identical self as the bearer of this experience, because our experience is a thing of gradual growth and this will not be possible unless there is some basis on which the results of our past sensations and perceptions, thoughts and volitions can be accumulated. But for this it does not appear absolutely necessary that there should be a self-identical self. The purpose may as well be served by our psycho-physical organism through which all our experience is acquired. Even this organism does not need, for the possibility of experiences, to remain identical with itself for a very long time. The

results of our past experience need not remain gathered up in a permanent store-house. It will be enough if they can be carried forward along with our body. The bodies may even be of very short duration—our present bodily self may arise on the grave of our past selves. The only thing necessary is that it should rise with all the varied heritage of its predecessors.

When we judge of a particular person present before us that he is the same as the one whom we saw some years back, we make an inferential judgment based on the marked similarity of the two appearances. Primarily we got two figures before our mind's eye—the one given by perception and the other recalled by memory. The two figures may not only be numerically distinct but may also be qualitatively different. The one may be thicker or thinner than the other. But in spite of this difference there must be some indisputable identity to serve as the basis of our judgment. This basis we find in the identity of the form of two figures. This is all the identity that can be found as given in such instances. That the self-conscious personality, associated with the visible figure, has contentiously remained the same without suffering a break, is not given in experience but supplied by our thought. When further we find that the person before us speaks in a manner and a tone, that were peculiar to the person we knew before, we are considerably strengthened in our belief that we see before us the same person of our old acquaintance. But the similarity in figure, speech or thought does not constitute the identity of the person. These similarities are only the signs from which we infer the identity which is intimately one with the person himself.

But in order that we may be able to supply this identity by our thought, it is necessary that it should be directly given to us in some form of experience. It is thought that we have the original experience of identity in our own selves. We have an indubitable sense of identity throughout our past life. We feel the persons that we now are, engaged in serious affairs of life, are the very persons who played with toys in childhood.

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But what is the basis of this feeling ? How do we validate our sense of identity in the face of the fact that we do not actually find any identical element throughout our life ?

It may be supposed that we have got a basis of identity in memory. Whenever we feel that we are now the same as what we were before, we invariably refer to some past experience which we are able to recall.

But although the identity of the self may be one of the hypothesis by which memory may be sought to be explained, it is not the only hypothesis. Memory refers no doubt to the past but must itself have some basis in the present, from which we are able to project things in the past. If the basis can otherwise be available, we need not think then of a self-identical past self. Our past experience may leave some traces in the organism, which may have come to our present body by successive inheritance. Memory may play us false. Sometimes we remember to have done some thing which in fact we never did before. There may be a tract of experience in our past life out of which we are not at present able to recall any thing. The fact that we are able to recall some experience does not prove whether or not we actually had the experience.

Moreover from memory we may infer identity, but identity is not given by memory. Memory refers to a past incident. But identity must be in present fact.

But although memory does not solve the problem of identity, it seems to refer to the right place where we can look for the solution. When we say we get at identity by memory or by recognition (*Pratyabhijñā*) which involves memory we do not mean that the remembered content is the same as the content of our present experience ; what seems to be meant is that the experiencing subject in different experiences is the same. And this is a fact. No experience is possible without a subject which is the self. And the self never detects any change in its subjectivity. The object changes and the changes can clearly be pointed out. But the subject remains the same. The subject is not given as an objective content of any experience.

It is given in its self-enjoyment and in this no change or difference is ever discoverable. We may imagine it to undergo some change by confusing it with a complex of objective contents. But if we view it in its subjectivity, we find that no change is possible in it. We find that the subject remains ever truly identical with itself. True identity can be found only where there is no change or difference. The identity of the subject is the only meaning of the identity of the self. Here we have got identity in the absolute sense. All other identities are only more or less and with regard to certain elements and in some respects. And unless the elements and the respects are specified we cannot determine whether any judgment of identity is right or wrong.

The Central Problem of Metaphysics.

G. R. Malkani.

It is common to affirm that the subject-matter of philosophy is the whole of reality. But sciences also study reality. What then is the difference between a philosophical and a scientific study of reality? It may be that they do not study the same reality; or if they do, it is not exactly the same sort of questions that they raise.

At the very outset it is evident that the standpoint of a science is necessarily very much limited. Observation reveals that facts of nature fall into certain well-defined groups or classes. Each science studies the facts that are relevant to a particular class only. It is indeed true that the student of science is sometimes conscious of the arbitrariness of the line dividing one class from another. But still the line has to be drawn somewhere. Science cannot tackle the whole of reality taken together. It can only do so by isolating one set of phenomena from another and treating it as a more or less completed system. Every science then has first of all to define its facts,—the sort of phenomena it wants to subject to examination. It studies reality only as reality is defined by certain postulates the truth of which scientific logic does not question.

Another limitation of a scientific study of reality is the scope of the subject-matter as a whole. It is a fundamental postulate of science that the real is the visible and the objective. Accordingly it leaves out of account everything that is either subjective or transcendental. The former has no interest for science; for it signifies to the scientific mind lack of order. The latter is never seen to have existence. Reality for science is thus confined merely to phenomena of an objective character.

This however is not all. Science makes another postulate, namely that facts of nature are unaffected by the fact of their being known. Indeed it cannot prove the truth of this statement. Nor can it consider facts other than the facts known. The only data for science are the sense-data which are the products of man's perceptive faculties. Nevertheless science holds the unwarranted position that its study of facts is the study of ultimate reality as such, and that the laws which are seen to hold good of those facts also hold good of the latter.

We have set out so far some of the general limitations of a scientific study of reality. In order to have a scientific problem however two further presuppositions are necessary ; firstly, that change is real ; and secondly, that nature repeats itself, or that there are uniformities that are in the nature of things themselves. A static universe can offer no scientific problem ; and we cannot study a thing unless we reconstitute it as part of a process. Also we can have no problem if we do not notice common modes of behaviour among isolated phenomena and conclude that there is an order inherent in the nature of things. The question now is, are the presuppositions justified? Science does not attempt to answer this question. Its solution is beyond the scope of a mere empirical science. Science accordingly accepts the presuppositions on mere faith, and so far the whole fabric of scientific knowledge may be said to rest on unsound foundations.

We now come to scientific procedure. The task which science sets to itself is not to explain anything; it is to describe what actually happens. But how are we to determine what actually happens? We can well describe what we see. We cannot describe what is beyond the seen and the known. We have accordingly recourse to certain general descriptive formulae the truth of which is merely hypothetical and can never be *seen*. These formulae or laws as they are called in science are simply *our* ways of thinking together certain perceived uniformities in the isolated phenomena of nature,—they do not give us a peep into *nature's own ways*. If our

perception in course of time discovers a single exception to a hitherto recognised uniformity, the law must be accordingly changed. If it discovers a new uniformity comprehending a wider range of phenomena, the laws as previously formulated must either be given up as wholly wrong or radically modified. The essential thing to note is that the law, by its very nature, can neither be unchangeable nor ultimate. It is man-made, and true only so far as it faithfully describes certain phenomena experienced by him up to a certain point. The scientific search after the actual thus becomes an unattainable ideal. The only thing actual so far as science is concerned is what we actually see. When we go beyond this to set out the processes underlying what we see, we go into a realm of speculation which has no satisfactory goal.

The true reality for science is the law, not the thing; and the law is necessarily abstract; it is obtained by ignoring real differences. It also represents an incomplete synthesis of experience; for our experience is continually growing as observation reveals new facts for study. The whole structure of scientific knowledge is built out of concepts and formulae that are strictly relative to the range of our observation and powers of perceptual discrimination and of intellectual synthesis. Laws are not what may be called *natural necessities*; they are, as has been appropriately said, a sort of conceptual short-hand that "relieves our memory from the burden of individual sequences, and enables us to grasp a vast complexity of natural phenomena".*

*Note in this connection the following: "Scientific law is the resume or brief expression of the relationships and sequences of certain groups of these perceptions and conceptions, and exists only when formulated by man. It has no relation to something above and beyond man, but solely to the special products of his perceptive faculty.....By the contents and the manner of perception the law of nature is essentially conditioned for each perceptive faculty. It does not, any more than sense-impressions, lie in a universe outside and unconditioned by ourselves. pp. 84-85. The law of gravitation is not so much the discovery by a Newton of a

We have seen something of the problem and the method of science. It may now be contended that the problem of reality which philosophy must face cannot be materially different. What science seeks to know is just what philosophy also ultimately seeks to determine. The goal of both is the same, namely knowledge of reality. Only their mode of approach is slightly different. Philosophy as the universal science is unhampered by the stand-point of any particular science. It can take a wider view. It can examine, criticise, and co-ordinate the results of different sciences, and thereby help to arrive at a more unified and self-consistent view of reality. But the labours of the different sciences are essential to the realisation of this goal. Philosophy cannot afford to ignore scientific research. And if the sciences are yet incomplete, any system of philosophy reared upon them must be incomplete also. There is no short-cut to truth.

This may be true. But can philosophy on this view be said to be an independent branch of knowledge with a method of its own for studying reality? Can it be more than a superficial view of things generally, which only those who are incapable of a detailed study of things would like to undertake? We think it is a wholly false view according to which science is what matters both in method and in substance, and philosophy is no more than a sort of general index of the sciences. There is such a thing as a philosophical approach to reality, and the justification of it lies in a new problem and a method of tackling it which is quite distinct from the method of the sciences.

Prof. Bradley, in his *Appearance and Reality*, holds the view that the object of metaphysics is to get at ultimate truth intellectually. He says, "All of us, more or less, are led beyond the region of ordinary facts. Some in one way and rule guiding the motion of the planets as his invention of a method of briefly describing the sequences of sense-impressions, which we term planetary motion."

K. Pearson's *Grammar of Science*.

some in others, we seem to touch and have communion with what is beyond the visible world. And, with certain persons, the intellectual effort to understand the universe is a principal way of thus experiencing the Deity."

It is evident that according to Bradley the object of philosophy is to grasp the whole of reality; and this whole is somehow non-sensuous, and equivalent to what in ordinary parlance is called Deity. The question now is, can we experience the Deity intellectually? The intellect has relevance only to the visible. It cannot construct the invisible by any consideration of the visible; and when it does seem to suggest the invisible, it relies on an intuition which is wholly non-intellectual and mystical in character. The work of the intellect can at best be negative. It can clear certain misunderstandings about the Deity. It cannot give any positive knowledge of It. A metaphysics then which seeks to grasp the Deity, the Whole, or the Invisible All, must, at the very outset, point distinctly to an intuition of It which is different from our intuition of things visible. What is this intuition in the system of Bradley or of any writer who holds similar views as to the task of metaphysics? We seek in vain.

It is sometimes held that the fundamental problem of philosophy is the study of the nature of being as such. Now being is indeed the most general category. But when we want to have a problem about It, we must distinguish two different things: (a) The subjective affirmation which has no character; and (b) the objective variety of being. There can be no problem so far as the former is concerned. It means the denial of objectivity, and so of variety and manifoldness. If we want to have a problem of being then, it can only refer to the latter, and can only assume the form: what objective variety of being is the *being-stuff*? It is evident however that objectively considered, differences must be taken to be ultimate and irreducible; they can never be resolved into a simple and undifferentiated unity of being. This unity can only be found, if at all, in a non-objective and super-sensuous mode of existence.

But once again, how is this existence to be distinguished from that undifferentiated subjective being which we know in the direct intuition of the "I" or the "self" ?

Sciences seek to know the visible, metaphysics the invisible and the transcendental. But this latter is not some mysterious entity, called God or the Absolute. There may be an entity that deserves to be called God. But there is no intuition of Him which may be said to be common to all thinking beings alike. There is one entity however which every self-conscious individual knows to be real in some form or another, but which never forms part of the visible universe. It is the entity which every individual regards as his "self". The central problem of metaphysics is the study of the true nature of this "self". We have no direct intuition of Deity such as would pass unchallenged from critical epistemology. We have no intuition of a fundamental existence-stuff. But we have an intuition of ourselves ; and this intuition, properly understood, may satisfy our longing to know God or the nature of true being.

There is another reason why "self" should be regarded as the true subject-matter of philosophy. The urge to philosophical reflection does not come from a certain kind of intellectual curiosity merely. We have a natural curiosity to know the environment in which we find ourselves placed. The questions which suggest themselves to us in this connection are questions that can be properly tackled by the various physical sciences. There are no questions that relate to the environment or the visible universe as such that can truly be called philosophical. Philosophical reflection does not begin with an empty curiosity to know. How can there be any curiosity to know what we never see, and what never therefore puts any obstruction in the smooth movement of life ? The urge to philosophical reflection is also not the purely intellectual desire for system and unity. System and unity we must have. But system and unity on the intellectual plane must necessarily be a very inadequate and progressive matter ; its justification

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lies not in the satisfaction of a new desire, but the old one of a proper and all-rounded adjustment to environment. It can never become a new revelation of reality or a basis for a re-valuation of values.

True philosophical reflection begins with the consciousness of the pain of life, and especially the pain that is due not to the special circumstances of a life-time but to the very nature of a limited and circumscribed existence, in short, the pain that is inherent in earthly life or bodily existence as such. The greatest of these pains is the pain of death or fear of self-annihilation. Philosophical reflection aims to unravel the mystery of the self or to distinguish our true nature from the super-imposed nature, and thus enables us to get over this pain. If pain is in the very nature of our being, the desire to be free from it must be an illusion. But the very fact that there is this desire and this desire supplies the very power of life, is an indication that things are not as they seem, and that our true nature must be different from the nature to which we find pain such a necessary adjunct. The urge to philosophical reflection is the desire to be free from pain and to attain to supreme happiness. This can only be achieved by knowledge of the true nature of our self. This knowledge is the only guarantee of our present well-being and ultimate good.

Our self is not unknown to us. We have an intuition of it which cannot be improved upon, by any amount of philosophical thinking, in its directness and power to convince. At the same time, it is not to be thought that there is no problem here. We know the self completely; and yet we *think wrongly* about it; we entertain various false beliefs. It is the business of philosophy to rationalise our beliefs,—to eliminate error from our thought. The fact of error is thus as fundamental a postulate of philosophical thinking as the fact of our complete knowledge of ultimate reality. The process of rationalisation consists in a proper analysis of this knowledge, and a harmonising of our beliefs with the real inner assent.

Reason can do nothing more. It can give us no extra revelation of reality.

It is often considered a great advantage of a scientific study of reality that the truths formulated by science can always be verified, while those of philosophy are incapable of verification. This is quite true. But what truths need verification? It is evident that it is only truths that are in the nature of generalisations that need verification. A truth that is based upon the deliverance of direct intuition does not need verification. We do not need, for example, to verify the fact that we see a table before us. Scientific truths are all in the form of generalisations or hypothetical statements. We do not see them to be true, we suppose them to be so; and the truth of a supposition needs to be verified by reference to the known body of facts,—a body of facts that is ever growing with the passage of time and the minuteness of observation. There can however never be any finality with regard to such truth; a hypothesis can always be replaced by an alternative hypothesis or by a more comprehensive one. A scientific truth is therefore by its very nature provisional, and merely a matter of convenience. It is not in the nature of things themselves.

Philosophical truth is nothing if it is not ultimate in character. This it can only be if it is of the order of intuitional or perceptual truth. Only this intuition does not relate to ordinary facts of nature. It relates to another kind of reality altogether. It is not to be understood however that philosophy is merely a matter of mystical perception. If it were no more, we should have no problem, and no room either for reason or for common agreement. Philosophy would cease to be the super-science, and a species of methodical study. Intuition there must be. But this intuition requires to be interpreted and its true significance brought out. It is an intuition that passes unnoticed ordinarily, because it is opposed to the common habits of thought and the every-day interests of life. It is the business of reason to reverse these habits and to bring out the true importance of things as they are

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viewed by us in their inmost nature. We have not to *construct a system of reality* which will have a distant relation to things that we see. We have simply to realise the full meaning of a reality that we know,—and yet know not, because we have so many misconceptions about its true character. This reality as we have seen is the self, and the intuition of it is our consciousness of the self or self-consciousness. All the mysticism that any strict philosophical method can ever admit is this common every-day intuition of self which comes to everybody, and on the strength of which alone the self is affirmed.

The progress of science is bound to be gradual and endless. The field of its inquiry grows with knowledge. As more is known, more remains to be known. Philosophy cannot proceed like science bit by bit. A philosophical view of reality is nothing if it is not a whole and completed view of things as they are. The problem is fixed. Its solution must be fixed. Our knowledge of things in detail may change. But that can never affect our view of the whole. For this view is based on data that are not the same as the data of a physical science or of any empirical study. It is based on a consideration of all the possible relevant facts. The view may indeed be right or wrong. But there can be no arbitrary test of its correctness. This test consists in the complete satisfaction of that desire which started the inquiry. So long as this is not achieved, there is bound to be room for uncertainty and doubt, and we might well say that the goal of philosophical thinking has not yet been reached. It will be reached when we know we have no further question. It is indeed a subjective test of truth; but there can be none which is more free from error, or more satisfying.

A Note on Contemporary Sensationalism.

N. N. Sengupta.

It was believed for a long time that the Kantian and Hegelian traditions had settled once for all, the issue between sense and reason. Empiricism had come to be regarded as a sign of philosophic immaturity which disturbed only here and there, the even tenor of modern thought. Sense-perception, however, has acquired a new importance for some time past in the views of Mach and Avenarius, in the philosophy of Radical Empiricism and in contemporary Realism.

One of the reasons for the revival of *Sensationalism* as a theory of knowledge, is to be found in the romantic ideal that the life which is worth living must be an *intense life*. Man's experience must be rich in variety and deep in meaning. Each pulse of experience should stimulate the whole being and each adjustment would bring with it a new arrangement of the mental pattern. A life steeped in sense conforms to this notion of intensity. A colour or a sound dominates the field of consciousness and guides the course of motor responses. On the one side there is an unceasing procession of sensations, rich and variegated; on the other side, the diverse impulses to action are given free play with every stimulation, so that sensations and emotions blend with impulses. As James says "No matter how small a tract of it be taken, it is always a much-at-once, and contains innumerable aspects and characters which conception can pick out, isolate and thereafter always *intend*. It shows duration, intensity, complexity or simplicity, interestingness, excitingness, pleasantness or their opposites. Data from all our sense enter into it, merge in a general of which each occupies a big or a small share. Yet all these parts leave its unity unbroken"¹. It is a dynamic

1. James—Problems of Philosophy, p. 49.

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experience for "there is a push, an urgency in it, against which we are on the whole powerless"². The natural constitution of mind certainly develops other kinds of psychic states. Memory, anticipation and deliberation would gradually arise and claim their share in the guidance of life. But these must be regarded as halting stations of mind. The life of sense flows on "deep, majestic, smooth and strong".

The psychic life, conceived in this manner, represents the primal stage of mind. The vital actions of lower organisms take place under the guidance of sense-presentations, whenever a mental process can be supposed to intervene between a stimulus and a response. The cue of sense is sufficient for the organism to adjust itself to its limited world. Thus, the stream of sensations is capable of fulfilling the basic purposes of life, of satisfying the essential urges which are implicit in the life-process in all its forms³. Other states of consciousness are to be conceived as but subsidiary aids to organic adaptation.

Again, the reality directly communicates itself to the mind through sense-impressions.

".....or the visible scene
Would enter unawares into his mind
With all its solemn imagery, its rocks
Its woods, and that uncertain heaven received
Into the bosom of the steady lake".

Such an experience can be represented by thought only in a schematic form in which the perception loses its warmth and uniqueness in the system of concepts and relations. The value of conceptual translation lies in the fact that it can recall the vivid impressions. No concepts are necessary, when we are in the presence of percepts⁴. The latter alone bring man in touch with objects as vivid and concrete realities.

2. James—Meaning of Truth. p. 69.

3. James—Problems, p. 79.

4. F. C. S. Schiller—Humanism, p. 193.

The aesthetic value of sense-perceptions has much to do with the development of sensationalism. The aesthetic apprehension is unique and concrete ; it carries a sense of finality and satisfaction and leaves an after-effect in the mind which renders all other kinds of experience stale and shallow. At the same time, there is a pleasure in the retrospection of aesthetic states which, therefore, serve as stimuli to thought and memory. A similar account of sense-perception is given by the sensationalist. The sensation, too, is unique and concrete. Thought is stimulated by perceptions and appears abstract and unreal in contrast with the vividness of percepts. The sensationalist, thus, rests his evaluation of sensations upon an aesthetic basis.

There is an indescribable quality in sensations which thought fails to retain. When we hold conversations with a friend the subtle message of movements and intonations leaves its mark upon our consciousness and supplies a context for our understanding. The conceptual translation of the conversation fails to represent the spirit and the meaning. In the same way, our perception of a beautiful landscape or of a glorious sunset eludes the rigid language of concepts. For this reason it is said that thought, however articulate and elaborate it may be, ever fails to embody the reality as it presents itself in sensation.⁵

All forms of sensationalism prevalent to-day owe a heavy debt to Hume. To be sure, the term 'impression' as used by Hume possesses a wider denotation than 'sensation' of modern thinkers. "By the term impression" Hume states "I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel or love or hate, or desire or will"⁶. Clearly, 'impression' thus defined, subsumes all kinds of immediate experience sensory, emotive and volitional. Yet in his actual analysis of higher

5. James—Pluralistic Universe, p. 285.

6. Hume—An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (Open Court), p. 15.

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types of thought Hume apparently identifies the term with sensation. Thoughts and ideas arise out of impressions when the latter grow less 'lively' or 'vivacious'. Inferences are possible through 'association' which is nothing more than custom or habit. Intellectual knowledge thus is a derivative of sensations. It arises through the operation of certain physical laws :—the law that a stimulation left to itself grows weaker, and that 'custom' or 'habit' sets in when sensations repeat themselves. All orders of knowledge then can be regarded as constituted of sense materials under these conditions.

Present day sensationalism differs from traditional empiricism and from Hume in many ways. In the traditional philosophy of empiricism, the ultimate problems such as those of substance, of causality etc. were regarded as insoluble. For there could be no solution of these questions in terms of sensuous knowledge of facts. To the sensationalist of today sensations are no longer looked upon as *representations* of reality; they themselves are fragments of reality. In sensing, the subject directly communes with the real world and not with its shadow. Thus, each of the basic concepts can be defined in terms of sensation. 'Substance' is a 'class' of sensations; 'Causality' is a functional relation between sensations and so forth. In so far then, the modern sensationalist has not advanced beyond Hume. But Hume was a sceptic; he had still an idea of an independent world hovering in his consciousness. He was in this matter influenced by the tradition of the British empiricistic school. Its problem was to determine the limits of knowledge and not to explain the world in terms of knowledge. Hence, a portion of the universe always remained in the mind of these philosophers, independent of the system of experience; for Locke, the primary qualities, for Berkeley the Divine consciousness, and for Hume a general seuse of an overhanging reality. The sensationalist of today has got rid of this notion and has assumed a bolder attitude toward the world. Reality, he says, is immanent in

sensation ; it is only necessary to analyse experience in order to understand the proper constitution of facts. The subject as well as the object may be regarded as complexes of sensations. And since, nothing transcends or is logically prior to sensations, these cannot be regarded as subjective phenomena.

But there are other points of difference. For Hume the elementary constituent of knowledge is a 'vivacious' sensory quality. The analysis is carried through mainly with respect to the attribute of clearness or vividness. For the modern sensationalist, the elementary experience is a sensory quality delimited with respect to its attributes of intensity, duration or extensity. 'Sensation' for him therefore, is mainly an irreducible quality—intensity, quality-duration or quality-extension experience. The view of 'things' as complexes of 'perspectives', and of 'time' as complexes of sensation-moments bear out this view. The truth is that Hume was largely influenced by the then prevalent doctrine of truth as 'clear and vivid idea'. The ideas of constitution and of validity of experience were blended together and supplied the motive for his analysis. The sensationalist of today accepts the results of psychological analysis and identifies the psychological and epistemological notions.

Again, the associative link as conditioned by 'habit' is recognised as the main principle of combination of sensations into concrete and complex wholes in Hume's system. For the modern sensationalist, this account fails to do justice to the actual complexity of the question. Association for the older epistemologists is almost a mechanical force ; it operates upon the materials of sense and binds them together into concrete forms of cognition. No notice is taken of the living organism and its ways of behaviour ; nor is there any attempt to study the innate tendencies of the sensory processes themselves. The present day sensationalist proceeds to explain the nature of the combining processes on the basis of the tendencies inherent in the living organism and in the sensations themselves. Thus we have 'construction,' 'substitution', 'develop-

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ing' etc.—the relations that translate the particular sensations into concrete items of knowledge.

Two main questions arise in every system of sensationalistic epistemology. (i) In the first place, we are to enquire how the concrete objects of every day life can be explained in terms of sensation : in what specific manner do sensations combine in giving rise to knowledge of things. (ii) In the second place, there must be an explanation of the way in which concepts develop out of the materials of sense. A solution of this question would indicate the value and validity of concept in the scheme of knowledge. An examination of the answers that the sensationalist offers to these problems, would enable us to estimate its importance as a system of epistemology.

A particular existence, a thing, is for the sensationalist, a complex of sensory elements. We treat it as a unity, so far as it is useful for us to regard it in this manner. Consequently, the notion of the thing is a "vague image" of a totality.⁷ But the elements appear to differ in their stability. "Colours, sounds and the odours of bodies are evanescent. But their tangibility, as a sort of constant nucleus, not readily susceptible of annihilation, remains behind, appearing as the vehicle of, the more fugitive properties attached to it".⁸ Mach thus revives the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities. But both of them are alike sensory in their nature. Sensations are grouped into 'things' by habit that "keeps our thought firmly attached to the central nucleus". Put habit itself arises from the wider and more fundamental tendency of the organism to economise its efforts. The unity of things results from a practical necessity to neglect the actual multiplicity. We could, if need arose, observe the sensorial elements that really constitute things ; but the need of adaptation forces us to treat certain masses of sensations as units.

James agrees with Mach in this account of "thing". "The consciousness of particular material things present to sense"

7. Mach—Analysis of Sensations.

8. Mach—Analysis of Sensations.

is called perception⁹. And "perception differs from sensation by the consciousness of further facts associated with the object of sensation"¹⁰. It is a 'solidification' or 'integration' of actual and revived sensations. Consequently every material object is but the 'conflux' of sensible qualities. If we consider the cerebral mechanism of the process we find that cerebral path-making, an outcome of habit, is at the basis¹¹. And the principle of habit is that of economy¹².

In his doctrine of 'Pure Experience', James, tries to explain the origination of 'things' in terms of the inner propensity of experience. Pure experience, he says, is but another name for sensation. "But the flux of it no sooner comes than it tends to fill itself with emphases, and these salient parts become identified, fixed and abstracted"¹³. This 'dialectic of experience, however, is not inherent in the experience itself. It is an effect of the operation of the environment. "The elements in it (Pure Experience) that have a practical bearing upon life are verbally fixed and coupled together, so that we may know what is in the wind for us and get ready to react in time". It is the need of adaptation, then, that trims off the irrelevant and shapes the pure experience into 'things'. So that they may be taken account of and adequately reacted upon¹⁴.

Sensations by themselves cannot account for the origin of the complex which we call 'thing'. We must take recourse to some extraneous principle, be it that of physiological habit or of biological economy or of adaptation. The constituents of the sensory flux apart from these organising agencies cannot

9. James—Principles of Psychology Vol. II p. 76. James however uses the term 'percept' in the same sense as 'Sensation', c.f. Problems ch. IV. and Meaning of Truth.

10. Op. cit. p. 77.

11. Op. cit. p. 79.

12. Op. cit. p. 183-84.

13. James—Essays on Radical Empiricism, p. 94.

14. Op. cit. p. 96.

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form anything more than a flux. The Kantian and the post-Kantian philosophies in most of their ramifications have amply brought this home. Philosophers of this manner of thinking have, thus sought to formulate conditions that make knowledge possible. Instead of seeking these conditions in biological factors, they have turned to the system of knowledge itself, to the presuppositions underlying the inner constitution of knowledge. The sensationalist seeks his categories in the realm of Biology ; the Kantian seeks it in that of Logic and Epistemology.

It is possibly for this reason that the question of 'practice' has assumed such importance in the arena of Epistemology. The world of common experience is a world of 'things' but things cannot be explained wholly as sensation-complexes. The link between the constituents is non-sensuous ; it is 'practice'. Hence it follows that the world of our daily life owes its being to 'practice' epistemologically considered. Thus it is that 'practice' has claimed recognition as an epistemological entity as we find in pragmatism. This fact also explains the double tendency so obvious in Pragmatism. Pragmatism gravitates between sensationalism and voluntarism. In the doctrine of Radical Empiricism we have an explanation of knowledge in terms of sensations ; in the doctrine of 'Will to believe' and in 'Humanism' of Schiller, the explanation is in the terms of Will, in terms of practice. The novelty of Pragmatism consists in an apparent welding together of these two tendencies.

No one can deny the importance of 'practice' ; the question is whether it should find a place in Epistemology, whether it should be regarded as a constituent of knowledge in the same way as sensations. Regarded as a physical response, simple or complex, it should clearly be excluded. It may be a condition of sensation-combination ; but it cannot itself be a constituent of the process. It belongs to a different order of reality, namely, action. But one might say that it is not the physical responses but their psychic correlates which weld together the fragments of sensations and give rise to the

world which we have to face in daily life. Such considerations lie at the basis of all forms of voluntarism. The concepts of purpose and of 'rational will' of the neo-Fichtean philosophy owe their inception to this logic. In psychology, the motive has given rise to the doctrines of teleological mental activity and of apperception¹⁵. It has joined hands with vitalism¹⁶ in so far as the doctrine encroaches upon philosophy and Epistemology. The translation of practice into its psychic correlate carries reason and plausibility. But then, it means the abandonment of sensationalism, just as much as the acceptance of Kantain position does.

Sensationalism as a theory of knowledge, therefore, refutes itself. It is true of all types of the theory, old or new. The organism learns to react to 'things' rather than to impressions. The reaction occurs even when an impression has a chance to arise. The 'things' which make up the environment *mean* weal or woe action or inaction; the organism accepts and rejects them even without a full import of its activities. Sensations only serve to bring into relief one or more features of the thing, so that the action of the organism may be better directed. The world of things form the background of sensations and impart meaning to the latter. It is therefore, found that apart from actions, which represent the organic adjustment to things, sensations appear as a series of unrelated psychic phenomena. Sensations have to be supplemented by meanings in order that they may portray the world of every day life.

15. See Stout—Analytical Psychology, Vol. I.
Wundt—Outlines of Psychology.
- Hobhouse—Development and Purpose.
16. Driesch—History and Theory of Vitalism.

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"*L'Intuition Philosophique*", by Henri Bergson. Published by Hellen et Sergent. 125 Boulevard Saint Germain, Paris. Price 25 Frs.

This small book is a reprint of a paper of Henri Bergson, read on the 10th April 1910, before the Philosophical Congress, held at Boulogne. It is very suggestive and thought provoking. But the main interest of the book lies in the side light which it incidentally throws on the method of philosophising of Bergson himself, and in the indirect guidance that it gives for following his own works.

Bergson in this book maintains that the essence of Philosophical spirit is simplicity, (p. 83), that philosophising always consists in the performance of a simple act, and that all attempts at construction and synthesis resulting in apparent complications are in fact mere superficialities that do not touch the heart of true Philosophy. Every great Philosopher has a "simple", direct and concrete intuition of "something simple", so extraordinarily simple that he never fully succeeds in rightly expressing it. It is for this reason that he continues to talk about it his whole life. As he cannot fully set his vision before the world, he is forced to restate again and again in different wordings with a view to remove the misunderstandings created by each previous expression. This method of continuous restatement and perpetual recasting is by its very nature incompatible with the full statement of a simple intuition. (p. 17). But this is the only method given to us. We must therefore take note of these limitations in studying the works of any philosopher. We must free our mind from the confusing complications and try to get at the simple intuition or at least at the image that translates it. In as far as we succeed in this, we find that the philosophy in question would become clear and transparent. It is freed from those limitations of the time and place of her birth on which she seemed to depend so much in the beginning (p. 23). In order to explain these remarks Bergson refers to his professional experience. Every student of the History of Philosophy can easily notice that various philosophers make use of "the language of their own time", the terminology handed down to them by their predecessors on the one hand and modelled by the scientific conceptions of their own time on the other. It is not difficult to trace back many theories of any great philosopher to what appear to be, at first sight, their original sources—the works of his predecessors. There is certainly a pleasure in looking at a system in this light. It satisfies one's vanity. It makes us feel that we have succeeded in recomposing the production of a master mind from out of the fragments of ideas and thoughts collected from different quarters. But continuous study of the same work generally brings us a new and a deeper insight. If at all we really understand the real significance of a system of philo-

sophy then the undeserved pleasure based on utter illusion vanishes. We see that even when the philosopher appears to repeat the thoughts of his predecessors, he imparts a new and original meaning into those thoughts (p. 26).

The more often and the more carefully one reads the works of a philosopher, the more fully conscious one becomes that the theories and ideas of former thinkers are employed by a philosopher only as a medium of expression. If Berkeley or Spinoza—two philosophers whose systems Bergson examines in detail for illustrating his foregoing theory—were born earlier than when they were actually born then too, Bergson maintains, their philosophies in their essence would not change. But the form of expression and the wordings would be very different from what they are now. The same "Simple Intuition", "l' esprit philosophique" would be expressed in a different language.

How far the foregoing views are applicable to various philosophical productions is difficult to decide. But in the case of Bergson himself we surely find that it is the same "Simple Intuition" of a perpetual change which with its other allied ideas about the mutual relation of philosophical and scientific attitudes of mind and the differentiation between intelligence and intention etc, recurs in different forms. The last and concluding portion of the book contains these very views with which every reader of "l' evolution creatrice" is fully familiar. The setting constituted by a new wealth of ideas and observations, no doubt lends an increasing charm to these very old views, but to enjoy this the readers must go to the book itself which like all other writings of Bergson is written in a style at once forceful, simple and charming. The get up of the book is also excellent.

I. D. T.

The Philosophical Review.

Contents: **Charles M. Bakewell**—*Harry Norman Gardiner*; **Horace Craig Longwell**—*The Significance of Scholasticism*; **J. H. Muirhead**—*How Hegel came to America*; **Clifford Barrett**—*The Problem of the 'Situation'*.

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By 'situation', Barrett intends to designate a group of relations taken together to constitute a unit for consideration, explanation or control. According to him, from the point of view of Metaphysics, three general attitudes seem possible for functionalistic and relationistic thought: (1) to deny all ultimate unity and order to the world; (2) to affirm a character of systematic totality; (3) to embrace an attitude of scepticism towards the entire metaphysical problem, situations being regarded as

working units. Such Metaphysical Scepticism may rest upon either of two positions : (1) a denial of the genuineness of man's knowledge ; or (2) a denial of the knowability of the world. Viewed historically, relationistic systems have been divided in their choice between two possibilities : (1) By some, it has been held that in our attention, metaphysical speculation, must give place to problems of functional relation as in the physical sciences. (2) Others have shown that the very relativity of items in experience suggests and requires a large framework of relations, within which they may function, and implies in the dependence of every functioning activity, the idea of a metaphysical depth of ground. Barrett reviews one aspect of the philosophical system of Renouvier in order to discover the problems involved when a relationistic philosophy does seek to work out the metaphysical implications of its tenets. He concludes with an enumeration of some of these important implications. (1) There is the preliminary question whether it is genuinely necessary that inquiry should press beyond the limits of the *situation* and beyond the bounds of functional description. (2) if this question is answered affirmatively, a second problem follows : If a specific situation is constituted by a group of activities which function with regularity (law) either of two possibilities is open : (i) these must represent law operating upon undifferentiated *activity*, or (ii) they must inhere in differentiated activity-centres. But the first possibility is based upon a substantialistic and not a relationistic conception. If, on the other hand, the second alternative be regarded, and activity looked upon as inhering in activity-centres, themselves only the expressions of *laws* meeting, they will differ from one another *solo numero*. (3) The problem before pluralistic relationalism, when once the realm of Metaphysics has been entered, is even that of escaping from between the upper and nether mill-stones of spiritualistic pluralism and absolute monism. In so far as the situation exists as a unit of understanding, appreciation, or control, its organisation is explicable in terms of meaning, but meaning can arise only in relationship to what is beyond. Whether viewed as an hypothetical or instrumental construct, inseparability from some beyond is evident. It is a further question whether this larger structure is eventually to be explained as an absolute which embraces and gives meaning to its parts, or an experience which possesses or is an intrinsic taste and presents the nature of a value continuum in relation to which specific situations derive their organising bond of unity.

THE MONIST.

(Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2 April, 1928.)

Contents : **John Dewey**—*Social as a category* ; **J. E. Turner**—*The Character of Reality* ; **F. S. C. Northrop**—*An internal Inconsistency in Aristotelian Logic* ; **Charner M. Perry**—*Language and Thought* ; **Ovidia Hansing**—*The Doctrine of Recollection in Plato's Dialogues* ; **Lyman V. Cady**—*Wang Yang Ming's Doctrine of Intuitive Knowledge* ; **L. L. Bernard**—*The Development of Methods in Sociology*.

Turner holds that man's experience declares itself to be, at bottom, his search for Reality. It may be objected that widely differing schools of thought have repeatedly maintained that Reality lies ever beyond human attainment. The world with which we are in immediate contact is thus contrasted with, or (still worse) severed from, the Absolute, the unknowable, transcendent Deity or the unknown God. Yet, in spite of all this, it is the real that constitutes the ultimate standard of reference. Such negative philosophic and religious attitudes rest, at bottom, on the repeated failure which has attended man's age-long search for the real. But while all these facts cannot be denied, they may still be given a totally different interpretation. There are two possible types of transcendence. It may consist, not as is generally supposed in opposition and absolute severance, but on the other hand, in greater fullness, in richer abundance, or as a far higher level of something that in itself is already quite familiar or even commonplace. It is quite consistent both with continuity and (to an important degree) with positive identity. This is plainly implied by the principle of evolution. The highest type of reality is a "self" or a "person" and this suggests the possibility that the Supreme Real within the universe is a Self not finite but infinite.

* * * *

Northrop in his interesting article on Aristotelian Logic takes the following four propositions :—

1. All just acts are expedient acts.
4. All inexpedient acts are unjust.
5. Some unjust acts are inexpedient.
15. All unjust acts are expedient acts.

and tries to prove according to accepted rules of Aristotelian logic that propositions 1 and 15 are both consistent and contradictory. They are consistent according to those rules of Aristotelian logic which govern the distribution of terms. Proposition 1 implies proposition 4 according to the rule of conversion by contraposition. Again, proposition 4 implies proposition 5 according to the rules of conversion by limitation. Therefore proposition 1 implies proposition 5, according to the rules of the syllogism. By obversion proposition 5 becomes "Some unjust acts are

not expedient," which is the corresponding O form of proposition 15 which is an A. Thus according to the rules of the opposit on of propositions, proposition 5 contradicts 15. Northrop proves by means of diagrams the cause of the inconsistency in Aristotelian logic. By no process of valid inference can proposition 1 imply the falsity of proposition 15. It does so in Aristotelian logic because the method of conversion by contraposition is inconsistent with that logic as the meaning of existence is usually defined in that science. This contradiction can be removed by admitting the use of a minimum of the universal proposition. Once this happens, it ceases to be Aristotelian in character and one will have a theory of propositions which is that of the logic of classes

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Cady tells us that in his translation of W. Y. Ming, Henke has tried to differentiate between the various shades of meaning in which the single term "liang chih" is employed. He has given us, as its equivalents, "intuitive knowledge," "intuitive faculty," and "intuitive knowledge of good". Intuitive knowledge is acquired by means of "the intuitive faculty" which knows without any cognition, "and is the organ of general knowledge which is an intrinsic part of man's native endowment completely fitted for its function by nature, immediate and untaught. Sometimes this term appears as conscience, the maker of judgments. "Liang chih" is constantly identified with "tien li" "heaven-given principles" or "moral law" It is also employed as an ultimate principle. In discussing the relation of intuitive knowledge to thought and reflection, Wang says: "Reflection is the manifestation and use of the intuitive faculty." Wang holds that intuition includes reason. It is not for him a special type of knowledge with superior claim over against the knowledge arrived at through the discursive reason as it is for Bergson. The fundamental presupposition of Wang is that man's mind is the key to the universe. "There is nothing in the universe independent of mind." "The principles of all things are not to be found external to the mind, for the mind is itself principles". "The mind is itself truth and truth is heaven. He who knows the mind thereby knows both truth and heaven." Thus, Wang has given us, in Confucius' phrase, "one all-pervading unity"—a mind universe. This is his "Monistic Idealism," as Cady styles it. The intuitive faculty of the mind is itself an expression of this single mind principle. "The intuitive knowledge of man is the intuitive knowledge of plants and stones." Here Wang tries to coerce the stubborn facts of the material world which are opposed to such an idealistic theory. No mind, no body; no body, no mind, is his solution of the mind-body problem. His conclusion is that they are a unity which in its last analysis comes back

to mind as ultimate. Cady goes on that while Wang may not impress us by his grasp of the problem of subject and object, he exhibits a strikingly modern and clear insight into the relation of knowledge and action. He is best known for his vigorous arguments for the "Unitary Nature of Knowledge and Practice". He recognised the pedagogical value of the separation of the terms "knowledge" and "practise" but he refused to recognise as a knowledge that which was not intimately related to action. "No one who really has knowledge fails to practise it." "Knowledge without practise should be understood as lack of knowledge." While making the most sweeping claims for the adequacy, perfection, and scope of the intuitive faculty in its original purity, Wang recognises that experience enters into its development and that effort and cultivation are required if the inherent capacities of knowledge are to have their fruition. The intuitive faculty naturally knows the difference between good and evil, and this faculty and knowledge belong to all men. The moral categories and judgments themselves are all innate, simply awaiting the appropriate situation to rise to consciousness. Selfishness and passion or desire obscure the natural functioning of the moral intuition and bring in evil. "Good and evil are not all in things themselves. They are only in your mind." "From the moral point of view, evil is evil; from the metaphysical point of view it has no reality. At the end of the article, the writer sums up the weaknesses as well as the excellences of Wang's Philosophy. (a) Its weaknesses :—Wang's exposition of the intuitive faculty suffers from the extravagance of his claims. Further, in epistemology, the subject-object problem suffers from a failure to analyse sense perception. His answers would seem logically to lead to Solipsism. In the field of moral knowledge, his method constantly faces the peril of subjectivism. (b) The excellences :—He has both an instinct and a method for securing unity in the life of the individual and in the world of experience. "The underlying principle is one." He was the first Chinese thinker to realize the prime role of mind in the universe. Again, Wang's emphasis on intuition as the spontaneous manifestation of the original nature, when cleared of obscuring faults, gives rise to a freedom and inwardness in morals which were greatly needed in his day as in all times.

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Journal of Philosophical Studies.

Vol. III No. 8 April 1928.

Contents : S. Alexander—*Morality as an art* ; W. R. Boyce Gibson—*The Philosophy of Melchior Palagyi (II)* ; Louis Arnaud Reid—*Instinct and moral life* ; C. Delisle Burns—*The conception of Liberty* ; John Laird—*The Ethics of Communism* ; R. G. Collingwood—*The limits of Historical knowledge*.

In his article on morality as an art S. Alexander has tried to show that morality is an art, not merely because it implies certain delicacies of conduct, but because it is a realisation of a specific instinct.

Art, science, and virtue owe their value and their existence to their satisfying certain human needs, certain instincts, which clamour for satisfaction. It is small wonder that this has been neglected because the instincts in question are so overlaid by human characters that they have ceased to be instincts in the proper sense. Still they have their roots in instincts which we share with the animals. Truth satisfies the instinct of curiosity which may be observed in any dog pursuing the delights of smell. Human curiosity is in the first place systematic and in the next place it is disengaged from practice. The instinct which fine Art satisfies is the instinct of constructiveness of which the nesting of birds is an example in the animal world. In human form, this instinct is at first synthetic and purposive and results in handicraft, but later it is disengaged from practice and results in fine art. Morality is the satisfaction of the gregarious instinct. It is an art which takes the human passions as its material, and elaborates them into conformity with the social nature of man. The art of the good man being concerned with practice, is satisfied in practice. Like science or beauty, it does not get disengaged from practice. Yet it is still applied art. For, the same distinction of the form and the matter which is found in theory, and in fine art, is found here too. The satisfaction of social instinct in practice may even take a reflective and disinterested form especially from the point of view of the spectator. We have then the reflective judgment this is good ; the act is contemplated and the situation approaches that of fine art.

* * *

C. Delisle Burns, in his article on Liberty tries to show that Liberty is positive and consists in the full realization of Personality.

It is implied in the common arguments both for and against liberty that (1) The mere absence of restraint is good, which is as negative as the most of the Ten commandments, and that (2) The individual or the group whose liberty is under discussion, is essentially a segregate atom in a social void.

We must find out why restraint is bad. Restraint is bad because there is in each man or group of men an inner force which grows upward to a natural height if obstructions are absent. This inner force is the fundamental fact which explains liberty. Liberty is the natural growth of this force. Liberty is one of the aspects of life, in so far as life is an effort, and an enjoyable effort. Liberty is the use of the sphere of growth ; not a mere removal of restraint.

The Individualistic assumptions imply that society and personal contact are evils. Liberty, which is the use of all the force in a man, includes the use of such force as he has in his communication with others. A man who can make himself intelligible spreads his personality, as it were, over the frontiers of another personality, and is freer in proportion as the flow of his personality into another is operative. Thus freedom is increased by personal contacts. Petty individualism is not the essence of Liberty.

D. G. Vinod.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

The Foundations of Living Faiths.

II

H. D. Bhattacharyya.

But there are bolder spirits than Huxley and Herbert Spencer, and these neither scepticism nor agnosticism satisfies. Why should there be so much uncertainty, conflict or incomprehensibility in matters of religion if God really exists? How are we to explain the fact that while so many things are objects of certain knowledge; God is not? Is it not strange that the creator of man, his faculties and his objects of knowledge should so hide himself that different sects should play hide and seek, if not blind man's buff, to find him out in truth, and are unable to certify that they have found him in his true essence? Atheism therefore cuts the Gordian knot in the heroic style by denying that God exists, and thinks that it is the only next step which a conscientious agnosticism is logically bound to take. To say that the supreme reality may exist but is not knowable is a very anomalous position. It is better to assert that no supreme reality as postulated by religion exists at all.

Now, atheism has tried to justify its position by going farther than agnosticism in its treatment of the premises on which knowledge of God can be based. Atheism denies that we can get unequivocal facts on which a belief in God can be grounded. An impartial examination of the world shows that the evidences in it are not such as would make the existence of God even probable. There is too much of chance

and evil in this world to justify a faith in God, and besides it is possible to explain the whole course of the world without supposing that God exists. The theories of cosmological and biological evolution together, as enunciated by Laplace and Darwin, may explain whatever laws and adaptations we see in the world without assuming that a God was at the helm of worldly affairs. Haeckel enunciated the Law of Substance to explain how the origin and evolution of the world could be understood without assuming any God but Ether. His gibes at the 'gaseous vertebrate' form the culmination of a series of irreverent descriptions of God advanced by atheistical writers of the nineteenth century and before.

This is a contingency which, though not absolutely new in the history of religion, is yet of recent growth in respect of its intensity and volume. Atheism can come only with culture and with freedom from social fear and popular superstition which culture alone brings in its train. Ward's description of the atheists as the parasites of a social organisation eminently religious in its cementing principle is unfair to the cultured atheists who believe that social organisation will continue as usual without a belief in God if people were all cultured, for self-interest and non-religious altruism may effect as satisfactory a balance of mutual conveniences to form a stable society as a belief in God has done. As J. S. Mill observed: "Belief in the supernatural, great as are the services which it rendered in the earlier stages of human development, cannot be considered to be any longer required, either for enabling us to know what is right and wrong in social morality, or for supplying us with motives to do right and to abstain from wrong." In fact, the atheists have never been given an opportunity to form a society of their own while societies professedly built on religious foundations have not always been models of equity and righteousness. If, after centuries of religious teaching, people are individually and collectively as much prone to fly at one another's throat as wild beasts, the less we talk of the humanising and socialising influence

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of belief in God the better. A world of atheists would not so effectively disprove the brotherhood of man as the wars of civilised nations, especially towards those professing a different form of religion, have done and are doing.

It is a pathetic irrelevance on the part of the theologians and anthropologists to show that a belief in the supernatural is a universal phenomenon among the lower races of mankind. The thesis of Sir John Lubbock to the contrary, first challenged at length by Flint, has been successively, and probably successfully, controverted by anthropologists and missionaries alike. Two reasons may be advanced to explain this religious solicitude. The first is to prove that howsoever low might be the culture, the belief in the supernatural is an everpresent reality. Might not this be used as an argument to prove that the idea of a supernatural is an innate idea of the human mind or an idea implanted by the Being who created the human race? A consensus of faith may be used as an argument to prove that a being corresponding to that faith exists: a universally valid experience, to use the Kantian terminology, may be used as a criterion of objectivity. But it may be pointed out that this yields very little by way of content, for barring a faith in something supernatural there is very little agreement among these primitive beliefs; to use such a contentless faith as the foundation of God's existence is a very shaky procedure. It is therefore better to use this fact of universal belief in the supernatural in a different way, namely, for missionary purposes. If it can be proved that no race is without some belief in or conception of the supernatural, it will encourage us to hope that by spreading culture we shall be able to spread our own faith amongst savages. To one absolutely destitute of the religious sense it is difficult, if not impossible, to impart religious instruction of a higher type. But the sense of the supernatural being there, it is possible to fill the unseen with one set of concepts rather than another. Just as moralists take infinite pains to prove that an instinctive altruism characterises all grades of human

beings, for without that foundation higher morality is impossible, so these religious writers try to prove that the rudiments of faith are present everywhere, for without them higher religion would be impossible. Even a vague fear and a sense of dependence for good or evil on unseen powers, which an innate anthropomorphism invests with personal characteristics, will provide the necessary basis of faith. The atheist, while he sympathises with this missionary attitude, points out however that religion may be a superstition which a race may learn to outgrow like many other superstitions and magical rites, as it advances in civilisation.

This is substantially the contention of Bertrand Russell who believes that a time is bound to come when the existence of God would be an unnecessary hypothesis. As industrialism develops, and as knowledge and control of nature's laws increase, the assumption of a God to explain the working of nature would become more and more unnecessary. God is invoked to fill the lacunae in our experience and action, and the greater the ignorance and the impotence the more the dependence upon God. When mankind will have come to see that the known and the unknown, the success and the failure, make one common texture and are controlled by the same set of laws, the realm of being will cease to be divided between God and man, and it will come to be recognised that although there are super-human (or rather non-human) forces, there are no supernatural powers. The non-human (unconscious or conscious at a lower level) forces are governed by laws, and knowledge here means power; but the supernatural powers are subject to caprice and knowledge is either impossible or, when possible, brings an inevitable sense of helplessness. We must therefore cease to invent divine interference when anything comes out surprisingly good or unaccountably wrong: only self-reliance and a steady faith in the relentless operation of natural laws will enable us to repeat the former and avoid the latter by our own exertion without relying upon outside aid. Russell is here in substan-

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tial agreement with Comte who too taught that we must cease to explain facts of experience by theological concepts and metaphysical principles and take the sole help of scientific formulae. There are neither capricious gods nor mysterious forces controlling the destiny of the world but only ascertainable and verifiable laws which are knowable and thereby controllable within very wide limits. The positive facts of experience alone should guide our faith and conduct, and for the three invisible persons forming the Christian Trinity we should substitute the three visible entities, Earth, Space and Man. If you must have a religion, worship Humanity in its noble manifestations and do not pay the tribute of homage to mythical personalities in which a credulous and superstitious past believed. Both Comte and Russell would probably agree that, if not exactly an invention of priest-craft or political diplomacy, religion continues to be patronised and propagated in the interest of the Church and the State. As such, religion stands in the way of enlightenment in all countries and in many a land has it laid its smothering hand on free thinking and impiety solely on account of this fact.

It would be a mistake to suppose that the atheists deny the existence of the idea of God in human mind. What they do deny is not the existence of the idea but the existence of the ideate, i.e., the supernatural being corresponding to the idea. With Kant and against Descartes, they think that this transition from idea to being, from the thought of God to the reality of God, is not justified. The chance of an idea being true or representative of reality depends on its keeping close to concrete individual experience. The more complex it is the further removed it is from fact, as can be readily shown by comparing ideas of sensation and perception with ideas of imagination and conception. Our idea of whiteness or a tree is truer than our idea of the tree of golden apple guarded by the dragon, or the descriptions in 'The Pilgrim's Progress.' The idea of God is claimed by the atheists to be one such

complex idea. Thus while the theists try to prove that God is known through a simple, concrete, immediate apprehension and therefore truly, the atheists try to prove that the idea of God is exceedingly complex and therefore far removed from reality. Reference may be made to the writings of Strauss and Feuerbach who taught that in constructing (whether consciously or unconsciously it does not matter) the idea of God (which therefore is neither innate nor adventitious but only factitious, to use Descartes' terminology) we collect the good qualities of finite things of which we have direct experience and, synthesising them into an organic whole, project the construct at an infinite distance from ourselves and thereby magnify the qualities, just as an ordinary projection of light through a lens to an infinite distance will do. Finite goodness, mercy, wisdom, power, etc we know; but out of them we construct the divine attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, grace, etc. by conceiving the attributes we know as being magnified to infinity. The Puranas of the Hindus say that the heavenly dancer Tilottamā was created by taking a grain of beauty from every lovable object in the world. Feuerbach's conception of God is similar—only that he will deny that anything real corresponding to the synthesis exists. Man was not made in the image of God but God was made in the image of man: belief in God is a glorified anthropomorphism, a worship of an image not graven by human hands but constructed by the human mind. "Ah, ye brethren, that God whom I created was human work and human madness, like all the Gods! A man was he, and only a poor fragment of a man and ego. Out of mine own ashes and glow it came unto me, that Phantom. And verily it came not unto me from the beyond!" (Nietzsche).

This radical atheism is to be distinguished from a number of polite atheisms that have characterised Philosophy at different times. It is difficult to decide what constitutes theism proper. Have we reached a final conception of God that we can stigmatise any other conception as atheistic? It

is clear that imperfect conception of God and atheism are not synonymous : still pantheism either of the Spinozistic or of the Schopenhauerian kind has been the anathema of theists of the orthodox kind, although orthodoxy itself took a pretty long time to decide whether it should side with the deistic view of a God beyond the world or the theistic view of a God both within and without the world. Orthodoxy took a pretty long time again to decide whether the majesty and power of God could be best upheld by an instantaneous creation of the mighty fabric of the world or a slow but sure evolution of higher types of being out of a primitive nebular mass. Hear, again, what Samuel Butler says of theism itself. Says he : "Pantheism and theism alike profess to give us a God, but they alike fail to perform what they have promised. We can know nothing of the God they offer us, for not even do they themselves profess that any of our senses can be cognizant of him. They tell us that he is a personal God, but that he has no material person. This is disguised atheism. What we want is a Personal God, the glory of whose presence can be made in part evident to our senses, though what we can realise is less than nothing in comparison with what we must leave for ever unimagined." When theism itself is in such a fluid condition it is evident that atheism will not mean the denial of any particular idea of God but a denial of his existence in any form whatsoever, pantheistic, deistic, theistic, polytheistic, ditheistic, animistic, etc. ; in short, atheism will be identical with a want of belief in the supernatural in general. In this respect atheism is distinguishable from heresy and some types of impiety and blasphemy which, without denying the existence of God altogether, attack some of the orthodox theories regarding the nature and attributes of God. To say, for instance, that Christ was a man created by God and not the second person of the Trinity or that God is not omnipotent or all merciful would be an impious utterance from the orthodox Christian standpoint, but not atheism.

The fact is that a positive religion's conception of God is to be gathered from its scriptures, and these are sometimes so pliant that any exegetical interpretation is possible. Keeping within the limits of scriptural texts, contradictory theories have created their notion of God, and orthodoxy and heresy have alike appealed to the scripture in support of their viewpoints. Extreme atheism has never been socially popular; hence even heresy wishes to show that it can also find justification for its creed in some facts of the scripture. The most instructive field of belief of this type is to be found in India where very early in the history of its religious thought a distinction was drawn between a *nāstika* and a *nirīśvara*. Here, in India, heterodoxy in relation to the Vedas (*nāstika*) was more resented than want of belief in God (*nirīśvara*), and thus the scripture was set higher than the revealer of the scripture. The Chārvākas were looked down upon not for their atheism, materialism and hedonism but for their description of the Vedas as an unmeaning jargon with the help of which a wily priesthood traded upon the credulity of a foolish laity. The Jainas and especially the Buddhists were also stigmatised as heretical because they denied the authority of the Vedas and not because they were also mainly atheistic in their philosophy. Contrariwise, two philosophical systems that summarily dismissed the topic of God were tolerated because they admitted the eternity and infallibility of the Vedas. The Sāṃkhya declared that God's existence was unprovable and the Mīmāṃsa declared that the inexorable law of Karma ground out the destinies of men and thus it reduced God to an impotent spectator of the moral drama of the conscious world without the will or the power to intervene either for or against any being. But, having divested God of knowability or of all attributes without which God is an empty name, these systems proceeded to swear allegiance to the revealed scriptures, for, according to them, their revelation did not require the agency of any god, as they were eternal. These scriptures form, as it were, an impersonal code of morals and can dis-

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pense with a legislator because they form a system of unalterable verities not dependent on any divine will.

From this position a transition to Buddhism and Jainism is so easy that the keen Indian wit was not slow to make it. If the law is more important than the lawgiver, what is the utility of assuming the latter? Cannot the moral law be sufficient unto itself? The answer in the affirmative was given by Buddhism and Jainism. Two forces were at work to bring into being these two oldest atheistic living creeds of the world. The one was a gradual mystic tendency in the Upanishads which either declared that the highest reality (Brahman, Ātman) was unknowable and indescribable, or else described that reality in contradictory terms, as Nicolanus Cusanus did in Europe at a much later time. A religious agnosticism, prompted no doubt by the very pious motive of confessing inability to express the nature of the Supreme Reality in terms of human understanding, was however the best preparation for atheism; and, as a matter of fact, we find that not only Mahāvīra, the founder or reformer of Jainism, and Buddha, the founder of Buddhism, but also other persons, some mythical, like Brihaspati and Chārvāka, and some historical, like Pāyāsi and Ajita Keśakambalin, taught atheistic doctrines, and some, like Pūrṇa Kāśyapa, Maskarin Gosāla and Kakuda Kātyāyana, attacked some fundamental principle or other of the theistic creed. It was a time of great religious upheaval of thought, and not only professedly anti-Vedic speculations but also pro-Vedic philosophies like Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Mīmāṃsa were affected by a vague atheism and either denied outright the existence of God, or declared Him unknowable, or else reduced Him to a mere helper of concentration, or to a spectator of the moral drama of the world. The degradation of the deity was effected by two convergent factors, one of which was also the second cause of atheism. The first was a gradually strengthening belief that a disembodied soul had both a temporary destination and a final destiny. Heaven

and hell represented the former while salvation represented the latter condition of the enlightened soul.

The Vedic nature-worship had brought in a number of gods for the different departments and phenomena of nature without any very clear idea as to their interrelation. Some however rose to a major position, while others remained minor all through. Here and there attempts were made to conceive one god as supreme for the nonce, but many prominent gods shared this position by turns—a form of belief to which Max Müller gave the name of henotheism. The monotheistic element was never strong and only some late hymns are almost all that careful research has been able to advance in its favour. When therefore the Upanishads began to give shape to this Supreme Being (although with a good deal of mysticism thrown in here and there), the Vedic gods were shorn of much of their splendour. We find in fact that the great Indra himself is instructed into this Brahma-knowledge by Umā Haimavatī who tells him that Brahma is behind whatsoever powers the gods have. We now get the beginnings of that theory according to which heaven and hell come to be regarded as places of reward and punishment for good and bad actions, from which a return to the world is inevitable after the fruits of action have been consumed. Very soon after, the gods themselves are regarded as subject to decay—in fact, they become descriptive epithets rather than personalities—posts held in succession by good men deified on account of their merit; and a later mythology, linking itself with the myths of the Brāhmaṇas, depicted the inhabitants of heaven as being molested by the *asuras* or demons, e. g. Vṛtra, Namuchi, and others. To such an abode of doubtful peace good men naturally did not want to go, and they propounded a new eschatology according to which Heaven was reserved for those following the old Vedic way of sacrifices and other meritorious actions and a new condition was invented for the soul that followed the path of knowledge

viz. salvation. Both Jainism and Buddhism largely followed the Upanishadic writers in their doctrine of salvation as being a condition (and not an abode) of the released soul, attainable through knowledge; but as they condemned the sacrificial cult (principally because it involved the taking of life, which both abhorred) they did not, in their first enunciations, have any great faith in heaven to which good men might temporarily go. When polytheism crept into Jainism and Buddhism at a later age through a deification of the long succession of mythical and real prophets, the ideas of heaven and its gods (especially Indra who is supposed to have adored both Mahāvīra and Buddha) returned, and specially in Buddhism of the Mahāyāna school, a well arranged and full pantheon made its appearance. But the earlier Jainism and Buddhism had greater affinity with the pluralistic Sāṃkhya, and all the three taught that salvation was to be achieved by each man for himself through right knowledge and right conduct, Jainism going so far as to assert that divinity was a reward of merit but salvation could come when, born as a man, a God attained saving knowledge. Religion was replaced by philosophy and morality, and Buddha specially deprecated all attempts to fathom the inscrutable hereafter when so much remained to be done here on earth to combat sorrow, decrepitude and death—a procedure that was adopted by Confucius also in China at about the same time. The general acceptance of the Sāṃkhya doctrine of cosmic evolution out of an unconscious Prakṛti had in the meantime been making the assumption of a creator more and more unnecessary. Both nature and spirit were thus freed from the domination of an absolute consciousness.

But the other force that brought about the downfall of faith was much stronger than the mystical speculation about Brahman in Upanishadic writings. This is the belief in the doctrine of Karma along with a consequential belief in transmigration. It is true that even in the age of the Vedic Saṃhitas it was recognised that good actions had their reward and it is not true also, as has been generally

supposed that the doctrine of transmigration is totally absent in the earlier Vedic writings.* But the speculations regarding both are extremely meagre in the earlier writings, and worship generally takes on a joyful form of praise and does not brood over the cursedness of existence. It is a little surprising, therefore, that when the doctrine of Karma appears in Indian speculation it does so in a remarkably complete form, and the equilibrium of Indian thought was disturbed to such an extent that no serious speculation could afford to ignore this new doctrine or fail to attempt reconciliation with it. Whatsoever might be the origin of this doctrine—whether it was derived from the non-Aryan natives of the Indian soil or whether it was conceived in the fertile brain of an Aryan thinker—it is certain that it made its appearance at a psychological moment and caught the popular fancy. Its acceptance had a magical effect upon the entire history of Indian philosophical and popular thought, for it shifted responsibility from God to man so far as the consequences of action were concerned. It is no wonder, therefore, that the three systems that accepted this doctrine most fully, found it difficult to accommodate at the same time a belief in an omnipotent divinity and a moral governor. The Mīmāṃsā school of Jaimini, while adhering to a belief in the sacredness of Vedic rituals, came to the conclusion that a right action duly performed generated a store of merit (*adr̥ṣṭa*) which was capable by itself of determining the future destiny of the individual concerned. Nay, the principle was extended from man to the world as a whole, and it was asserted that creation proceeded according to the merit of the past world now in a state of involution—a theory which Śaṅkara tried to refute in his commentary on the Brahmasūtras of Bhaṭṭarāyaṇa. In the system of Jaimini, the function of creation as well as of moral government was taken out of the hands of

* For a discussion on the whole subject, see Deussen's *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 117 (Ancient Vedic Eschatology).

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God, and, as in the Greek tragedies, Fate was set up above God. When God is reduced to such impotence it is not surprising that the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā should be stigmatised as atheistic, although it never denied the eternity of the Vedas. Buddhism and Jainism took the logical step of dispensing with the concept of such a God, although each admitted that finite spirits were capable of attaining perfection, even unto omniscience. Consequent on the want of belief in a supreme moral governor, both Jainism and Buddhism had to turn more exclusively to the doctrine of Karma to explain the moral phenomena of the world. As is inevitable in such speculations, the inanimate world suffers a philosophic neglect, and either it is reduced to a field of moral activity (as in the system of Fichte) or of retribution for sinfulness (as in Buddhism), or else its nature is transfigured and the inanimate is regarded as animate in a lower degree and peopled by souls of inferior merit (as in Jainism).

It is interesting to observe that for an elaborate speculation on the law of Karma and its implications, we are dependent upon Jain and Buddhist writers. Buddha enunciated the doctrine of Dependent Origination (*pratitya-samutpāda*) as the true insight into the nature of suffering, which being acquired, the process of salvation becomes an easy operation for one wishing to get rid of that suffering. The Jains similarly described in detail the various impediments to the progress of a soul striving after salvation, the helps that it must get and the stages through which it must pass before attaining the desired goal. There are indeed striking similarities in content and terminology between Yoga philosophy, on the one hand, and Buddhism and Jainism, on the other; but when we remember that all these three were propounded by thinkers of ascetic tendency and profession, among whom there probably existed, in spite of differences in philosophic creed, a kind of masonic brotherhood, the similarities are not difficult to explain. Still, the Yoga philosophy was so much interested in the upward path that the fates of the downward-

inclined figured very little in its speculations ; but Buddhism and Jainism tugged at the theory of Karma with all their might and Jainism, specially, spun out an elaborate theory on the subject.

This law of Karma, supposed by many to have come from non-aryan sources, could, however, be very easily filiated to its Vedic prototype, the doctrine of *Rta*. In the famous cosmogenic hymn of *Aghamarṣaṇa* in the tenth book of the *R̥gveda* *Rta* or Law is described as having first come out of *Tapas* or austerity together with *Satya* or Truth. This *Rta* was regarded at once as a moral law and as a fixed order of nature—a double meaning which attaches at present to the word 'dharma'. It would be strange indeed if the Aryans, whose occupation as an agricultural people and whose worships and sacrifices as a religious people depended upon a belief in the regularity of nature, did not come very early to the conclusion that the realm of nature was governed by laws and that not only the heavenly bodies but everything else followed the law of periodic revival or reappearance. It appears that a transition to the conception of a moral law was also made. In Vedic speculations this moral law is associated with *Varuṇa*, who is regarded as keeping an ever-watchful eye on the doings of men. In the *Taittirīya Upanishad* also this rule by law is associated with *Varuṇa*. Now, as has been remarked above, *Upanishadic* speculation had a disastrous effect upon the status of the gods, and even in Vedic speculation itself the star of some of the gods like *Varuṇa* was already setting. What happened, therefore, was that the moral law was dissociated from the deity customarily associated with it, and, not being easily assimilable by a mystical, rather impersonal, principle like *Brahman*, it began to have a career detached from all divine personalities ; and in this way the Vedic doctrine of the *Rta* was readily absorbed by the later doctrine of Karma. But the emphasis fell unequally on nature and man, the greater emphasis falling inevitably on man, for, all through the centuries, advancing thought was concentrating attention

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more and more on soul and less and less on the phenomena of outward nature. The history of thought, as revealed successively in the Samhitas (hymns), Brāhmaṇas (ritualistic treatises), Āraṇyakas (forest treatises giving allegorical interpretations of some of the sacrifices) and Upanishads, is a history of the inwardisation of religion in Indian soil. The law of natural causation thus became transformed into the law of moral causation, and this being dissociated from the earlier gods, easily paved the way to atheism. It was not shallow thinking but the deeper draught of knowledge that ushered in atheism at the close of the Upanishadic period, and it was not the fools in India that said in their heart, 'There is no God.'

It would be a mistake, however, to think that in India (as also in China) a refusal to postulate the existence of God was accompanied by a lowering of the standard of moral living. The records that we possess of the personal character of Buddha, Mahāvīra and Confucius and of their followers are supremely satisfactory from the moral point of view, and no one can rise from a perusal of their doctrines even now without feeling ennobled and chastened. The high moral tone was certainly due to the personality of the propounders of the faiths. Lapse of centuries has not dimmed the moral lustre they shed on their church, and even now, after passing through the baptism of contact with inferior creeds in their progress through time and space, these three religions stand as three of the noblest faiths in the world. This is all the more remarkable in the case of Buddhism, because it not only refused to speculate about God and future life but taught also that there was no abiding substance called soul and that the sins that were committed brought their punishment in accordance with the law of Karma, not on the person committing it (for personal identity was, according to it, a fiction and did not in any case survive death) but on somebody else. To orthodox theism it is a mystery and a discomfiture that a religion that is godless as well as soulless should yet be

capable of preaching the highest type of morality.

The explanation of this anomaly is to be found in the way in which atheism was approached in the East. It did not start from the side of matter (except in the systems of Chārvāka, Ajita Keśakambalin and some other minor thinkers whose creeds were weeded out in the struggle for existence from the spiritual soil of India) and teach that mind was an epiphenomenon of bodily processes. Buddha and Mahāvīra expressly combated the doctrine of Ajita Keśakambalin as a false and dangerous method of approaching the problem of the soul's impermanence and the denial of God and future life; also they attacked the view of Maskarin Gosāla who believed in fatalism and mechanical attainment of perfection by all living things; and of Pūrṇa Kāśyapa and Kakuda Kātyāyana that the soul was not active and therefore not responsible for its actions. Both Jainism and Buddhism accepted the law of Karma and the determination of the next life by the deeds of this one, but neither accepted the position that the capacity of moral improvement was absent in any grade of existence or that salvation was attainable by anything but personal effort and moral living; and if morality was a categorical imperative, then, as Kant said, freedom to choose good or evil was a necessary postulate. Unlike the majority of Western speculations which based atheism on a materialistic philosophy, Indian atheism was idealistic and moralistic in outlook and temper, mainly because while it denied the necessity of God it did not abandon belief in the efficacy of moral action and true knowledge for salvation, as of the reverse for bondage and transmigration. This atheism was the product of culture in ancient India, and it successfully effected that separation of morality and theistic belief which many theological writers fondly consider to be an impossible feat for the human mind. It is idle to object that the philosophical position does not consistently justify the moral temper, for, as Paulsen observes and the life of Epicurus shows, men do not base their practice

on a previously thought-out philosophy, e. g. materialism, but the philosophy is more generally a theoretical justification of the life we live or want to live. Intensely alive to their personal sense of morality, Buddha, Mahāvīra and Confucius could yet propound a theory which dispensed with the necessity of a moral governor and the prospect of a recompense in Heaven and gave to all future times a pattern of creed which atheists of all lands with a sense of personal and social responsibility could follow without provoking the susceptibilities of their fellowmen. If Buddhism lost its foothold in the Indian soil, it was not because there was any great persecution of the Buddhists (notwithstanding the celebration of the great Horse Sacrifice by Puṣyamitra in the palace of Aśoka) but because Buddhism lost very early in its history that royal patronage on which it had been dependent from the very beginning; because, unlike Jainism, it had neglected to collect a large lay following on whose charity and active zeal it might depend for the continuance of the rather disproportionately large monastic order; and because in its later history it developed a pantheon and an idolatry which deprived it of its right to separate existence by the side of a far more ancient and well-established polytheistic creed. If Jainism persisted, it was because, although more anti-Brahmanic than Buddhism at the beginning, it made early overtures to Hinduism by abandoning extra-territorial ambitions, by retaining much of the caste system and allowing Brahmins to officiate in worship, by retaining on some pretext or other much of the Hindu pantheon and in general by leading an unobtrusive existence by the side of the more powerful creed. It was by failing to develop a stable social organisation that Buddhism disappeared from Indian soil to continue its existence in other lands.

But if the success of Buddhism and Jainism encourages the atheist, their failure is likely to strengthen the faith of theism. The very fact that the followers of Buddhism and Jainism could not keep up an agnostic or atheistic attitude for long and, while denying the existence of a supreme God

fell to worshipping their own prophets and minor gods and goddesses, is proof positive that atheism is not a practical guide of life for all. It requires a keen wit and a bold heart to follow an atheistic theory of life (as Nietzsche rightly observed regarding Buddhism that it must get its start among the higher and better educated classes); but the ordinary people do not possess either the intelligence or the courage to withstand the blandishments of a theistic philosophy of life. In the vacancy left by want of faith in a supreme God there step in a host of lesser divinities according to the inclination and intelligence of the worshipper. An act of gratitude to the prophet for preaching the message of truth is transformed into a religious devotion, and prayer and worship begin to be offered to the deified promulgator of the creed. This was a danger that befell not only Buddhism and Jainism but also Christianity, and only Mahomedanism, true to the Jewish tradition, seems to have withstood the temptation to deify its prophet. Hinduism accepted consciously the position that all were not fit by temper and equipment to conceive the highest type of divinity and, therefore, permitted its followers to worship according to their own light any type of divine manifestation that might hold their attention and improve their life.

Now, in collecting the threads of our discourse, we may observe that atheism has an insidious way of making its appearance again and again in religious history. Atheism, though not absolutely subversive of private and public morality, is yet absolutely fatal to all belief in supernatural power. As such, it is an enemy not only of positive religion but of religion itself, and if some of the atheistic creeds have yet passed by the name of religion, it is because by religion we generally mean not only a personal relation to the supernatural but a social institution with certain peculiar dogmas; and also because these creeds, in course of their history, reabsorbed some of the elements that go to make up a religious view of life. In modern times the atheistic danger comes from a

new philosophy. The old idea that God is known in pretty much the same way as other things by means of our intellect is being gradually displaced by a newer theory that religion, art, morality and science form distinct realms of knowledge and conviction. Religion has a value just as truth also has a value of its own. It is not possible to identify religion with scientific truth just as it is not possible to identify it with art or morality. Man stands in multiple relation to his environment, and his apprehension of the same takes a variety of forms according to the attitudes that his mind is capable of taking up. It is, therefore, illogical to expect that God should reveal himself through our sense-organs as if he were our neighbour. There is a religious way of looking at the world just as there is a scientific way of doing the same thing, and these two view-points may in any given instance overlap.

This view, which is substantially the view of Münsterberg, is not necessarily irreligious, for it admits the equal right of religion to exist side by side with other types of human experience. But when once the cognitive function of religion is set aside, there is the danger that religion should cease to be regarded as a distinct way of apprehending spiritual values and come to be regarded as a regulative postulate or a volitional fiction. Since the time when Kant declared that God and immortality were not objects of knowledge but merely postulates of faith and morality, philosophy has not been able to shake off completely the virus of agnosticism and has attempted to give a non-intellectual origin of faith in God. In the writings of Forberg and Vaihinger and of the pragmatists in general, the view is advanced that God is a postulate of our moral conduct or else a fiction generated by the volitional side of our nature. We are told, in fact, that even if God does not exist we must create one for ourselves as a guide for moral conduct: even if he is not known to exist, we must believe as if he does. This position, while intellectually agnostic, is yet volitionally

theistic, but it is not free from the danger that a construct of will may very easily be regarded as an unnecessary encumbrance just as to Feuerbach a construct of the intellect was. No wonder, therefore, that theological writers have not taken very kindly to these voluntaristic speculations and have preferred to show their confidence in an immediate experience of divine inspiration. In this matter they are only following in the footsteps of the earlier followers of every religion who combated the intrusion of too much speculation into what they considered to be an affair of God, and of the great Bacon who said that sacred theology must be drawn from the word and oracles of God and not from the dictates of reason. We find, for instance, in the early history of the Christian Church a determined attempt to combat speculation, as, for example, of the Gnostics, and a declaration, in the system of Augustine, that faith in divine revelation is a source of the knowledge of God. Mahomedanism also tried to put down with iron hands the free thinking of the Mutazilites. Brahminism also allowed speculation only in so far as it was consistent with the teachings of the Vedas, and considered Dialectic as tending towards anti-Vedic results. Jainism similarly regarded unquestioning faith in the teachings of the Jina as one of the three gems of the creed. Those who foresaw the dangers proceeding from an indiscriminate use of reason in religious matters stuck to the path of faith as the best antidote against a possible agnosticism. The conversion of Cardinal Newman from a rationalistic to a faith attitude shows that they were substantially right. But so long as man retains his rational capacity it is idle to expect that religion should be exempted from a rational examination. A religion that tries to entrench itself behind the barricade of faith may be temporarily saved but is likely to be overpowered in the end; it certainly loses the power of aggressiveness and becomes gradually circumscribed in its dominion over

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the hearts of men. It is always a problem with every positive religion as to how far it can admit of rational treatment without losing its distinctness as a creed or landing in agnosticism, scepticism and atheism. Did not Nietzsche say, "Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies"; and has not the poet sung, "There is more of faith in honest doubt than is found in half the creed"? Revelational religion has, however, at all times been confronted with the problem of dealing with those whose doubts are *not* honest—people who are not satisfied with attacking the excretions and formalities of a creed but who want to storm the citadel of faith itself.

Intuition of Self.

G. R. Malkani.

We all have an intuition of self or self-awareness. This self is not a public property. It is private to each individual. Nevertheless the intuition of one man of his self is exactly the same in point of content as the intuition of another man of his self. They intuit the same thing. Indeed we are in the habit of saying that A intuit *his* self and B *his*. But whatever that may mean, the intuition of each in respect of his self is the intuition of something without any character beyond "I—ness". We may no doubt read into this intuition a certain bodily feeling or a state of the mind ; but at the same time, we distinguish these from the intuition of self as such. This intuition in fact forms the basis of the identification in question ; without it, no bodily feeling or state of the mind will have the character denoted by "I". We may give any analysis of the intuition of self we choose ; but we can never get beyond or further analyse the character of "I—ness." It is the ultimate ground of the intuition of self and is the same for all individuals.

We know physical objects. This knowledge is mediated by our body. The result is that we do not know the thing ; we only know certain aspects of the thing as determined by the nature of the body. These aspects further are liable to change for many reasons ; and the content of one perception can never be determined to be identical with that of another.

We know mental events or states of the mind. This knowledge is indeed not mediated. Still what we know is very indeterminate in character. We may no doubt be said to experience a state as it is. But to experience a state is one thing and to know it is another. What we are concerned with in metaphysics is the knowledge of things. So far as this knowledge goes, a mental state has all the

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elusiveness of a physical object. To know it truly, we should have to undertake an analysis of mental life which will take us far beyond the state in question. A mental state is not simple; it is a very complex object; its true character is determined by motives, tendencies and pre-dispositions which are not always at the surface of mental life. The act of knowing a mental state is itself a complicating factor. What we call retrospective introspection is our only method of knowing mental occurrences; and this method is not free from fault. It involves the reproduction of the actual conditions of a mental occurrence; and although the event be very fresh, almost present, reproduction is determined by a new motive,—a motive which does not leave the content wholly unaffected.

Our intuition of self is not mediated. The self does not present any *aspect* to us. It has not even the objectivity of a mental state. Its only character is "I—ness" or *pratyaktva*; this is not something mental; it is presupposed by what is mental. This character is one and the same no matter who intuits it. There can be no varieties of it. There can be varieties only of what is objective. Our intuition of self then implies a content (if content we can call it) that is necessarily unchanging and self-identical. It is the content which everyone intuits as his self; and it has no mark by which it may be, so to say, individualised.

We have said that the essential characteristic of the self is its "I—ness" or *ahamatva*. Now we have consciousness of the self in the me-object, or what Kant called the empirical ego. Are there then two kinds of "I—ness" represented in this consciousness by the subject-self and the object-self? It is evident that there can be no two kinds of the character "I—ness" one subjective and the other objective. It is a character which can only truly belong to the subject. The self which is object must lack it. It is not the true self. This latter can never be known as object. It is always the subject, and so far not knowable.

It will here be contended : But the knower also is in a manner known. We can have no notion of the knower without the known, of the subject without the object. The knower is then determined by this relation, and it is to that extent known. Apart from this relation we can have no intuition of self, and no self-consciousness; and without self-consciousness, there is no problem as to the true nature of the self. We have then to start from the fact of self-consciousness, and we have to admit that the true self is somehow known; for it is the subject in knowledge, and the subject is relative to the object.

The knower knows himself. The subject is aware of itself as subject. Somebody may argue that this is not possible. "Agent and patient never are the same in the same act ; such terms as self-caused, self-moved, self-known either connote the incomprehensible or are abbreviated expressions—as e. g. touching oneself when one's right hand touches one's left."* It is certain that self-awareness is not the awareness of one part of self by the other. The self has no parts, and certainly none that are so distinct from each other as subject and object. How are we then to account for self-awareness which we have accepted as a fact ?

It is the view of some that in self-awareness, the self is not really known at all. We know an object and we distinguish from this object the idea of the self. We know this idea. But the idea is not the self itself ; it is something that partakes of the nature of the objective. The difficulty here is, how can we distinguish the self from the not-self, the subject from the object, and arrive at the idea, if there is no original intuition of the self at all ? We cannot simply look at the world, and deduce from the known content itself the knower of the world, or the *pratiyogi* of the known. We have to act the knower or actually to know in order to get at the idea of the

*Prof. J. Ward's article on Psychology in *Encyclo : Britannica*, 11th edition, p. 55.

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knower. In other words, without a first-hand intuition of the self, the self cannot even distinguish itself from the not-self. The self known in self-awareness is not merely an idea got out of or by relation to the not-self. The relation would not even be possible without an original intuition of the self.

We have an original intuition of the self. But this intuition, by its very nature, cannot be the intuition of one thing by another thing, or of one part of the self by another part, or even of the self by the self taking the self to be in two different positions such as subject and object. It is intuition in which subject and object cannot be distinguished. Accordingly the self is this intuitiveness itself which is the soul of every other intuition. The only proper sense to apply to the self as thus understood is that of being. The idea of being does not involve any kind of dualism whether of the subject and the object or any other. The self is this being. Further it is the ground of every intuition. It is therefore being that is intelligent, and essentially of the nature of the subjective : for what is not subjective can only be objective,—and the self cannot be its own object.

This fundamental intuition of the self in which the being of the self is not distinct from its intuitiveness is the basis of self-awareness. We cannot indeed start with it. We can only start with ordinary self-awareness. But in this we must distinguish the true ground from the false appearance. We must analyse away every relation of the self which gives it objectivity. The self thus got at will not be a matter of any image. We cannot even think it ; for thought is confined to objects. The true knowledge of the self is merely a matter of the understanding. We have simply to know what to guard against, what errors to avoid. We have not to reproduce in imagination our knowledge of the self. The attempt to do so will bring us back to self-awareness, which is not so much the solution as the problem itself. Our knowledge of the self consists in the satisfied desire that the self *is*, and that there is no objective image that is equal to it; it does not consist

in a hunt for a new image or in the elevation of the one we already have

We have indicated the true nature of the self. The self can never become the known. About this self we can have no problem. Our problems relate to the ego, the subject or the knower. It is by the study of this that we get to the deeper significance of the self. For all practical purposes then the self is identical with the ego. The ego has all the inwardness which we can, in thought, associate with the self. We shall now proceed to ask is the ego a real entity, so far as mental life is concerned, and is the unity of this life explained by it?

It is sometimes maintained that there is no single entity "I" which apprehends in the different acts of apprehension of an individual. The entity which apprehends in the different acts of direct apprehension which we call "ours" is numerically different in every different act. The unity of conscious life is accordingly explained not by reference to any single entity "I". It is explained either by a certain relation which the different acts of apprehension have to one another or which they all have to some other entity, external to them, which may or may not be something which deserves to be called "me".†

It is possible that the entity which apprehends in the different acts of apprehension which I call "mine" is numerically different. But even then it must be distinguished from the apprehension. It cannot be the apprehension itself. If the apprehension is the entity, "I apprehend" must mean that the apprehension apprehends,—which is meaningless phraseology. There is also no possibility of the consciousness of "I" in respect of a mere apprehension. An apprehension is distinguished by its objective content, and this gives to it a *not-self* character. But if there is no consciousness of self, there is no self to be explained or explained away. There is no problem.

†See Dr. Moore's "The Status of sense-data." A. S. P. 1913—14 p. 361.

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We must then suppose that there is the apprehension, and there is the entity that apprehends in it, and that the two are somehow distinguishable. But even so self-consciousness will not become possible. It can only become possible when the entity that apprehends further apprehends that it is what apprehends. A momentary perception will not yield self-consciousness. The entity that apprehends in it will have passed before it is aware that it is aware of anything. It cannot distinguish itself from the apprehension, and cannot therefore rise to the consciousness of itself. In the pure present, even the awareness of objects is not possible. For this awareness implies (a) consciousness of the time when the awareness in question had not yet arisen; (b) consciousness that the awareness is a completed fact; and lastly (c) consciousness that the entity that is aware of the above two situations is one and the same. In the mere instant or the pure present, the object will so to say coincide with the subject and knowledge of the one by the other will not be possible. We conclude therefore that it is essential to the possibility of knowledge in general and to self-awareness in particular that the entity which apprehends in the different acts of apprehension should be one and the same. It is because of this that we can distinguish the different acts of apprehension themselves, and find in them evidence of something that knows a subject or self.

It has been contended that there is no direct awareness of an unchanging self. All that experience lays before us is the fact that certain apprehensions are what I call "mine". Indeed if we knew an entity which deserved to be called "me", this fact of experience could be easily explained. But as we cannot find it, this fact is to be differently explained. There is first of all the hypothesis that the different acts which I call "mine" have a common relation to some other entity which is external to them and which may not deserve to be called "me". But we have no evidence of any such entity; and no relation can ever constitute an act "mine", which is not a

relation of that act to what properly deserves to be called *me*. There is secondly the hypothesis that what constitutes certain acts "mine" is a certain relation which these have one to another. Once again what is this relation? A can be "mine" with reference to B as the subject; B can be "mine" with reference to C as the subject, and so on. If we take away the subject notion altogether, nothing that we can put in any relation will constitute the relation "mine." Something then must be "me" apart from any relation "mine". This "me" must further be the unchanging ground of the different acts of apprehension which I call "mine". It is that which apprehends in them all. We cannot doubt it without doubting the possibility of any kind of unity of mental life.

There is one more point which deserves to be considered in this connection. It may be that there is no entity which deserves to be called *me* in our sense of the term, and that therefore the idea of certain acts being "mine" is also an illusion. But the whole of our experience cannot be an illusion. It is the fundamental postulate of every system of philosophy that our experience has a meaning which gives us a clue to the real state of things or the actual fact. No conclusion then is valid which does not validate in a way our experience. What we have to do is to give the right analysis of this experience, and not to suggest a meaning which will render experience itself meaningless and impossible. The analysis of the self which we have given is implied in all our experience and renders that experience intelligible. That is its only justification. If our experience can be analysed in any other way without prejudice to it, it can then indeed be concluded that there is no ground for upholding the reality of any such entity "I" or "me" in our sense of those terms. But this is just what we have seen not to be possible; and as we cannot regard the whole of experience to be an illusion, so neither can we regard the reality of an entity such as "I" or "me" to be a matter of doubt.

The reason why we fail to recognise a single self-identical

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entity in the different acts of apprehension is a two-fold expectation in regard to it that is not justified. Firstly we expect that the entity must be capable of being distinguished from each separate act of apprehension and viewed as a reality by itself. Secondly we expect that the entity thus distinguished and known must again be seen to be self-identical in the different acts of apprehension much as one physical object may be seen to be identical in its known characteristics with another. But if the entity could be distinguished from the act of apprehension it would be just another kind of content; it would not be the true subject. No doubt it is distinct. But we can understand its distinctness not by any image, but only negatively, i.e. by the idea that what apprehends is not and can never be, the same as the mental fact of apprehension. Again, since the entity can not be separated or objectified it cannot be distinguished by any identification-marks. Objective identification is thus impossible in regard to it. At the same time we have the feeling of the identity of the subject. This is not an illusion. And if it is an illusion, it is not only the consciousness of self that becomes impossible, but in fact the consciousness of anything whatsoever. Self-identity is the pre-supposition of all experience.

The question may here be raised, how far does this identity go? Once again there can be no objective test of this identity. There can only be a subjective test,—how far is the identity felt and affirmed? If any portions of mental life have got detached, we shall have to ask: are the detached portions in any way related to those that remain even as forgotten memories are? The latter leave some vacant places or incipient tendencies. If there is no known empirical relation, the so-called divided personalities must be taken for all purposes to be really separate and distinct. Periods of sleep, unconsciousness etc. are all known as parts of a single life,—they are experienced as states of a particular unitary self. In the case of divided

personalities, the same test is to be applied,—are any of the so-called lost portions known as real intervals or real parts of a historically singular life? There are indeed always experiences in the life of an individual that are more or less completely lost to explicit memory, but not to the unconscious. The empirical unity of a single conscious life is thus hard to determine exactly. It must necessarily remain beyond certain limits, a mere postulate and not an experienced fact.

The Ideal as God.

R. Das.

We have contended that the ideal must be real, because the validity of moral judgments, which we have tried to establish beyond question, cannot otherwise be justified. Now, one of the easiest ways of conceiving the ideal as real is to suppose that it is fully realised in some being. The name God may conveniently be given to such a being. We human beings have all our characteristic drawbacks. None of us is perfect. We cannot say that the ideal is fully realised in any one of us. On the contrary our idea of God is such that it is never associated with any moral imperfection. God is generally thought of as all wise, all powerful and all good. It is possible to think, as some writers have actually thought, that there are limitations to his power and even to his knowledge. But it is not possible to impugn his goodness without at the same time falsifying our idea of God. His goodness must not suffer any limitation ; he must be all good, perfect, if he is to be God at all. It thus appears very easy to identify the ideal with God.

We find a strong support of this position in the teachings of Christianity. God is revealed, for the Christians, in the life of Christ. They know what God is only through the life and teachings of Christ. In Christ they have found the ultimate ideal by which their life and conduct may be guided and judged. But the life of Christ, the Christians think, is nothing but the revelation of God to us. So ultimately God is the ideal which determines the measure of our goodness. In that injunction of Christ which says "Be ye perfect even as your father in heaven is perfect" we have the very same idea more clearly expressed. God is held up here as the supreme ideal. Perfection exists already as realised in God and we are good or have worth only in so far as we realise that perfection in us.

We are not giving here a variant of the moral argument. It is not our purpose to prove independently by any argument the existence of God. But having previously shown that the ideal is real, we are now trying to identify it with God. Common people as well as philosophers speak of God and do understand something by it. The difference between what common people understand by God and what philosophers mean when they speak of God may be more or less marked. But there is a general agreement among all people about the idea that if Godhead means anything, it must mean or include in its meaning moral perfection. Some of the gods of polytheism are not of course very remarkable for their moral excellence. But, as has been pointed out, they are not to be regarded as Gods but rather as angels. Those who believe now-a-days in God believe also in the unity and moral perfection of God. We can thus see that the ideal, which is implied in all moral judgments and which is required to be real by the validity of such judgments, may be one with God. By thinking of the ideal as God, we are saved from the necessity of admitting the dual reality of God and the ideal. We need not think that God is real and the ideal also enjoys a separate reality. We may be content to think that God alone is real and the ideal is real in him. If God can guarantee the reality of the ideal we need not search for it outside God and the world.

A question may arise here about the precise meaning of the proposition that God is the ideal. We may be asked whether we hold that God and the ideal are interchangeable terms, i.e. identical in meaning, or think that God is a being who has only realised the ideal fully although the meaning of God is not the same as the meaning of the ideal. God is generally understood as the ground and source of all reality whereas the ideal is the basis of goodness only. Power and knowledge besides goodness have to be attributed to God, but for the ideal we require nothing but goodness merely. So the difference between God and the ideal seems very clear.

Even if we suppose that God has realised the ideal fully, we have to admit that the ideal as such is different from God. The difference is apparent from the very idea that God has realised the ideal. If God himself were the ideal, there would be no question of this realising the ideal. God can realise the ideal only when the ideal as such is different from him. How can we then identify God with the ideal?

We readily recognise the difference in meaning between God and the ideal. If they were synonymous it would not be necessary for us to assert that God is the ideal. We cannot also say that God has realised the ideal just as a moral agent would try to realise it. No one believes that God has through moral endeavour reached the ideal which was in the beginning away from him. On the contrary we think that the ideal is bound up with the being of God. There was never a time when God had yet to realise the ideal. If God is anything he must be one with the ideal from the beginning. Although the difference in meaning between God and the ideal may be there, in fact they are one. The British Premier in 1928 does not literary mean the person who is called Mr. Baldwin, but in fact they are one. God may mean more than the ideal, as the ideas of power and knowledge, besides that of goodness are associated with him. But God must at least be the ideal, otherwise his godhead will suffer.

We have said that it is not our intention to give here an independent proof for the existence of God. But we cannot help remarking that God conceived as the ideal is the only real God that can be found and found to be satisfactory. The ontological argument is now-a-days regarded by many as fallacious. (Cf. C. D. Broad's article in the Hibbert Journal, Vol. XXIV. p. 43). The cosmological and the ontological arguments also are not very conclusive. They proceed upon an examination of external facts. These facts can be explained by some other fact of the same order or by a principle which is inherent in them and has its being only in them. The hypothesis of God can legitimately be used

for the explanation of these facts only if we propose to degrade God to the level of natural phenomena. However far we may go back in a causal series we shall always find some member of the series and shall never get out of it. We can get out of the series to God only by a big jump; but the jump is neither warranted nor necessitated by the series of facts examined. The first term of the series, if there be any first term, must fall in a line with the rest of the terms and cannot claim a status superior to that of the rest.

A designer is necessary only when a thing is unable to fashion itself. For the growth in shape and proportion of a banian tree we do not constantly require the services of a master architect. We know that the whole thing is pre-figured in the seed. If we started with formless matter we should require some external hand to put it into definite shape. But if it itself has the form and the tendency to give rise to other forms, the services of a moulding hand are absolutely superfluous. We should require the hypothesis of God if we supposed that in the beginning there was mere matter without any form and character. But it cannot be proved that the universe was ever in a state of this sort. The universe is always in a determinate state. It has always a definite character which is determined by its previous states and which again determines in its turn the state that follows. The process is absolutely continuous and no time or place can be found where we can introduce the designing hand of the providence.

If God is anything, he is spiritual, and a spiritual principle cannot be found in a non-spiritual medium. The external world is sometimes supposed to be the manifestation of some spiritual principle. But the spirituality of the external world as revealed to our senses is not so clearly manifest as the spirituality of the selves that we are. So if there is God, we must look for the evidence of his being rather in our own selves than in the external world. However unworthy we may be in our everyday

thoughts and deeds, we seem to come in touch with the divine in our sense of the ideal. In us there is nothing higher than our sense of the best. Here if anywhere, we must look for the revelation of the reality of God to us. It is with a rare insight that Prof. Pringle-Pattison has said that "the presence of the ideal is the reality of God within us" (*Ideal of God* p. 246). We know that God is the embodiment of perfection and we also know that the ideal embodies perfection in itself. It is easy therefore for us to think of God as the ideal or of the ideal as God. We have found that the ideal must be objectively real. So there cannot be any question about the reality or existence of God conceived as the ideal.

We have said that God conceived as the ideal is the only God that can be found satisfactory. The cosmological and the teleological arguments even if they are successful, can only prove a highly powerful and clever God. That God, however powerful and clever, need not be a God of goodness. And no being can be worthy of our love and worship unless it possesses the attribute of goodness in its perfection. The ingenious creator of the world might be there, but there would be no reason why we should love and worship him. He might inspire us with awe and wonder but he would never fill us with reverence. Such a God would never satisfy our religious sentiments. It cannot be supposed that we might be induced to love God in the hope of some reward or out of fear of some punishment. For love actuated by such selfish motives would be no love at all. It cannot also be argued that we should be grateful to God for the things he has given us to enjoy, because one does not usually feel any gratitude for things he has never asked for, especially when he finds that the things for which he asks are not granted to him. Such considerations however do not arise at all when we come to think of God as the ideal. The ideal simply because it is the ideal, the source and ground of all worth and goodness,

demands our love and devotion. We do not require any reason be given for our worshipful attitude towards it. Our heart goes out spontaneously in love and worship to a being whom we recognise to be no other than our ideal. Thus in our sense of the ideal we have got a proof and evidence of God which can nowhere else be found.

Some modern writers have been led, like ourselves, from a consideration of the moral world to the idea of God. All these thinkers are deeply impressed with the objective validity of morality and they are convinced that the ideal implied in morality must have objective existence. We are glad to have the support of these writers for our fundamental position that the ideal must be objectively real. We perfectly agree with them in so far as they think that morality cannot be made wholly rational without some religious or metaphysical background. Our difference with them begins only when they try to define the nature of that background and its relation to the ideal. A brief consideration of the views of some of these writers on this subject may help us to elucidate our position as well as to explain where and how we differ from them.

Dr. Rashdall is anxious to secure objective reality to the ideal. He realises that it cannot exist in material things or in the mind of this or that individual. But 'it cannot exist nowhere and no-how but in a mind.' It requires therefore the mind of God. "The belief in God" he argues "is the logical presupposition of an objective or absolute morality". "Our moral ideal can only claim objective validity in so far as it can rationally be regarded as the revelation of a moral ideal eternally existing in the mind of God". (*The Theory of Good and Evil* Vol. II p. 212). Dr. Rashdall does not seem to think that God himself is the ideal. He only says that the recognition of the existence of the moral ideal implies a spiritual source of Reality whose idea it is. (*Ibid.* p. ix).

It appears that according to Dr. Rashdall the mind of

God is necessary to give reality to the ideal. The ideal is real; but he says, it can be real only in a mind. And so a divine mind is required. But why should it be so? If we are persuaded that the ideal must be real, why can we not suppose that it is real by itself and on its own account? We have already tried to show that although the reality of the ideal may not be of the same order as that of any fact in the world of mind or of nature, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot be real.

Even if we suppose that the ideal exists somehow in the mind of God, we shall find it very difficult to understand the relation between the ideal and the divine mind.

(1) Does the divine mind add only awareness to the ideal which is already intelligible by itself as ideal? (2) or is the very being of the ideal as ideal constituted by its being in the divine mind? (3) Does the ideal exist as an *ideal* in the mind of God? (4) Or does it exist there merely as a real idea?

(1) If the presence of the ideal in the divine mind means only the addition of awareness (on the part of God) to it, then so far as the being of the ideal is concerned it seems to be unaffected by such presence or absence. If the ideal has a being of its own, its objectivity is already guaranteed and cannot be improved upon by the fact that God or any one else is aware of it.

(2) To be in the mind of God does not mean to be the ideal. So it is not possible that the ideality of the ideal should be constituted by its being in the mind of God.

(3) When we suppose that the ideal exists in the mind of God as an ideal i. e. as something still to be achieved or realised in fact, very little seems to be gained by the supposition; for the ideal exists as ideal in our minds as well. When we think that the ideal is only *ideal* to us, we may suppose that it is *real* somewhere i. e. in the mind of God. But if it is merely ideal even there, the very

reality of the ideal seems to be in danger. We have to suppose therefore that the ideal is real in the mind of God.

(4) Now if it is to be real in the mind of God, it can be real only as an idea. How otherwise can anything be real *in any mind*? But the ideal is real as an idea even in our minds and if its objective reality is not secured by its presence in our minds in the form of an idea, the situation is not likely to be altered very much by its presence in the divine mind in the same form.

Moreover by enclosing the ideal within the mind of God Dr. Rashdall seems to have made the ideal quite unavailable for us. Ordinarily we have no means of knowing directly what is present in the mind of others. We may infer from visible acts or facial or other bodily expressions what is going on in the minds of our neighbours. But as we do not see the face of God and do not think that he has a visible body, we should be unable to know what is there in the mind of God. So if the ideal existed solely in the mind of God, we should be unable to know that it is there and what it is like. We should have no sense of the ideal and it would be impossible for us to make any attempt to realise the ideal in our life and conduct. The ideal must reach out to us in some sense before we can be drawn towards it. But this would not ever be possible if the ideal existed only in the mind of God. Dr. Rashdall does not think that the divine mind is only a comprehensive unity of individual minds. If it were so, then what is present in the divine mind might at the same time be present, at least partially, in individual minds. But Dr. Rashdall makes a real distinction between the divine and the individual mind (*Ibid.* Vol. II. P. 242). If we hold to this distinction and understand the divine mind after the analogy of the human mind that we know, it is incomprehensible how what is present exclusively in one mind, even though it be the mind of God, can be operative in other minds as well. If however we are not to under-

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stand the divine mind after the fashion of the human mind, we shall not understand what it is and the assertion that the ideal is real in the mind of God will remain equally insignificant.

It may be objected that morality expresses itself in our conduct; and so the moral ideal is not a person but a course of action. And while it is possible for the ideal course of conduct to be represented in the divine mind in will or in idea, it is not possible for God himself to be that ideal, simply because God is a person and not an act.

The objection overlooks the fact that an act as such is neither moral nor immoral. It becomes so only when it expresses the character of some personality. Acts are important for moral consideration because our character can find expression only in volitional acts. But ultimately the moral judgment is not passed on acts as such but on the person who performs the acts. It is we who are primarily moral or immoral, our acts are so only secondarily. We want to be moral and our ideal cannot simply be a course of action. It must be a character and personality which we wish to become. The degree of our moral advance is to be judged not so much by what we do as by what are. So the moral ideal cannot be an idea in the mind of God or a course of action represented in idea in the divine mind but must be a personality who may be no other than God himself.

Prof. Sorley is another writer who has been led from a consideration of moral values to the idea of God. He has argued with great force for the objectivity of value, and has tried to establish the objective reality of the moral ideal. He has been impressed, however, with the apparent incongruity between the world of values and the world of causal relation. But he recognises at the same time that both the worlds must find their proper place in a harmonious scheme of reality. He thinks that the desired unity between the physical and the moral world is supplied by the hypothesis of a divine mind whose purpose that goodness should be realised is being

fulfilled in the world. It is one of the main contentions of Prof. Sorley that goodness, especially moral goodness, can be realised only in persons. Now if man is to realise goodness in the highest sense, he must be free. 'Mere correctness of behaviour is not a realisation of that high value of which man is capable, which requires its free choice and attainments'. But his freedom implies that there is the possibility of his doing wrong also. It is true that 'the world as a causal system displays such apparent indifference to the standard of good and evil.' But the world cannot be explained from its present appearance only. The final issue, the end which it is made to subserve, should also be taken into consideration. And it is found that "even in its incongruities with the unchanging moral order, the world of nature may be regarded as a fit medium for the fashioning and training of moral beings" (*Moral values and the Idea of God* p. 504). This may be supposed to be the end or purpose of the universe. We find that nature is subservient to the moral order, and this means that it has got at its back 'intelligence and the will to good as well as the ultimate source of power.' This involves, in short, the acknowledgment of a supreme mind or God as the ground of all reality.

Professor Sorley does not think that the view he has propounded can strictly be proved or demonstrated. But he appears to think all the same that he has given a synoptic view of the universe which should be philosophically satisfactory. On certain important points we are in whole hearted agreement with him. When he argues "that the value or goodness actually achieved in personal life implies as its ground or condition a standard or ideal of goodness," (p. 499) and further contends for the objective reality of that ideal we are glad to have his support for one of our main theses. When again he speaks of God as the supreme worth and says that wherever there is intrinsic worth in the world we may see a manifestation of the divine (p. 467) we find absolutely no reason to dissent from him. But when he speaks of the divine

purpose and says that it is revealed in the world his words do not seem to bring much enlightenment to us.

The meaning of purpose (in divine reference) as well as its relation to the ideal has remained rather obscure in Prof. Sorley's writings. Purpose in the sense of a felt want cannot be attributed to God, because God who is conceived as the ultimate ground of all reality cannot be supposed to have any deficiency in his being and cannot therefore feel a real want.

A purpose is not intelligible without some content or object which is purposed. What may be the object of divine purpose? We may suppose that the object of divine purpose is that there should be perfect beings in the world. But since there are no perfect beings, as is admitted by Prof. Sorley himself, we have to admit that the purpose of God, understood in this sense, is completely thwarted. The purpose of God should therefore be understood in the light of what is found consistent with the present order of reality. So has Prof. Sorley suggested that the fashioning and training of moral lives, which is permitted by the natural world, even in its incongruities with the unchanging moral order, is the purpose of God. But if the purpose is a real element in the heart of reality, an essential factor in our conception of God, then we should think that the training of moral beings is co-eternal with the being of God. The purpose being eternally present in the mind of God the fashioning and training of moral beings should go on eternally. But is not the idea itself preposterous that there should be eternal doing of a thing without its ever being done? Fashioning or training has no meaning unless something is actually fashioned or trained. So it appears that the divine purpose cannot be understood exclusively with reference to the process only. But if we wish to understand it in reference to the product, if i. e. we think that perfect moral beings are the object of divine purpose, we find that the purpose is not fulfilled in the world. Moreover it would not then be true to say that the fashioning of moral lives is the purpose of God.

These are some of the difficulties of our understanding purpose as a subjective correlate of something which has yet to be accomplished. To avoid these difficulties we may try to understand purpose objectively as an end which is realised in a thing that admits of growth and development. In this sense treehood is the purpose of the plant which gradually grows out of a seed into a tree; manhood is the purpose of the child which develops into a man. When viewed in this light the divine purpose will be seen to be identical with the moral ideal which is being realised in this world. The ideal is not something which is purposed by God but it is itself the purpose. When the ideal is thus identified with the divine purpose we should have no objection to saying that the purpose is being realised in the world. But if by purpose in this connexion we understand nothing else than the ideal, there is no special advantage in speaking of it as the divine purpose. Moreover Prof. Sorley does not appear to think that the divine purpose is identical with the moral ideal itself.

Professor Sorley has not made it clear whether there is any essential relation between goodness and the purpose of God. He does not seem to hold that goodness depends on the purpose of God, that a thing originally neutral in its character becomes good when it is purposed by God. In accordance with the general tenor of his teachings he thinks that it is the purpose of God that goodness should be realised in the world. But when goodness is made part of the object of divine purpose, it appears clear that goodness as such should be intelligible quite independently of such purpose. For if goodness meant what is purposed by God, then instead of saying that it is the purpose of God that goodness should be realised in the world, he should have said that God purposes that X should be realised and X would have appeared as good because it formed the object of divine purpose. Moreover when we know that the divine purpose is directed towards goodness the virtual independence of the

two concepts goodness and divine purpose, becomes at once clear. Now it is the nature of goodness as such that it should be realised in the world. If anything presents itself as good to us, we spontaneously feel that it should be realised. Our understanding of anything as good is identical, or at least coincident, with our feeling that it should be realised. When goodness is such that it should be realised nothing seems to be gained by the addition of the clause—'It is the purpose of God.'

Professor Sorley has vigorously maintained the objective reality of the ideal. But he has not made it clear where, how and in what sense the ideal is real. The ideal is not real anywhere in the material world. If it is to be real it must be real in man or in God or in third something outside both man and God. But it cannot be real in man as no man is perfect. The third something may be supposed to exist in the manner of a Platonic idea. But this has not been hinted at by Prof. Sorley. So we think that according to him the ideal can be real only in God. The only question that has to be decided is whether the ideal is real as an idea in the mind of God or is identical with God himself. In considering Dr. Rashdall's theory we have seen that the ideal cannot simply be an idea in the mind of God and we think Professor Sorley too cannot support the position that the ideal is only an idea in some mind. The objective reality of the ideal for which he has argued with so much force cannot be sufficiently guaranteed if the ideal is real only as an idea. Moreover Professor Sorley thinks that goodness can be realised only in persons. So the ideal of goodness, if it is to be real at all, must be real only as, and in, a person. And the easiest way of conceiving this person is to think of him as God.

We see so far that if the ideal is real there is no harm in identifying it with God. Instead of supposing that there are two supreme entities, God and the ideal, we think there is only one such being whom we call either God or the ideal. This supposition has the advantage of comparative simplicity.

But when we have identified the ideal with God, can we say that we have solved our problems? Can we give a satisfactory explanation of our moral consciousness on the hypothesis that the ideal is identical with God? Again, although we vaguely suppose that we have made some advance in our knowledge of the ideal when we have found it to be one with God himself, do we in fact know where and how it exists? The nature of the ideal as well as the manner of its being does not at once become clear even when we have given the name God to it.

Now when we know that God is the ideal of goodness—that in him the acme of perfection has been reached—we understand why we should love and worship such a being. But however much we may worship God in whom the ideal is real, there does not appear to be any necessity why we should ourselves be good. God's being the ideal does not at all explain the obligation that lies on us to realise the ideal in our lives. The sense of obligation is an essential factor in our moral consciousness. We are never genuinely moral unless we feel that there is an unescapable obligation on us to be morally good. And this sense of obligation cannot be explained simply by the fact that the ideal is God. God may be perfect but this fact does not seem to have any relevance for the morality of men. God may be good, but why is it necessary for men to be so?

It may be said that if the fact that God is the ideal explains why we should love and worship him, it also explains why we should try to be good ourselves. We cannot truly love and worship goodness without feeling at the same time strongly inclined to be good ourselves. If anything is conceived as the ideal, it means that it demands to be fulfilled in our life.

We do not deny the fact that the ideal demands to be fulfilled in our life. We recognise that there is a sense of obligation which everyone of us feels to realise the ideal. We start from this empirical fact of the moral consciousness and seek for an adequate explanation of it. But we contend

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that this fact is not sufficiently explained by the hypothesis that the ideal is real and is real in a being who is different from us. We all feel drawn towards the ideal and the adequate metaphysical explanation of this fact is not that the ideal is real in God if we understand God, as he is generally understood, in the sense of a being who is different and distinct from us. The very conception of the ideal carries with it an urge in us to fulfil the ideal and we are persuaded that this fact must have some very profound metaphysical implications. And our present contention is that all these implications are not found, and can never be summed up, in the saying that God is the ideal. If the ideal is to be my ideal, if it must be a bounden duty on my part to realise the ideal, then the relation between myself and the ideal must be more intimate and closer than what is granted to be there between men and God. We have already said that God is generally conceived as distinct and different from men. God is no God unless he can be loved and worshipped. But if I am to love and worship God, he must be an other to me. This otherness or externality with regard to men seems to be an essential characteristic of Godhead. If I am simply merged in God or God is merged in me, God remains no God for me.

We may be reminded that we are supposing without justification that deism and pantheism are the only possible alternatives with regard to God. We may be told that there is the third alternative of theism which enjoys the merits of both deism and pantheism without falling a victim to the defects of either. Deism as a philosophical theory has long ceased to be maintained by any serious thinker. But there are still many powerful writers who believe in God and distinguish their theism from deism and pantheism. Ward for instance writes ; "For pantheism God is the immanent ground of the world, for deism he is the transcendent ground, for theism he is both." (*The Realm of Ends*, P. 234). Professor Sorley also has argued in

favour of theism. But his theism is to be distinguished both from theism and from pantheism. Many other writers have followed the same course. There is nothing wrong in the belief that a satisfactory view of theism should be free from the defects of both deism and pantheism. But we are inclined to think that the desired synthesis of immanence and transcendence is not easy of accomplishment and the view of theism which we get in philosophical writings is scarcely distinguishable from what is known as pantheism.

Theistic writers speak of the world as the creation of God. But they take the word creation in a technical sense. Causation transeunt or immanent, is foreign to their notion of creation. Creation does not mean for them a change in some material which was already in existence nor the bringing into existence of something which was not there. We are not even to think that creation means a change in God himself. But we are to understand by creation the dependence of the world on God. "To say that the world depends on God is tantamount to saying that could God cease to be, the world too would cease to be, or that if the world should cease to be, it would be because God had ceased to be. In other words God is the ground of the world's being, its *ratio essendi*" (Ibid. p. 234).

How are we to understand precisely the relation between God and the world? To call anything a ground is after all to apply to it a relation of thought. The thing itself must be something, must have a nature and being of its own which justifies the attribution of this relation. Similarly that which depends upon it must have a being of its own which must be granted to be there before we can say whether or not it depends on something else. But it is said that the being of the world depends upon God. This is a conception which is by no means very easy to grasp. How can the *being* of a thing be dependent on another? The relation of dependence may be there between two things. But if any or both of

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them are nothing or have no reality to start with, how we assert any relation between them? So if the world is to depend upon God, the world must itself be and be something. Wherever we have any instance of dependence, we find that a thing depends upon another for something other than its mere being. Its being it owes entirely to itself, although its further continuance in being may be dependent on other circumstances.

In two ways however we may try to think that the world depends for its being upon God. Either, we may think, the world was brought into existence out of nothing by God or it forms part of the being of God. In the former case we can say that if God had not been there, the world would not have come into existence. In the latter case also it would be legitimate to say that should God cease to exist the world would also cease to exist. There does not seem to be any other way in which we can think that the being of the world depends on God. But these however are the theories of deism and pantheism which are sought to be avoided by the supporters of theism.

Ward has specified the relation of dependence between God and the world by saying that 'could God cease to exist, the world would cease to exist also.' But how do we know it? The hypothetical nature of the statement shows that it can never be verified. When we form part of the world, the experiment, which can prove conclusively that the world does really cease to exist on the cessation of God's existence, can never be witnessed by us. When we start with the reality of both God and the world, it is impossible to justify or prove to be false, empirically, the sort of relation that is asserted to be there between them. We may try to do so only by means of pure thought; that is, we may examine our ideas of God and the world and see whether they are such as to imply the asserted relation between them.

We can rationally say that the world would cease to exist if God had ceased to exist when and only when we know for

certain that the being of the world is included in the being of God. If the being of the world went beyond the being of God even by an inch, then to that extent the world would remain even when God had ceased to exist. If the world is to disappear with the disappearance of God, then the being of the world must be included in the being of God. The world must in that case be wholly immanent in God. If theism can put up with this position it can hardly find any fault with pantheism.

It may be said that although the world is immanent in God, God is not wholly and simply immanent in the world. He is, in theism, both immanent and transcendent, and not simply immanent as in pantheism. But this position of theism, we are persuaded, cannot strictly be maintained. If God is immanent, it is difficult to understand how he can be also transcendent. By the immanence of God we understand that God exists in the world. When further the immanence is understood with regard to the whole world, we have to think that every part of the world is instinct with the being of God. God as immanent has therefore to be understood as pervasive of the whole world. The world in a sense is included in the being of God. How can God so understood fall also outside the world and be transcendent?

It may be said that God is more than the world and goes beyond and so to that extent he may be supposed to be transcendent. But in this supposition it is only a part of God which is transcendent and a part immanent; and God as such is neither immanent nor transcendent. When we suppose that the being of God not only fills the world but also falls outside of it, we conceive God as consisting of two parts one of which falls within the world and the other remains outside it. It is only by applying the name God alternately to these different parts that we can say that God is immanent as well as transcendent. But if godhead belongs to the part which falls within the world, God is immanent but not transcendent. If it belongs to the part which goes beyond the

world, God is transcendent but not immanent. But if by God we are to understand the whole constituted by these parts, we cannot truly say that he is either transcendent or immanent simply because no whole can ever as a whole remain outside or fall inside any of its parts. We find it impossible therefore to reconcile with regard to God the idea of immanence with that of transcendence.

The difficulties of the theistic position that God is both transcendent and immanent are felt by all serious and honest thinkers (cf. Prof. Alexander, *Hibbert Journal* Vol. XXV. p. 251). Even Ward must have felt these difficulties. But he proposed to get rid of them by his hypothesis of intellectual intuition. By availing himself of the Kantian theory of the passivity of sense and the activity of understanding, Ward constructs the idea of intellectual intuition by doing away with the passivity of sense perception and the discursiveness of intellectual synthesis. He writes: "But now we are to imagine our sensory and passive perception replaced by an active, intellectual position, our discursive synthesis by an original thesis or intuition. The Being to whom this intellectual intuition belongs will be creative: its objective experience will contain nothing that is merely given to it, but only what is ultimately posited by it: its objects will not be phenomenal but noumenal, not independent manifestations of an other but the creation of itself." (*Ibid* p. 235)... "in intellectual intuition all real difference between being and knowing, thought and thing, seems to have vanished." (p. 235). While contrasting intellectual intuition with absolute or complete knowledge Ward has further elucidated the idea by saying that absolute or complete knowledge "would leave the things themselves still independent as regards their existence, and so would fall short of this intellectual intuition wherein, it is supposed, they are not merely known but whereby they exist" (236). This intellectual intuition thus appears to be a sort of creative knowledge by which things are not merely known but maintained in existence.

But how does it solve the problem of immanence and transcendence? Ward thinks that it solves in the following way: The creative knowledge, which constitutes the being of things and by which God knows them, is not after all God himself and so God is transcendent to it. But as it is God's knowledge and is ever sustained by him, he must be supposed to be also immanent in it. In his own words, "God is transcendent to it, for it is not God, but his utterance and manifestation; and yet because it is his utterance and because he ever sustains it, he is immanent in it, it is continuous creation" (240). The opposition between transcendence and immanence is sought to be relieved in this way and they are supposed to exist in God in harmonious union.

But this way of solving the problem does not seem to carry us very far. The first question that it raises is whether in fact our ideas of being and knowing are such, or can be so modified, that they may, in some reference, be made interchangeable. Ward admits quite frankly that with us the knowledge of a thing is never the being of it. Our knowledge of a thing never means or constitutes the being of it. Now when we find that in all cases, with which we are acquainted, knowing and being are quite disparate, we may quite legitimately doubt whether in any case, even in the case of God, they can be so assimilated to each other that they will lose all distinction between them and become absolutely equivalent. Even in divine reference the meaning of knowing is not the meaning of being. When we can say that God *knows* a particular object we cannot say that God *is* that object. From the side of things too, we cannot say that their existence means the very same thing as the knowledge of them by God. The fact they are known by God need not be disputed; but this fact, namely, that they are known by God, is not necessarily expressed by saying that they exist. When we say that they exist we do not necessarily understand that they are known by God. When, however, we say that they are known by God we may understand that they exist, not because know-

ledge and being are identical in meaning but because no real knowledge is possible unless things that are known also exist. We are not said to have any knowledge when we merely entertain some ideas in our mind corresponding which there are no facts in reality. Knowledge implies existence without being identical with it in meaning. It is impossible to get rid of this distinction. If there is no being of things independent of or different from their being known by God, we may as well say that there is only the knowledge of God and no being of things. But if there are no things how can there be any knowledge at all, seeing that knowledge implies the reality of things? There will be only divine imagining or fancy but no knowledge in the proper sense of the term. We shall be left only with God and his ideas. The world as a fact or reality will not be there. This is perhaps worse than pantheism.

The objects, it is said, are not to the divine being "independent manifestations of an other but the creation of itself." But if knowledge means anything it must mean at least a distinction between the subject that knows and the objects that are known. The subject and the object cannot run into each other and leave the knowledge intact. It seems absolutely necessary that in the field of knowledge the objects should always maintain a sort of otherness to the subject.

The objects are supposed to be the creation of the Divine Being. But creation must mean either actual creation in the ordinary sense of the term or an illusion of the Divine mind or simply a modification in the Divine Being. We cannot think of a fourth alternative. In the first case we have to suppose that God has actually brought the world into existence (by some mysterious process which we may not be able to understand) which after its creation enjoys a being different from that of its creator, though it may again be destroyed by him. God in this view sees the world actually spread out before him. But this is a deistic view of creation which Ward repudiates. If the world has no independent

being, then it may not be there at all or may be only a modification of the divine being. So one of the remaining alternatives is that creation is an illusion. If the world is not actually projected or brought into existence and made independent in its being by God and is still seen to be there, the only way of thinking of such a situation is that God is having an illusion. When God sees the world as different from him (for theism makes a distinction between God and the world), the world must either be actually there or it must be an illusion. If the world is to be there, it must be created by him in the ordinary sense, since God is supposed to be the ultimate source or ground of everything. If this view is not accepted, we can only suppose that in fact there is no world at all but only a false appearance of it. This view will raise its own crop of difficulties and is not of course accepted by Ward. The only other way in which we can think of creation is that it is a modification in the Divine Being itself, and not an actual precipitation into existence of an external object. But this is a pantheistic view of creation which finds no favour with Ward.

Let us however suppose that somehow God's knowledge constitutes the being of the world. But we shall see even this supposition does not reconcile divine immanence with divine transcendence. Ward says that God is transcendent to it, for it is not 'God but his utterance and manifestation.' The divine knowledge which constitutes the world may not be God himself, because God is more than his knowledge. His knowledge is only a part of his being. But can we have any adequate conception of God if we separate him from his knowledge? If we are to understand him aright, should we not think of his knowledge as essential to his being? If God is to be understood as inclusive of his knowledge, how can we think of him as transcendent to it? The being of God, we are persuaded rises up to his 'utterance and manifestation'. If they are essential in his being he cannot be supposed to fall in any way outside of

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them. So we conclude that the analogy of creative knowledge will not help us out of the difficulties which we have discussed above and which must have been felt by Ward himself and to which indeed he also has made some reference.

Professor Alexander has frankly recognised that strictly speaking transcendence cannot be reconciled with immanence. So he writes in a recent article in the Hibbert Journal to which we have already referred "that transcendence and immanence are not reconcilable, that God cannot be, as Ward suggests he can be, at once the immanent and the transcendent ground of the world. If God is co-extensive with the world, he does not transcend it. If he transcends it he is not immanent in it. (Hibbert Journal, Vol. XXV, P. 257). He recognises however the merits as well as the defects of both transcendence and immanence, of theism and pantheism. He has therefore tried to retain the merits of both by attempting a sort of reconciliation between them. For religious consciousness it is essential, he thinks, that God should be different and distinct from the worshipper; otherwise he cannot be properly loved and worshipped. So the strong point of theism is that it has conceived God as transcendent. But if God always remains aloof from the worshipper, how can he ever be united with him in love? And without such union with God no religious consciousness can be satisfied. So for religion pantheism or the theory of immanence has the special merit of guaranteeing the substantial unity of the worshipper with God. If, therefore, our idea of God is to be a satisfactory one it should be such as to combine in itself both transcendence and immanence. But we have seen that transcendence and immanence are not strictly reconcilable. So Prof. Alexander suggests that God may be transcendent in one respect and immanent in another. "God is immanent in respect of his body but transcendent in respect of his deity" (*Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 396). The world of space

and time is the body of God, and so God is immanent in the world ; but he does not thereby destroy the individuality of the beings contained in it, as is the case with ordinary pantheism. But God's deity, being the next higher quality to mind, is not yet anything actual in the world. It is something towards which the world is moving and which will appear in course of time. In respect of this quality, viz. deity, God is transcendent to all the finites which now make up the world, inasmuch as they all occupy a level below deity. All the finite beings of the world form the body of God and so he is immanent in them ; but as they do not share the distinctive quality of deity, God is transcendent to them.

The difficulties of this position, despite its great merits, seem quite obvious. Although a distinction has been made between God and deity, it will have to be granted we think, that God is God only when he is possessed of the distinctive quality of deity. A God without deity is no God at all. Professor Alexander himself has admitted in his book that his notion of God is predominantly theistic. If this is so there does not appear to be any real immanence of God as such in the world. And the jest of a friend of his (to which he has referred in his article), who said that "the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is to exist a million of years hence," seems quite justified. Prof. Alexander thinks that the jest is a misconception. "For the universe as straining towards deity is a present reality. And the universe so conceived is God. It is the actual existence of deity which belongs to the future." But if deity is the distinctive quality, as he seems to have admitted in his book, then God is properly God when and only when he has that quality ; and if that quality is to be actual only in the future, we have then to look forward to the future for the actual being of God. The universe as straining towards deity may be a present reality, but it can scarcely be called God seeing that it lacks the characteristic quality of deity. The universe as tending towards deity may at best be called God in the making, an embryonic God who has yet to

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realise himself. Our religious consciousness demands a real God with actual deity. A God in the making can neither evoke nor satisfy our religious sentiments.

However Prof. Alexander's view, inspite of all its defects, is highly suggestive. According to his theory the universe is straining towards deity. In our terminology we should say that the world is moving towards the realisation of the ideal. He says that deity will be actual in the future. The history of the world so far is only preparatory to the last act of the cosmic drama in which deity is to make its appearance. We believe that, although a fuller realisation of the ideal in the world of space and time (appearance of deity) may take place in the future, the ideal (deity) must be a present reality in some sense as drawing the universe towards itself. There must be a level or plane of existence in which deity must be real even now. At least there must be a sense in which we should be able to say that deity is a present reality. Unless this is so, deity will not be able to inspire the movements of History towards itself. The tendency or straining of the world towards deity will be meaningless unless we grant that deity has been operating in some sense even from the beginning.

Although we do not accept Prof. Alexander's way of reconciling transcendence with immanence we think he has very aptly brought out the merits of both the theories and has thereby shown that God and man should be so conceived as to make their unity consistent with their difference. It appears to be one of the main tasks of Philosophy to show how this can be possible.

We have found in this chapter that so long as we understand God as transcendent, as simply different from man, Godhead cannot be a satisfactory description of the ideal, because it cannot explain the necessity why we ourselves should realise the ideal. The ideal must be my ideal. It must not simply remain aloof from, or ahead of me; but it must penetrate down to my inmost being and get se

perfectly under its sway. Then and then only can it be truly and completely my ideal. So it seems that a more adequate view of the ideal will be one in which the being of the aspirant after the ideal, i. e., the moral agent, is taken up into that of the ideal itself. That is to say, if the ideal is God, we must at some point be one with him. But as this is not satisfactorily guaranteed by ordinary theism, which cannot get beyond the transcendent view of God, we have to conclude that there is some inadequacy in our notion of the ideal as God.

Moreover the word God does not bring any very definite meaning to most of us. We may abstractly discuss about the transcendence or immanence of God. But his God-head cannot consist in mere transcendence or immanence. He may be supposed to be the creator and sustainer of the universe. But we do not think that merely in this capacity he can be regarded as the ideal. We may say that highest perfection is realised in him, that he is all good. But we do not know wherein his perfection or goodness consists. There may be a being called God and he may be one with what we are trying to think of as the ideal. But our knowledge of the nature of the ideal as such is not very much advanced when we say that the ideal is God unless we know what constitutes the ideality of God. The term God does not universally give rise to only those ideas which may clearly be seen to be the characteristics of the ideal. So the term God has to be further defined before any identification between God and the ideal may be considered quite satisfactory,

The Object as Character-Complex.

Nikunjavihari Banerjee.

The purpose of this paper is to show that the object of knowledge is a character-complex, and to lay bare some of the implications of this position. By characters we mean what are ordinarily regarded as the qualities of physical things, e. g. form, size, colour, taste, smell etc. So when we say that any object of knowledge, an apple for example, is a character-complex, what we mean is that it is a form-size-colour-taste-etc. The statement that an object of knowledge is a number of characters together or is a character-complex, does not imply that the characters are brought together into a unity by the knower. If, however, it is held, as some thinkers hold, that the object of knowledge is no other than a number of characters, put together by the mind, the difficulty that would arise is that—the characters previous to their being put together were certainly disconnected, and if objects cannot but be known other than as characters connected or as characters together, how is it possible for any one to conceive of such unconnected characters at all? So when we say that the object as known is a number of characters together, we mean that the characters are known as connected together and never otherwise. By realising the connectedness or together-ness of characters as an original datum, we easily avoid the difficulties of the sensationalists. The connectedness of characters having been regarded as an original datum, it follows that it is not an object of explanation. Any attempt to go beyond the connectedness or togetherness of characters in order to explain it, is sure to be involved in difficulties. The substance theory, for example, which seeks to explain the togetherness of characters with reference to substance is subject to the following difficulty: How to con-

ceive of the substance ? Is the substance the same as the characters or different from them ? If it is answered that the substance is the same as the characters together, we do not see the use of bringing in the concept of substance. If on the other hand, it is said that the substance is different from the characters, but is nevertheless the support or substratum of characters, the question that naturally arises is—do we ever know the substance as something which is not any of the characters, but is at the same time a substratum of the characters ? The reply to the question is certainly that in order to know the substance we must know it as characters. So we cannot go further than the characters themselves on the hypothesis of substance. Our logic, therefore, leads us to the conclusion that the object *as known* is a number of characters together.

If the above position with regard to the nature of the object of knowledge is accepted, the consequences which would naturally follow from it are the following :—(a) In the first place we may clearly understand the nature of percept, and a rational explanation of illusions, hallucinations etc. seems to be within our easy reach. Perceptive knowledge, as is well known, is due to the stimulation of the nervous system from outside. But in adult life when one perceives an object, it is not necessary that all the characters, which taken together are the object of his knowledge, should be due to external stimulation. Some of the characters may be due to external stimulation, and others due to central excitation. But in whatever manner the characters may be there, we find them together, when we perceive the object, which is nothing but these characters taken together. Now since the object is no other than characters, and since all the characters we perceive, are not due to external stimuli, it may be possible that at times with certain characters due to external stimuli certain other characters are found, which would not have been there, had they been due to external stimuli. It is evident from this consideration that the character theory can easily explain

illusions, hallucinations etc. If on the other hand it is held that what is perceived is not a character-complex but a substance, how is it that errors take place ?

(b) Secondly it seems to be easy to explain the following facts in accordance with the character theory :—(i) one and the same man may perceive a thing differently at different times and under different circumstances or two or more men may perceive an object differently at the same time and under the same circumstances. And (ii) the degree of the clearness and distinctness of the knowledge of an object may be different in the case of one and the same man at different times, or in the case of different men at the same time. If the substance view of the object of knowledge is maintained, we fail to explain why one subject should perceive an object as different from what another subject would perceive. If both of them perceive the same substance, and if it is the substance that is directly apprehended, there ought not to be any difference between the knowledge of one subject and that of another. Similarly in the case of one and the same subject there ought not to be any difference between his knowledge of an object on one occasion and his knowledge of the same object on another. With regard to differences in the degree of clearness and distinctness of knowledge, it may be pointed out that the substance theory altogether fails to give an explanation. If in knowing an object at any time, I know the substance which is permanent and unchangeable in nature, my knowledge of the same object at any future time can never be either more clear and more distinct or less clear and less distinct. But as a matter of fact our knowledge of objects may admit of change in its degree of clearness and distinctness, and this can be explained quite satisfactorily by the character theory. When, for example, it is said that my knowledge is improved, it implies that either I am finding more characters together than before, or some of the characters which were formerly there in an indistinct state, are now there in a clear and distinct state for some reason or the

other. The whole meaning is that the substance theory on account of the permanent and unchangeable character of substance is not compatible with the facts of differences in the degree of clearness and distinctness of the knowledge of one and the same object.

(c) Thirdly the character theory can give a satisfactory account of the various types of knowledge, and can show that the various types of knowledge have a family likeness and nothing sunders one from the rest. Knowledge is of various types viz. perceptive knowledge, memory, and conceptual knowledge or thought. These types of knowledge obviously differ from one another. They also agree among themselves. Their agreement and their difference seem to be of very great epistemological value. They agree with one another in this that all of them involve the subject-object relation. In other words in all cases of knowledge—whether perceptive knowledge, memory or thought, there must be some object presented to the subject. The subject must know the object as *other* or *external*. We shall try to show in another place that this “otherness” or externality does not lend itself to the interpretation that the object of knowledge necessarily exists in the external world apart from the subject. If this is true, we are in a position to state that the object of perceptive knowledge as well as that of memory and conceptual knowledge are *other* than the subject in the same sense. Now the question that arises is:—If the objects of the various types of knowledge are objects or an *other* or *external* in the same sense, how can a distinction between them be possible? Before we can give our own answer to this question, it would be advisable for us to take into consideration some of the view that have been held with regard to the present problem.

(i) From the commonsense point of view, it may be held that so far as perceptive knowledge is concerned, the object is something in the external world, which somehow or other gets into our mind. It is real externally, and continues to exist even after our knowledge of it has ceased to exist. The

object of memory or thought on the other hand, is not real in the external world, according to this view, and does not continue to exist, when our knowledge of it ceases to exist. In other words the object in the one case is regarded as something, having an abiding existence, while in the other it is regarded as something, having an ephemeral mental existence.

(ii) According to those thinkers who hold that sensations are the only reality, the difference between the object of perceptive knowledge, and that of memory or thought is one of degree only. Hume, for example, held that an image or the object of memory differs from a percept in the degree of intensity only. The former is less intense than the latter. That is all the difference between them.

(iii) Or it may be held that our perceptive knowledge is concerned with *particular* objects, our memory is concerned with *ideas* which can be regarded as copies of particular objects, but in character more general than *percepts*, and our thought is concerned with concepts or universals. With regard to the nature of universals again all thinkers are not agreed among themselves. According to some, universals are mere forms or schemas lacking content, while, according to others, universals are not mere forms without content, but are rather universalised contents.

So far as we are concerned, we cannot see our way to agree with the commonsense view of the difference between the various types of knowledge. We have already observed that the object of thought and memory is *other* or *external* in the same sense in which the object of perceptive knowledge is. So to say that the one is mental and the other is external or objective would not do for us. Again to say that the object of perception may continue to exist even when perception has ceased to exist, while the object of thought cannot be of a similar nature, does not also seem to be right. The object of perception as well as that of memory and thought exist as objects, and comparison between them is possible only in so far as they are objects. So to speak of the object of

perception as that which may continue to exist apart from perception, and of the object of thought as that which cannot exist when thought is over, implies no comparison between the two kinds of objects. But if such a statement is intended to carry any comparison, the comparison is unjustifiable. The universe of our discourse is the universe of knowledge, and all our statements must be limited to that universe. So it is clear that the commonsense view of the difference between the various types of knowledge is quite unsatisfactory.

Between the character theory and the second theory stated above there is a fundamental difference. In the first place sensations of the sensationalists are mental while characters are external or objective. Secondly sensations are the only reality according to them, while by characters we do not mean any thing other than mere objects. The question of reality does not arise for us. Thirdly though we hold that the object of knowledge is only a character-complex, and the characters are many, we hold at the same time that every object of knowledge is characterised by distinctness and individuality i.e. every object of knowledge is unitary in character. The whole difference between the sensationist theory and the character theory consists in this that while the sensationists go further than the *complexes* and stop at the pulverised elements of the complexes, we stop at the complexes as the unitary objects of knowledge. This stopping on our part is not a matter of choice, but one of logical limitation. The object of knowledge is the final terminus of logical criticism.

Apart from the above difficulties, the explanation of the difference between the various types of knowledge, given by the sensationist, with reference to the intensity of the object of knowledge, is hardly satisfactory. When it is said that the object of perception and an idea differ in intensity alone, it is implied that both of them belong to the same kind. One object of perceptive knowledge may differ from another object of perceptive knowledge in intensity, just as an object of perceptive knowledge differs from an idea. So the purpose

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of the explanation of the difference between the various types of knowledge is sure to be defeated, if the explanation offered is one with reference to the intensity of the objects alone.

The third theory, stated above, on account of its far-reaching conclusions, engages our serious attention. Universals are, it is said, the objects of thought, ideas are objects of memory and particulars are objects of perception. The ideas or images which are the objects of memory are similar to the objects of perception, in so far as they are particulars like the objects of perception, though there are differences between them in other respects. So the primary question, according to this theory, is the question regarding the difference between universals and particulars and their relation to one another. We can at once distinguish two views in this connection. (a) According to Plato and some modern Realists, universals are real and particulars are also real. But the reality of universals is not of the same nature and order as that of particulars. According to Plato universals alone can be said to be real in the proper sense of the term, while particulars have only a phenomenal reality. According to some modern Realists, on the other hand, it is particulars which can be said to exist in the proper sense of the term, while universals can be said to "subsist" merely. (b) The distinction between universal and particular is not, according to Kant, one of different orders of reality, but one of *form* and *content*. Mere manifold and mere forms may have transcendental reality, but phenomenally or within the sphere of knowledge they cannot be said to be real. Phenomenal existence belongs to "manifold" when it is taken in the universal forms, and not otherwise. So neither universals as such nor particulars as such can be objects of knowledge.

We have reasons to differ from both the above views. But we realise at the same time that both of them contain elements of truth, and correct each other. The mistake of Plato and some modern Realists seems to consist in assigning different grades of reality to the objects of knowledge. Plato

assigns greater reality to universals, and cendemns particulars to phenomenal existence, while some of the modern Realists place particulars on a solid foundation of existence, while Universals are regarded as having an ethereal type of existence. Kant however seems to be right in placing universals and particulars on an equal status. Within the sphere of knowledge they have an equal degree of being, and without the sphere of knowledge also they are not distinguished as having different grades of reality. There is, according to Kant, a mutual dependence between the universal and the particular within the sphere of knowledge. It is to be noticed in this connection that any attempt to distinguish between universals and particulars as objects of knowledge with reference to different degrees or grades of reality involves a step beyond the sphere of knowledge, and ends in disaster. Plato, for example, finds it extremely difficult to bridge the gulf between universals and particulars. We, on the other hand, hold that as objects of knowledge universals as well as particulars stand on an equal footing. There is no difference between a particular and a universal in respect of being, in so far as both are objects of knowledge.

We have just seen how difficulties arise, if a step beyond knowledge is taken to explain differences within the sphere of knowledge, and if difficulties arise, ways of escape from difficulties are also invented. The whole history of the controversy between the Conceptualists and Nominalists is nothing but a history of the raising of difficulties with regard to the relation between particulars and universals and attempts to avoid them. One of the attempts to avoid the difficulties given rise to by Plato's conception of universals is that of Kant which we have already mentioned. We have seen that Kant denies any status in the sphere of knowledge both to universals as universals and particulars as particulars by regarding the former as mere forms without contents and the latter as mere manifold without order or harmony. The element of truth which Kant's findings contain is that there is

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no knowledge which does not involve universals. As a matter of fact modern Psychology also testifies to this truth. According to Psychology every case of perception is a case of apperception. In other words we cannot perceive an object without at the same time classifying it. But this does not mean that there is no difference between conceptual knowledge and perceptual knowledge.

Another attempt at an escape from the same difficulty is that made by nominalists in general who hold that our knowledge in every case is knowledge of the particular. In cases of so-called conceptual knowledge the concept that is involved is no other than a mere name or *flatus vocis*. We need hardly point out that such a view is absolutely untenable on introspective and other grounds. If this view is true our conceptual knowledge should be mainly carried on in terms of pictorial representations. But no psychologist will bear testimony to such a fanciful hypothesis.

We are now in a position to state how we understand the difference between the various types of knowledge, or rather the objects of the various types of knowledge. We may point out at the outset that in spite of differences between the objects of various types of knowledge there is agreement in certain important points.

(i) The objects of perceptive knowledge, memory, and conceptual knowledge are, as has been already pointed out alike external. They are presented to the knower. So as objects of knowledge they are all equally *given* or external. It is to be noticed however that generally the objects of perceptive knowledge alone are regarded as given. The word *given* is very misleading. It implies that what is given is given, contributed or sent forth, as it were, from an unknown source. It is on account of this misleading implication of the term "given", that we have preferred to use the term *other* or external instead. If we realise this point of agreement between the objects of the various types of knowledge, we shall be able to get over the difficulty that arises in the case of

perceptive knowledge, due to the unjustified and unjustifiable distinction that is drawn between appearance and reality. The distinction between appearance and reality is in fact the same as the distinction between attributes and substance which we have already considered. So we need not enter into a fresh criticism of this distinction. If conceptual knowledge or thought can very well go on with objects corresponding to which realities in the external world need not be necessarily conceived, it passes our reason why corresponding to the object of perceptive knowledge, realities or substances should be conceived of as necessarily existing in the external world.

(ii) Secondly they are all distinct or individual in character. It might be urged against us in this connection that it is quite intelligible why the objects of perceptive knowledge should be particular, but why the objects of conceptual knowledge shall be distinct or particular in character, is not easy to understand. In answer it may be pointed out that distinctness and individuality are not opposed to universality. As a matter of fact a universal object is as individual and distinct as a particular. Had that not been the case, we would not have been able to distinguish one universal from another as well as one particular object from another. Now the object of perceptive knowledge as well as the object of conceptual knowledge cannot be said to be distinct and individual, unless they are regarded as *contents* and not merely as *forms* or *categories*. For Kant, of course, one universal form is different from another, and in that sense they are distinct. But the universals to be objects of knowledge should be distinct and individual not only *numerically* but also as *contents*. So we maintain that universals as well as particulars are individual and distinct as *contents*.

Now let us see how the objects of perceptual knowledge, memory and conceptual knowledge or thought differ from one another. So far as perceptual knowledge is concerned, the object is a *present* particular object, so far as memory is concerned the object is an *absent* particular object and so far as

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conceptual knowledge is concerned, the object is a *universal* to which the distinction between *presence* and *absence* does not apply. So in order to explain the difference between the objects of various types of knowledge, we shall have to show (a) how and in what sense the objects of all these different types of knowledge can be said to be character-complexes, and (b) how and in what sense the object of perceptive knowledge is a *present* character-complex, that of memory is an *absent* character-complex and that of conceptual knowledge is neither a *present* nor a *past* character-complex.

Let us take up the second question first. When we perceive an object, the object of perception is, as we have already seen, nothing but a character-complex. A flower, for example, which we perceive is nothing but a red-soft-fragrant etc. complex. We have already observed that when we perceive a character-complex, it is not that we obtain the characters individually and separately from various sources and then by combining them, get the object as a whole. We *find* the characters together—why we do not know. But though we do not know why the characters are found together there, at the time of knowledge, it is easy to see that in order to perceive an object, we must use our different senses. That is to say our perceiving an object is conditioned by the use of our senses. Now is it necessary that all the necessary senses must be used in order that the perception of a character-complex is possible? In answer to this question, it may be pointed out that in the early history of every individual mind there was a time when all necessary senses must have been actually used for the purpose of perceiving different character-complexes at different times. But in the adult stage, such actual use of the various senses is not necessary. What actually takes place at this stage is that some of the sense only function, and the work of other senses is somehow or other done even in the absence of their functioning. When, for example, by merely looking at a thing at a distance, I perceive it to be a rose, it goes without saying that the

character-complex which I perceive is red-soft-fragrant etc., though the object ought to have been merely red. From the physiological point of view, my visual sense is doing not only its own work, but also the work of tactual sense, smell sense and so on. From the point of view of knowledge, on the other hand, the red character does not stand for itself alone but also the soft, fragrant and other characters. It is clear, therefore, that theoretically speaking, the object of perception cannot be said to be wholly *present*. It is *partly present* and *partly absent* from an analytical point of view. But from the point of view of synthetic or concrete knowledge, it is *wholly present*. So whether an object of perceptive knowledge be wholly present or only partly so from the theoretical point of view, it is perceived *as present*.

It will not be out of place to point out in this connection that the work of substitute cannot be done equally well by all the senses. The visual sense, for example, is for various reasons the most reliable sense, and so it can do the work of other senses better than they can do the work of one another or that of the visual sense itself. By touching a man and exploring my hand on the surface of his body, I may be able to recognise him, but my knowledge of that man will not attain a very high degree of certainty. But when by merely looking at a rose, I perceive it to be a rose, I am more or less sure that it is soft and fragrant. We need not compare the senses with regard to their capacity of working as substitutes any further. For the present the question that concerns us is—How and why the object of perceptive knowledge, which may be, theoretically partly present and partly absent, is nevertheless perceived as wholly present.

It has been already observed that the object of conceptual knowledge as well as the object of memory and perceptual knowledge is a character-complex. But when it is said that the object of conceptual knowledge is a character-complex, what is meant is not that this object of our conceptual knowledge is *actually a character-complex* at any particular space

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or at any particular point of time ; nor is it meant that it is a mere *possibility* of a character-complex ; it is at every moment actual, but its actuality is not exhausted at any particular moment of time or at any particular space. So it can be best described as that by which we *mean* a particular kind of character-complexes, of all particular spaces and all particular points of time. It is, therefore, a character-complex by *meaning* only. A concept, therefore, is not what *contains* within itself a particular type of character-complexes of all particular spaces and particular points of time, but *means* it. A clearer and more intelligible account of the object of conceptual knowledge does not seem to be available. One thing should, however, be borne in mind in this connection. When we say that concepts mean character-complexes, it is not meant that concepts are different from their meanings in any sense. The concept is nothing but meaning itself, and the meaning is nothing but character-complexes meant.

Now we are in a position to consider the nature of the objects of perceptual knowledge and memory. As has been already observed the object both in the case of perceptual knowledge and in the case of memory is a *particular* as distinguished from a *universal*. The particular is a character-complex *explicitly* or *as such* and not *implicitly* or as *meaning*. The flower which is perceived is a red-soft-fragrant etc. complex, while the flower of conceptual knowledge *means* such a character-complex as well as others. Meaning to be meaning must stand for many character-complexes, while a particular character-complex is wholly itself and nothing but itself. Now though a particular is explicitly a particular character-complex, it is implicitly a meaning. We have already seen that in every case of perception the particular must be classified—however implicit that classification may be. In conceptual knowledge the explicit character-complexes lose their explicit character and become rarefied, as it were, and there arises what is called *meaning*. In the case of perceptual knowledge on the other hand, the meaning element is there

in the character-complexes, and it is by virtue of its presence that the characters appear to us as having one single meaning, distinctness or individuality. The meaning in the case of perceptual knowledge, shines forth, as it were, through the characters, and therefore it is not explicitly apprehended in it. This seems to be the reason why the object of perceptions inspite of its being partly present and partly absent theoretically, is perceived as wholly present. We see, therefore, that explicit character-complexes and implied character-complexes are inseparable from one another. The differences among the various types of knowledge is accordingly due to the fact that in some cases of knowledge the explicit character-complexes are preponderant over the implicit while in others the reverse of it holds good.

When we come to the consideration of the object of memory, we find some difficulty. The object of memory is *particular* like the object of perception, but is lacking in the explicitness of the latter. This fact means that the object of memory, though not actually meaning, is on the way to becoming meaning. Now when it is said that the object of memory is an *absent* object, and that of perception a *present* one, what is meant exactly? Is there or is there not an object of memory? The answer is obviously in the affirmative. If then memory has an object, the object is certainly *present*. So when it is said that the object of memory is an absent object, what is meant really is that the object of memory which is *present* for that knowledge *stands for* or *means* another character-complex which is absent, and as such it is not and cannot be so *explicit* as an object of perceptive knowledge is. We find, therefore, that just as an object of conceptual knowledge stands for or means many character-complexes, the object of memory stands for or means a certain character-complex alone and by virtue of its being a meaning, it lacks the explicitness of the percept. But, as we have already observed, meaning to be meaning must stand for a class of objects and not an individual object only. So a memory-object

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cannot be said to be wholly a meaning. Its nature can be described by saying that it is something like a half way house between a percept and a concept.

We see, therefore, that the objects of all the various types of knowledge are character-complexes, but in senses we have explained above. We have also seen in what respects they agree with one another and in what respects they differ. If the view we have maintained here is correct, it is clear that in the domain of knowledge, there is nowhere any gap or hiatus. From perceptual knowledge to conceptual knowledge there is a very smooth journey, and we are in a position to realise the deeper significance of the view of those thinkers who hold that perception is the source of all types of knowledge or is rather the only type of knowledge.

REVIEWS.

MIND.

Contents —**Mr. Bertrand Russell's *Outline of Philosophy* : W. A. Richard ;—*Spinoza's conception of Eternity* : H. F. Hallett ;—*Cook Wilson's view of Judgment* : Richard Robinson ;—*The Notion of Duty* (ii) W. D. Lamont.**

Lamont begins with the question of Legal Duty. Legal duties, he defines as definite actions (either 'active' or 'passive' actions), and these actions are indicated and defined by particular definite laws. What determines your duty is not your inclination, not what you think would be good, not what you would like to achieve, but a *law* which is something quite different from an end or a purpose, a law which prescribes that you must abstain from having certain ends, and that you must pursue certain others. What is claimed from us is not *blind* obedience, but simply obedience. The assumption underlying the whole notion of duty presupposes an ability to act out of respect for law, as law. "You ought" means "it is the law." We are assumed to respect laws, not in virtue of what they ordain, but simply because of their character *as* law, or not their content, but simply their form.

Let us see, now, how Right is related to Duty. As defined by Vinogradoff, a Right is "the range of action assigned to particular will within the social order established by law." If you want to know what your legal rights are, you must study the actual laws of the realm. 'Right' does refer to your purposes, or ends, or what you would like to achieve; and what the law does is, by prescriptions to guard you in the pursuit of your purposes. We have duties because one or more persons own rights against us. That we owe duties does not necessarily imply that we own rights.

To come to Moral Duty, who makes the moral laws in obeying which, our Moral Duty consists? Kant's answer, that the legislator is the individual person who obeys them, is the true answer. 'Duty' applies only where a being can be determined to act *either* by the idea of good *or* by the conception of law. The difference between a law of the state and a moral law is just this, that whereas a political law need not hold for the kingdom of Ends-in-themselves, a moral law *must* hold in that kingdom—i. e., between persons considered *as such*. Moreover, political laws *need* not be willed by all who obey them, while moral laws must be so willed. A law which is not laid down by the person who obeys it cannot be a moral law. In the kingdom of Ends the subject must also be the sovereign. What is postulated here is not *actual* agreement of the laws which all the members would make but it is the *claim* to universal validity which the moral judgment makes. Moral

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laws must be made by each person for himself. This doctrine is taken to be the same as Kant's doctrine of the legislative will. The fact that the law is made by you does not mean that it is subsidiary to an end you wish to attain ; it is a rule which has been made in order to define what end or ends you can or ought to strive for. The discussion is concluded with the argument, that the distinction between morality and immorality is impossible and unintelligible, on the theories of Moore, Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet. It is only if you adopt a view which holds that, "duty is that which is defined by laws," and that moral duty is that "which is legalised by the legislating will of the agent himself that you can find any valid ground for moral distinction.

K. D.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

Contents: C. Lowes Dickinson, M. A.—*A Dialogue—on the Discovery of God*; C. D. Broad M. A. Litt. D.—*Analysis of some Ethical concepts*; Professor Ralph Barton Perry—*Peace without Victory—in Philosophy*; G. R. G. Mure M. A.—*The Marriage of Universals (I)*; Professor G. C. Field—*Some modern Proofs of the Existence of God*; The Bishop of Manchester—*The Value of Philosophy to Religion*; C. E. M. Joad. B. A.—*Philosophy and Life*,

The purpose of Mure's Paper on "The Marriage of Universals" is to inquire what distinction can or should be drawn between logic on the one hand and on the other psychology so far as psychology concerns itself specifically with the problem of knowledge. The paper is based mainly on a criticism of the late Mr. Bradley's views of the nature and scope of logic and psychology. Mure begins with the theory held by Plato and Aristotle. According to this theory, if you are seeking to know what anything really is, then, despite the seeming imperfection of this poor world we live in, you will succeed so far only as you are able to define it in terms of its own perfection. This theory is mentioned only to show its influence on subsequent thought. We have to discuss here how far the standard of perfection can be applied within the abstract special sciences. Bradley's view is that one limited science differs from another according to the degree and kind of abstraction characterizing the category it employs. Our problem then is, "Does the abstraction which delimits it render inapplicable in any or every special science definition in terms of perfection?" A special science uses an abstract category only because it cannot systematize its facts in terms of one more concrete. The barer your scheme of identity in difference the more easily, because the more loosely it will fit the facts. Of course

you must pay in loss of truth the price of your abstractions and if you afterwards forget that you have made it, you will pay doubly but if you refuse altogether to make it you will have no facts left at all. Let us return to our question of definition by perfection. If any special science employs any such standard and criterion, this criterion will be one that falls within the abstraction that delimits the science. Does the physiologist employ such a criterion? I think it is clear that he does. The body, alive or dead, concerns him only so far as it exhibits approximation to the perfectly healthy human organism. It is this which at once guides his analysis and is revealed by it. Health is the criterion alike of itself and of ill health and disease. If we turn to consider the more abstract special sciences we shall expect by now to find that they make of their object a barer, more merely schematic, unity of differences. Have they then a criterion of perfection? Clearly not one to be expressed in terms of purpose or function, nothing with any trace of self-subsistent value, but yet I think a faint reflection, or better perhaps, a dim anticipation of these.

Bradley throughout his life held that logic and psychology are special sciences, and always he is concerned to prevent either from invading the other's territories and both from encroaching upon metaphysics. Mure quotes some passages from Bradley's writings to present his views on this point. He sums up Bradley's position in the following passage. 'If I am right, Bradley's psychology proves to be an account of experience as the mediation of immediate feeling. But I would add that, though we shall find later some difficulty in answering the question whether Bradley consistently confines logic to mere mediation, yet so far as he does so the converse emphasis which he lays in psychology upon immediacy seems to mark a contrast not between two logically complementary moments—immediacy and mediation—but one between (a) experience as the adjective of a single individual mind or souls (something felt and personal), and (b) experience as a body of, as it were, public truth, a whole of universal and necessary connections would have nothing that is personal to a self'.

(To be continued).

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Perry undertakes to show how the most recent philosophy seeks to escape hostilities by avoiding the initial antitheses, or by bringing to light original communities and identities which have been lost sight of in the excessive sharpening of distinctions. The older way of thinking will hereafter be summarily termed the "disjunctive" method; while the newer way will be termed the "conjunctive" method. The former

treats existence as mutually exclusive, and as *owning* their content ; the latter treats existences as interpenetrating, and as *sharing* their content. The conjunctive method is illustrated by three concepts, which have acquired a wide vogue in scientific as well as philosophical discourse. These three concepts are "pattern," "aspect," and "emergence."

When an existent entity is conceived as a *pattern*, it is in the first place, conceived as irreducibly complex. In the second-place, the identity or character of the pattern is not derived from the identity or character of the components taken severally. In the third place, it is entirely consistent with the specificity of any given pattern that its components should also compose other patterns as the two perfectly distinct words "lilt" and "till" may be composed of the same letters. The tendency of the disjunctive way of thinking has been to rob entities of their empirical attributes. The most familiar disjunction which has resulted from the assumption that what belongs to an individual existent must belong to it exclusively is that between perception and its physical object. When, on the other hand, units of existence, whether physical or mental, are conceived as distinctive patterns, or as organizations or like components, these difficulties are greatly mitigated. Physical entities may retain their specific natures despite the community of qualities. Minds may share experiences, ideas, and purposes without loss of identity, or forfeiture of independence. Physical nature and knowing minds may intersect in moments of perception, since the common region of intersection may belong equally both to that type of organization which is called "physical," and to that which is called "mental".

The conception of *aspect* serves a double purpose in contemporary thought. On the one hand it throws light on the difference between the physical and mental types of organization, while on the other hand it points towards a solution of the old problem of interaction. The older disjunctive method threw no light on interaction, whether between mind and body or between one body and another. According to the disjunctive view each entity being entirely self-contained, and entirely outside of every other entity, there could be no reason whatever why an incident in the history of one should make any difference in the history of another. The case of interaction between bodies and minds was a peculiarly aggravated case, because these were conceived not only as mutually exclusive but also as heterogeneous. The conception of aspect implies that it is impossible that anything should happen to a physical object without its happening also within those other physical objects or minds which overlap it, any more than anything could happen to President McKuley

without its happening also in the history of the United States, or in the President's family, or in the experience of contemporaries and the memory of posterity.

The doctrine of *emergence* applies to the relations between two types of determination, in the case in which a process governed by the one may apparently be produced by or analysed into a process governed by the other. The conception is conjunctive in the sense of holding that such appearances may be trusted, and that different systems may overlap. Thus things operating under law A can combine themselves into things operating under law B, and that things operating under law B can disintegrate themselves into things operating under law A. The disjunctive view, on the other hand, adopts one or the other of two alternatives. It affirms either that what can be produced under law A, must operate under law A ; or that what can produce that which operates under law B, must itself have operated under law B.

The conception of emergence has an especially significant application to the dynamic relation of an individual mind to the living organism which it "occupies". It revives the respectable Aristotelian doctrine that the activity of the soul is related to those of its body, not as one entity inside of, or outside of, or side by side with, another entity, but as the function of a whole which incorporates and transcends the functions of its parts. Mind is that type of activity or mode of operation of which highly developed organisms, endowed with nervous systems, are pre-eminently capable.

The present era of philosophical peace is not the result of conquest or exhaustion. It is due in part to the invention of abstracting concepts such as those enumerated above. It is due also to a shifting of interest, and this is perhaps its most hopeful sign. The old problems are no slighted, but there is a tendency to face them with a certain freshness of outlook.

K. D.

* * *

In the article 'Some Modern Proofs of the Existence of God' Prof. G. C. Field tries to give two arguments for the existence of God. He says that the ontological argument is unconvincing. The first of his argument is from the demand for a teleological explanation. He examines the argument in this way. Science out of the demand of reason to explain Reality assumes some principles as regards the nature of reality before it makes use of experiment and observation. The famous atomic theory was formulated by pure reasoning. But is the demand for intelligibility fully satisfied by these assumptions ? No. Some facts of the universe de-

mand a further explanation viz. teleological explanation. Herein comes the belief in a supreme personality whose purpose it is.

Before purpose can be taken as the final explanation of reality, its claims should be considered. Why should it be accepted instead of mechanism? The assumptions of scientific explanation are verified by sensible experiment. But the explanation in terms of will or purpose is not verifiable. So teleological explanation cannot be accepted as an established theory. But then mechanism alone cannot explain all facts; so teleological explanation forces itself upon us. Moreover the differences that exist between the organic and the inorganic nature can be only explained by the arguments from teleology.

But does this argument from teleology or purpose give the idea of God demanded by religious experience? Purpose as is manifest in biological phenomena works under limitations. The God of biology will be no doubt immensely powerful but could not be omnipotent. For the essential meaning of purpose is the desiring of some conceived state of things still to be actualised. So purpose has to choose means to ends, and has to work under certain conditions. It cannot fulfill itself in any capricious way. This means it is limited. So, Prof. Field comes to the conclusion that if purpose be taken as the final explanation, it points in the direction of a god or a purpose in the universe as a part of it working on another part opposed to it. It cannot give the omnipotent God of religion.

2. Prof. Field then advances his another argument. It is said that religious experience brings about the conviction in the existence of God. But all do not have such an experience, and so belief in the existence of God cannot be based on it. The argument is—We worship God and so He is, not that because God is, we worship Him. Religious experience according to Field is an emotional attitude, and he tries to argue from the existence of an emotional attitude to the existence of God. Prof. Field says that we have a religious attitude appropriate to God and the belief in the existence of God is simply an inference immediately following the emotion. Prof. Field calls Prof. Alexander to his aid and utilizes his theory of the notion of our belief in the existence of other minds external to us. How do we know minds other than our own? The common theory is that we infer their existence by sensible observation of their behaviour by the aid of analogy with our own experience of ourselves. But Prof. Alexander criticises this theory and says that the true ground of our certainty of existence of other minds is in our experience of emotions appropriate to those who are like us. We do not apprehend first that there is a mind like our own, then experience emotions proper to them. On the contrary we come to know them in our experiencing

tenderness or dislike for them, as we come to know of dangerous object from our experience of the emotion of fear.

Taking help of this theory Prof. Field proceeds to show that because men have a particular emotion appropriate to a Supreme Purpose, that Supreme Purpose must be existing or that the belief in such a Supreme Purpose is established. But the essential point is the uniqueness of this emotional experience. If it be shown that the emotion of religious experience is the same as the primitive emotion of fear or sex, it can be shown that these emotions which were originally excited by real objects were transferred to an imaginary object viz. God. And all the guarantee for the existence of God fails in that case.

R. D. D.

THE MONIST

VOL. XXXVIII, No 3 July 1928

Contents: S. Frank—*The problem of Reality*; G. A. Johnston—*Sensations, Sense-data, Physical object and Reality*; David R. Major—*Man is organic to Nature*; C. W. Morris—*The Prediction theory of Truth*; A. Cornelius Benjamin—*On the formation of constructs*; G. H. Langley—*The Temporal and the Eternal*; L. P. Chambers—*The Dialectic of Religion*; A. K. Sharma—*The relation between Buddhism and the Upanishads*.

The problem of reality.—The conviction that an independent Reality exists, cannot be given up and if philosophy fails to vindicate the same, it becomes a mental play—senseless and unnecessary. Commonsense, by itself however is merely a refusal to think and cannot supply the demand of a philosophy. Realistic systems of philosophy trying to 'prove' reality fail in the attempt and somehow smuggle it in either as a postulate or a presupposition. Idealistic theories, either cannot legitimately escape from "consciousness and ideas" to reality, or have to deny an independent reality. The so-called objective Idealism with its Transcendental Ego merely renames the problem, for as our concern can only be with human knowledge—the question how human consciousness can transcend its limits and avail itself of the Absolute knowledge remains unanswered. But the commonsense belief in 'independent reality' cannot be given up because our very idea of knowledge as of something that exists independently supports it. We must either give up 'knowledge' or show it to be of 'Reality'. If Reality cannot be proved and if it must exist, it must be shown to 'require no proof'. How to do it?

Consider the fundamental Idealistic thesis "Cogito Ergo Suum." Let us try to see what it implies. First, together with the assertion of the 'Ego', it also asserts the existence of something independent of the subject'. *It is*

not because I am aware of it, but because I belong to it, because it shows and reveals itself to me directly. Secondly, as the non-existence of the past and the future of the ego is compatible with the ego, the only ego asserted is the 'present' Ego, and we seem to subscribe to 'momentism' and land ourselves into scepticism. But further, that which is thus 'given' is not consciousness or ego etc as it is not any object. It does not yet belong to any sphere of reality—is an amorphous something. When we pass from this stage to analysis and definition i. e. when we feel entitled to call it a 'state of consciousness' we also characterize it by its 'inevitable' content—that is to say in saying I *hear* a din, I also say I hear a *din* (a real din). Something, then, exists and it is not a closed and separate sphere of the subjective, but is a 'point' of that reality and just as any point of space really gives us the whole of space, so does this point, of reality gives us the whole of reality. For the 'present' as such is merely an ideal line of demarcation between the past and present and if they do not exist, neither can it. But the present is never given by itself. It is given as a part of the illimitable reality and bears a direct and immediate testimony to the latter. All that is 'palpably' given here and now can only be conceived as part of something limitless—of a great unrevealed whole. The 'Transcendent' is given to us immediately and at the same time with the 'Immanent'. As a matter of fact it is the presence of the unknown transcendent that gives the meaning and condition of knowledge. Objective reality is something independent of us but just in this independence it merges into one primordial whole with our reality and the goal of all reasoning is to get at the all-embracing whole which envelopes 'us' and that which is 'outside us.' Failure to do this arises out of an atomistic construction of reality and the Idealistic theory of knowledge creates difficulties for itself, by its mechanical standpoint. Consciousness for the idealist is a receptacle and in order that we may have a world it must get *into* this receptacle. But our consciousness is in fact a point of reality and as such is the potentiality of the whole. The problem of reality solves itself only when we perceive the inner connexion between ourselves and the unity of the complete reality.

The Prediction Theory of Truth:—The 'Rationalistic Coherence' Theory of truth either tends to confuse it with formal consistency, or confesses that no clear test of truth is possible or at best gives us some too simple and meaningless truths. The 'Existential' Theory cannot well account for error and ignores the essential connexion of truth with the reflective process. Among the 'correspondence' theories, the Humean theory of representative images explains nothing. The critical realists ultimately resort to 'coherence'—only the pragmatist remains in the field. Prof James' statement of it is ambiguous and in one of its senses

makes truth too relative and human. Dewey comes nearer to the position taken up here—Truth is a function of prediction. Prediction is a claim made by symbols as to what would be found in a certain specific area of experience. Verification thus is the essence of Truth. To say 'that an idea is either true or false *before* it is tested, is merely to imagine an instantaneous or collapsed verification attributed to some actual or ideal observer.' Prediction in this sense, is possible with regard to the past as well as the future. The 'prediction' theory though it accepts the general instrumentalistic doctrine does not say that truth stands wholly for 'workable ideas'. For, 'In judgments of practice the effect upon behaviour *is part of the prediction*, and so is essential to the truth-claim, but in cases where the effect upon behaviour is not embodied in the prediction, such effects are irrelevant to the question of truth'.

Some deductions of our theory of truth:—Truth is relative in two senses—depends first upon the meaning we attach to the symbols by which we get at it (ii) Truth is dependent upon the observer.

Belief is a secondary attitude to prediction—a prediction that another prediction is true or false and the truth of the prediction is not dependent upon belief, but the belief is dependent upon the truth of the primary proposition.

Man is Organic to Nature:—In this article, an attempt is made to note the implications of this generally accepted doctrine on our theory of perception. As a preliminary point we may notice that the doctrine implies that man neither 'makes' nor 'creates' nature, nor merely 'discovers' it. It implies secondly that subject and object are abstractions—are two aspects of the same world and develop *paripasu*. Of the four answers given to the question as to the relation of mind and its objects we rule out the 'Subjectivist' because of its failure to account for the knowledge of other minds and the 'Phenomenal' because it involves the irrational supposition of an unknown world of things in themselves. The third position is represented by the New and Critical Realist. Of these, the former is unacceptable because of the contradiction involved in its conception of 'things' 'as existing independently of everything and as uniting in themselves all those multifarious discoverable feature of size, shape position, color temperature'. The critical Realist maintains that the mind 'intuits' essences, but how can it do so, unless it is in some sense continuous with them. The only remaining theory is the Idealistic and it is consistent with our thesis, as it maintains at once the continuity of the two (mind and object) and their relative distinction.

P. R.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY.

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THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

VOL, XXVI No. 4 July 1928.

Contents:—Albert Mansbridge—*The reassertion of the faith*; Viscount Haldane—*East and west*; H. C. Dalway Turnbull—*Hinduism and Christianity in India*; Mrs. Rhys Davids—*Buddhism not originally a negative gospel*; Dean Inge—*Harnack and liberal Protestantism*; W. R. Sorley—*Industrial Ethics*; G. A. Johnston—*The philosophy of Industry*; R. M. Fox—*Education for life*; F. Clarke—*English mind and dominion mind*; Professor W. G. de Burgh—*Self-realisation*; J. D. Unwin—*Marriage in cultural history*; Joseph King—*Schleiermacher's catechism for noble women*; Dr. Carl Clemen—*Prehistoric Religion*; Ernst Barthel—*Dr. Albert Schweitzer as theologian*.

Self-realisation:—

Self-realisation is susceptible of a diversity of interpretations. It is to be seen which of its meanings can furnish a valid formula for the highest end of life.

Can the term be applied to the Supreme Principle of Goodness, recognised as timeless Reality by the highest religions and by many systems of philosophy? First, God is conceived as a reality above time; and to speak of the realisation of what is timelessly real involves manifest contradiction.

Secondly, self when taken substantively and in its natural signification, implies limitations, incompatible with the nature of the Perfect Being. So, the term self-realisation is inappropriate as a description of the eternal principle of Goodness, even though that principle be thought as Individual Spirit.

To consider self-realisation in its proper field of application to the finite self.

Green bases his theory of self-realisation on the Kantian dualism of the timeless self, and the phenomenal self. The timeless self, or the Supreme Principle, we have seen, cannot have a realisation in time. The phenomenal self has natural capacities which furnish the materials for the process of self-realisation; the timeless self is not a given factor, but an ideal goal; The dualism of the two selves is negated by something within man which points beyond time to the Infinite and the eternal—to the Ideal Self. Our nature as intellectual and moral beings, capable of conceiving perfect Truth and Goodness, bears witness to the power of self-transcendence, which is the ground of the possibility of self-realisation.

D. G.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

VOL. XXXVII, 4. July 1928.

Contents—(i) *The Pragmatism of Peirce and Hegel*—H. G. Townsend. (ii) *Clarke's Ethical Philosophy*—(i) Ernest Albee (iii) *Behaviourism and the theory of knowledge*—Brand Blanshard, (iv) *Current Epistemology and Contemporary Ethics*—D. Luther Evans. (v) *Is art the Imaginative expression of a wish*—C. J. Ducasse. (vi) *Discussion*

The article on current Epistemology and Contemporary Ethics purposes to show that modern Epistemology displays a vivid concern for the Sentiments and confirms the speculative aspects of Ethical theory,

A useful Epistemology sanctions the objectivity of moral values. On this depends the two ideals of Ethics—authority and freedom. This requirement does not do away with the importance of biological and psychological motivation in behaviour. Objectivity is a necessary condition but of Ethical excellence it is not an efficient cause.

Freedom like authority also hangs on Suprahuman moral ideals and is dependent upon Epistemology. Determinists or Indeterminists, we may all agree with Hegel that in Duty which is a Supra-human moral Ideal we reach the real essence gaining freedom. Man in order to be free must first know the Truth. Bereft of the knowledge of the 'Over-individual norms', our morality would not have been any more the nobler than an enlightened expediency.

Next is the enquiry into the Epistemological significance of moral objectivity which axiology in one of its aspects studies. Axiology has arisen to overcome the partiality of the Traditional Epistemological theory. It is the consecration of an Epistemology which has been more interested in knowledge as Logic than in knowledge as life.

Modern philosophers in their love for axiological concept regard values, inspite of their emotional character, as valuable. The Realist and the pragmatist, failing to see that in Idealism axiology is complementary to the cognitive aspect of experience, have objected to Idealism as formal intellectualism and flagrant mysticism. It is to be shown that the objectors themselves have to supplement their epistemology with axiology. In his hostility to the objectivism of Idealism, the pragmatist has neglected the material aspect of the knowledge-situation and the Realist condemning the subjectivism of Idealism has overlooked the mental feature in the circumstance of knowledge.

They however have been not allowed their theories to show this one-sidedness. They have made up their defect by enriching their doctrine with Scientific Epistemology. With a desire to interpret experience fully

and concretely they have supplemented Cognitional technique with Emotional technique. For them as for the idealists reals are seen to be observed to possess ideality.

The important consideration from the standpoint of the paper is that for both pragmatism and realism, the fundamental realm, yielded by axiological speculation, is the locus of moral values. In both theories Ethical standards occupy objectivity though in one, it is instrumental and transient and in other intrinsic and eternal. They enjoy a transcendent character in pragmatism. The realist's location of ideas endows them with Supra-human significance.

The Pragmatist and the Realist do not like their crucial ideas to be taken as axiological concepts.

Both justify their speculative notion by Scientific rationalisation. One champions the cause of Empiricism and expiates Sentimentality by advocating evolutionism and the other, always evolutionistic, atones for speculation by abetting empiricism.

The theory that Epistemology and axiology should go together, also finds its sanction in Epistemology. Man knows objects in terms of a whole consciousness. In knowledge cognition, affection and conation are synthetically blended. We find convincing expressions of this fact in Prof. Dewey's interpretation of thinking as Art and Mackenzie's praise of imagination in historical discussion. Knowledge when treated as logical as well as living will gain for us facts and values equally real. Epistemology will embrace the experiences of materialists and mystics alike.

S. P. B.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

The Foundations of Living Faiths.

III

H. D. Bhattacharya.

We may now turn to another aspect of positive religion which a critical examination of all faiths discloses. This is its origin at a point of time in the onward march of human thought and civilisation. No extreme demand in matters of revelation is likely to be upheld in these days of reason. So the eternity of the Vedas or the periodical revelation of the Jaina scripture is not likely to be conceded at the present day. The Christian doctrine of the eternal Christ must not be upheld in such a form as to imply that it was Christianity that God was revealing from all eternity. Nor can we concede to the Mahomedan that a complete volume of the Koran was ready-made in heaven from all eternity : in this case the additional difficulty will be that some original revelations and their abrogation by subsequent revelations must be deemed to coexist from all eternity. In view of these difficulties, as also of the difficulties of reconciling rival eternal revelations, it is absolutely forced on us that we should abandon our faith in eternal revelation. There is another aspect of the case which must not be lost sight of, namely, that in spite of his origin at a remote past, it is extremely probable that man is almost the last to make his appearance on the scene of worldly existence. If revelation is eternal, to what can God refer, appearing himself before man made his appearance? Should we not be compelled to admit that if the nature of the Divine

Spirit is to manifest itself necessarily, that manifestation must originally have been in the form of an inorganic world, although we are not precluded from supposing that in that primal nebular matter there were the promise and potency of life and mind? At any rate, that revelation of God must have been something entirely different from what we understand by revelation in and through scriptures, although as the Hindus believe, creation proceeded according to the Vedas which the Lord of creation had before himself while he was creating the world or, as the Jews believed, God looked into the heavenly Torah, one of the seven eternal realities, when he created the world. Belief in an archetypal realm of being, that serves as a model even to the Divine architect, really postulates a pre-creational mode of existence not necessarily dependent upon divine activity or reason nor identical with the life of the Absolute Spirit. If then divine essence and revelation are not identical, it is difficult to see how revelation can be eternal.

It may, therefore, be taken for granted that the eternity of scriptural revelation is at best coeval with the appearance of man. But even then the question is not settled whether the appearance of man synchronised with any definite revelation. We have lost all faith in the golden age at the beginning of creation in which the West believed or the Satyayuga, in which the Hindus still believe, and in the progressive decay of the world in truth and goodness as its history advances. We are more optimistic than our forefathers because we believe that the world after us is likely to be better than the world we live in, and we are more humble in relation to posterity if we sincerely believe that the world is bringing into existence a better type of men in future. If revelationists fought evolutionary doctrines bitterly, there was probably a lurking suspicion that a better future was ahead of them had a greater right to receive divine revelation than a crude past and a tolerable present. In fact, if Christianity believes that it came to

replace the imperfect revelation of Judaism and if Mahomedanism claims to replace the dispensations of both Moses and Christ, is not each faith implicitly claiming that every successive future is better than its own past? Or, shall we slightly vary the dictum of Macaulay and say that as civilisation advances, revelation necessarily declines? The reluctance to admit the possibility or actual advent of a new creed on the part of the adherents of older faiths should lead us to suspect that some such belief lurks in the minds of these people. The growth of scepticism, agnosticism and atheism with advancing culture may similarly engender a conviction that the growing rationality which the future is ushering in is not conducive to the establishment of any new revelational faith. Incidentally, it is an admission that the preponderance of reason is not an unmixed blessing so far as revelational religion is concerned. The unwillingness to admit that a rational system of thought and conduct that the future may bring is equivalent to religion—that religion, as Matthew Arnold defines it, is morality tinged with emotion (where probably the emotion does not take anything from supernatural belief)—shows that the revelationists have no faith in the completely rational character of their creed; they believe rather that anything that tends to diminish the non-rational factors of faith tends thereby to affect at the same time positive religion itself. But it is a mistake to think that because reason is denied the capacity to initiate a new faith, therefore it will have nothing to do with the old. Just as in the absence of food from the outside the vital principle begins to draw upon the bodily reserve and thereby exhausts the constitution, so reason, when denied the right to establish a new creed more in consonance with its laws and requirements, falls back upon the existing faith and either spins useless formalities or else saps the foundation of that faith. The development of rites and mythologies in connection with the Vedic religion and the pharisaical accretions in Judaism are illustrations of the first and a general agnosticism that

characterises the present age is an example of the second. It is, of course, impossible to predict what religion the future will bring, but there is no doubt that the elements of mysticism, superstition and supernaturalism will figure much less there than they do in existing creeds. Already, to the thinking portion of every religion, literal interpretation of all scriptural texts has ceased to be an article of faith and it has overgrown with apologies, allegorical explanations or historical derivations.

But the problem of historical origin may admit of a different interpretation. The old objection that every positive religion, that claims to be eternal even in the limited sense of being coeval with the origin of man, has to justify why its scripture was not available to the first races of mankind, has not yet been satisfactorily solved. So all myths about an eternal logos and uncreated gospels are being gradually replaced in favour of the view that the only eternal phenomenon is the fact of religion itself, that is, a consciousness of the infinite or, at least, something supernatural and superhuman in the minds of man. We have already referred to the attempts made by anthropologists and missionaries to prove that no savage race, even at the lowest degree of culture, is without some faith in the supernatural. In modern times the problem has been tackled not *a posteriori* from an examination of the actual facts of savage life but *a priori* from a consideration of the nature of the human mind. It has been argued that, because of his mental constitution, man is incapable of thinking himself as finite without thinking at the same time of an infinite with which his own finitude can be contrasted. It is immaterial to discuss whether the idea of finitude or the idea of infinity is the positive idea and the opposite idea derived by a negative process or whether the two ideas are correlative, as Herbert Spencer, Max Müller and Hegel respectively think; it is admitted by all that the human mind rises necessarily to the consciousness of infinity. This is symbolised by the eating of the fruit of the tree of

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knowledge even by the mythical first parents of mankind and this has resulted in an original sin of discontent with the given and the finite. If then it can be proved that the sense of infinity is an original datum, we are not far from the doctrine that religion is coeval with the appearance of the human mind. The attempt to prove that the idea of the infinite is a *psēudo-idea* derived by a false process of abstraction from the idea of the finite—is, in fact, an idea of the indefinite in disguise—is contesting the *a priori* origin of the idea of the infinite and thereby challenging the necessity or the truthfulness of the idea of the supernatural or the superhuman based upon it. Philosophers have not failed to notice the important significance of the concept of the infinite, and almost all philosophers of note in modern times, from Descartes to Herbert Spencer, have discussed its nature and origin and its bearing upon the knowledge of God. It is extremely important to discuss whether the concept is *a priori* or *a posteriori*, as also whether it is actual or possible or false. While, on the one hand, some have concluded that the finite mind is incapable of forming a true and perfect idea of the infinite, others have equally declared that no mind is capable of knowing its own limitations as a finite being without first having, explicitly or implicitly, a consciousness of the infinite. If it could be proved that the first races of mankind, whose representatives may yet persist in some secluded spot of the globe, did not have, as a matter of fact, any idea of infinity, it would be a proof at the same time that not only positive religion but even religion itself is an historical event and is not either eternal or even coeval with the birth of human thought. It must be admitted, however, that no positive religion has claimed to encompass the infinity of God by an exhaustive knowledge of his powers, potentialities, attributes and manifestations ; but at the same time no religion can be made to stand without assuming the transcendence of finitude on the part of man in the shape of a belief in the superhuman and the supernatural.

Taking for granted that consciousness of the infinite or a power beyond itself is a part of the human mental constitution, we may yet assert that the first religion was extremely individual in its inception and that if man had not been by nature a social animal, religion would have remained in the stage of individual fears, superstitions and admirations. What happens, however, is that a thought that strikes one mind spreads to other minds by imitation or persuasion, and what was originally an individual animistic or fetishistic belief becomes the common possession of the family or the tribe; and in this way a social religion or rather a set of social beliefs regarding the unseen, the unnatural and the overpowering develops. Totemism or the tribal belief that the group or the tribe owes its origin to a common ancestor, generally an animal, is, therefore, a more advanced faith than bare animism and fetishism; the fetish is discarded but not the totem, for the latter owes its origin to a more stable social conviction. From this totemistic faith to the conception of a tribal god the transition, though not apparently great, is in reality a notable advance for whereas in totemism a kinship with the god is claimed, no such belief attaches to the conception of a tribal god who is regarded as superhuman. Such, for instance, was the belief of the Arabs in pre-Mahomet days. A curious mixture of totemistic and tribal conceptions of god lingers in certain Indian beliefs regarding the origin of some of the Kṣatriya tribes. We find, for instance, two great races, called the solar and the lunar race, which claim descent from the gods Sun and Moon respectively. Echoes of similar faith are to be found in Greek mythology and also in Jewish belief where we find that gods are credited with taking the daughters of men as their wives. A still greater advance is made in two directions, perhaps side by side, according to the constitution of the population in the midst of which the belief in a tribal god first arises. If the population be homogeneous, the tribal gods would fight for supremacy over the entire group of homogeneous tribes, and thus the tribal religion will

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pass over into an ethnic religion. If we believe that each race has certain distinctive instincts, it is not improbable that what was once the belief of a sect or sub-sect within the race would not have any great difficulty in spreading over the whole ethnic group and thus develop into a religion of the race. The common religion of the Jews, as also that of the Arabs after Mahomet, probably owes its easy propagation within the race to a similarity in the mental constitution of the group concerned. It has, therefore, not been improperly suggested that the curious coincidence that all the three great monotheistic religions of the world, namely, Judaism, Christianity and Mahomedanism, should arise in the Semitic group may be explained by the fact that the Semitic type of mind is comparatively deficient in the faculty of myth making. It is the want of imagination and a stubborn imperviousness to foreign ideas that explain why polytheism and mythology develop so little within the Semitic group. The notable exceptions are such races as the Assyrians whose contact with Eastern culture was long and continuous and who had probably a more liberal admixture of non-semitic races. If, however, the population be heterogeneous, there is a greater tendency to develop the concept of a local deity. In this respect a local religion keeps closer to more primitive faiths which attach peculiar superstitious associations to particular objects and spots. A local deity is originally the protecting power of a particular city or locality. Such, for instance, was the belief of the Egyptians and the Babylonians who had separate deities for their important towns, e. g. Osiris (corn-god) for Abydos and Ra (the sun-god) for Heliopolis in Egypt and Anu (god of the sky) for Erich, Baal (god of the earth) for Nippur and Ea (god of the waters) for Eridu in Babylonia. These gods share the fortunes of their adherents in war, and when their worshippers are conquered they themselves are conquered by the gods of the victors and either merge in the latter or pass into comparative insignificance. The establishment of a central authority or overlordship finds its counter-

part in the formulation of the notion of a supreme god who may not indeed be the only god but still the god above the gods. Both in Greece and in India the earthly kingdom finds its counterpart in a heavenly kingdom where strifes are not unknown, gods are not free from the vicissitudes of fortune (whence the belief in fate) and temporary overlordship is not absent. In India, and also in Babylonia to some extent, overlordship was not rigidly fixed in the earliest cult and henotheism or the practice of regarding the god worshipped for the time being as supreme over the rest supplied a transition from polytheistic to monotheistic worship.

It must be remembered, however, that of all the earlier forms of faith we have record in speech, writing or representation only of the dead religions of Egypt, Assyria and Babylonia and of the living religions of Persia and India. We are excluding from the list the religions of Greece, Rome, Germany and Scandinavia because these were confined to mythological descriptions and very rarely took the shape of philosophical speculations. It must not be thought, however, that a religion is identical with a scripture. It is at first a body of social beliefs which may express itself in certain rites, festivals and customs, in short, in certain common practices which serve to knit the whole group in a common bond of fellowship. This common practice generally brings into being in course of time a fixed mode which only the initiated can lead successfully, and thus the system of priests, or leaders of rites in any other name, is much older than the positive religions known through scriptures. A time must, however, have come in the history of all religions, except perhaps the very lowest, where the elders were looked up to not only for guiding the sacrifices but also for enlightenment in respect of the tribal faith, and thus a system of ancestral creed must have grown up in course of time, ready to be embodied in some permanent form as soon as suitable materials for the same became available. The revelatory character claimed by almost all religions may be traced to the fact

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that they were once really revelations of the creed by the elders of the community noted for their memory, learning, truthfulness and moral rectitude. As usually happens when there is no written record about the origin of any particular belief, each social practice is regarded as having come down from time immemorial or even from eternity. The haze in which every ancient religion begins invests it with a certain amount of superstitious awe and reverence, and any religion that cannot show an antique origin tries to make up for this deficiency by inventing the myth of an eternal existence as was done, for instance, by Christianity. The element of mystery that hangs about religion manifests itself also in a belief about the supernatural origin of faith in connection with all positive religions; the least that a religion can tolerate is that it had a psychological and sociological origin.

But even though the first scriptures are wrapped up in the mists of ancient obscurity the same cannot be said of their subsequent development. It may also be asserted regarding the original scriptures themselves that critical analysis almost invariably discovers within them traces of development. And this is not surprising when we remember that no scriptures that we know were composed by the prophets themselves; they took their form in the hands of their disciples who codified the sayings of the masters after lapse of memory, superstitious veneration and pious fraud had each contributed its mite to the sense of exaggerated importance of his own faith possessed by each prophet, in order to build up a striking positive religion. Much also is due to the fact that comparative ignorance and want of critical analysis are unable to dissociate the essential from the inessential, and thus what we have is not a finished system but a creed in process of growth; hence we may notice that in each scripture the presence not only of the eternal voice of God but also of the temporal hand of man. It is because of this mixture of the original and the imported that almost invariably schisms arise within the church when critical reason wants to dissociate

the original sayings of the master from the utterances attributed to him by his devout early followers. Take, for instance, the case of Christianity as narrated by Pffeiderer. Says he, "Historical science with its methodical criticism of the documents.....shows that our existing Gospels were none of them composed by eye-witnesses of the life of Jesus. They were the work of men of the second and the third Christian generation. They derived their materials from different sources written and oral, whose manifold variations prove that these materials were shaped under the influence of creative imagination and popular legend". More unsympathetic writers have supposed that by the end of the third century of the Christian era there were written not only the four canonical Gospels (the authorship of the last being still a matter of dispute) but also a very large number of apocryphal gospels and epistles which were rejected not because they were very much less old than the canonical Gospels but because they did not support the theocracy, the Church organisation and the traditions about Christ's life and ministration which the influential members following Paul wanted to build up. Some, again, have denied altogether the existence of an historical Jesus because, barring interested testimonies of the Christians themselves, there is no authentic confirmation about his earthly life by Jewish and Pagan writers of the time. It is still a matter of dispute between the Unitarians and the orthodox Christians of a less liberal and thinking type whether the true Christ preached only the message of revelation or also that of redemption as the latter suppose. The Unitarians think that the Gospel of St. John and passages in other Gospels that teach the divinity of Christ, original sin and redemption through the Messiah are incrustations upon a purer faith preached by a perfect embodiment of humanity, Jesus Christ. The same again is true, though in a lesser degree, of Mahomedanism. It is said, for instance, that although it was the practice with some of the followers of Mahomet to take down the revelations given to him, yet the

Quran in its present form was composed by Zaid ibn Thābit not only from "date leaves and tablets of white stone" but also from "the breasts of men." Similar is the case with Buddhism and Jainism, for in none of these were the scriptures written down till many centuries after the death of the founder. In Brahmanism also the oldest scriptures were transmitted by words of mouth and it is only extreme precaution on the part of the Brahmins to keep the sacred texts inviolate from what they regarded as human contamination that prevented the introduction of extraneous matters. From what we know of the ways in which even written texts get corrupted in the process of duplication of copies and give rise to different rescensions we must admit that the chances of foreign matter creeping into the original nucleus of a positive religion transmitted by oral instruction are not small. The above observations are made not with a view to discrediting the authenticity of the scripture of any religion in its entirety but only to bring out the fact that much of later trouble and dissension owes its origin to the fact that the scripture as we possess it is sometimes far from what the founder really professed to reveal. The fact that such a Christian as St. Paul should not think it immoral to lie to the glory of God should put us on our guard against accepting the whole of any gospel as something unmodified from the very beginning. If then the scripture ascribed to a single prophet admits of improvement, alteration and suppression, some deliberate and some unconscious, it is no wonder that an evolution of thought will be noticeable when the scripture is the work of many hands. In the Vedas, for instance, it is now possible to trace development of religious thought just as the Avesta, though ascribed to a single prophet, shows the same characteristic. This development is not the same thing as the natural development of intellect and expression which a single mind shows in course of its growth in time ; it is the development of the religion itself, by the time it becomes incorporated into a scripture, on account of the introduction of extraneous matters from

other sources. A prophet may grow in wisdom and may make better revelation as time advances, or he may hold that God's essence is not immutable and that though the prophet does not change, the character of the revelation changes owing to the changed mood and will of God. But a creed becomes less homogeneous when uninspired followers improve upon the original revelation with their superstition, ignorance and pious deceit and embellish a simple tale with ornamental drapery and spectacular brilliance, as, for example, was probably done in the case of Christianity by introducing the piously deceitful fictions of Christ's strange appearance by immaculate conception and equally strange disappearance by resurrection and ascension to heaven, in imitation of pagan and Jewish models.*

A religion is historical in another sense when it is viewed as rising out of other faiths and incorporating their materials. There is however this difference between a philosophical eclecticism and a religious synthesis that generally in the former the materials are consciously chosen whereas in the latter the materials mostly exercise an unconscious influence and are therefore regarded as forming part of an original homogeneous revelation. Even if a prophet be a hero, the foundations of his being are deeply rooted in the society to which he belongs. The great man, though not called into being by local and temporal circumstances, is yet not so uninfluenced in his views of life and its destiny by contemporary social beliefs and traditions as an extreme interpretation of Carlyle's theory would lead us to think. As the author of *The Oriental Christ* truly remarks: "Each prophet has his personal surroundings, his peculiarities of time and circum-

* How much modern Christianity owes to paganism, mithraism and solar cults, Babylonian and Egyptian myths, Greek and Buddhist legends the curious reader will find delineated at length in Khwaja Kamal-ud-din's *Religion of Jesus and Traditional Christianity*. The embellishments are all ascribed to later writers who wanted to meet pagan converts halfway by bestowing a Christian sanctification on pagan festivals and beliefs and adhering closely to pagan dates of celebration.

tances. These give a peculiar significance to his life and ministry. There is about him the local, the personal, the historical, as well as the universal. There are the conditions of birth, climate, nationality, education, and the thousand transmitted peculiarities of the age. Those who leave these out of consideration can never understand the true character of the men whom they view as their exemplar." Or, as Pfleiderer puts it, "Instead of a revelation of eternal truths by prophets impelled by the divine spirit, religious movements must be universally regarded as the reflex and effect of the conditions of national culture and economic necessities. This purely naturalist treatment of history is the extreme reaction against the traditional supernaturalism which persisted in seeing in prophets and apostles the inspired bearers of infallible divine oracles, as well as against the aristocratic hero-worship which overlooked, or at any rate under-estimated, the dependence of particular historical personalities on their environment and the general circumstances of their age.....It is indisputably true that even the great personalities and the pioneering deeds of history are only links in the chain of the development of the human race under the law of causation ; that their appearance and their success everywhere depend on their environment, and on the conditions which have issued from the preceding course of events. This holds good even of the religious heroes. They have not descended direct from heaven, nor are they the bearers of infallible oracles lifted above all temporal experience. They are the children of their race and of their age ; they not only share the general culture of the time, they participate especially in the religious traditions ideas, usages, feelings, hopes ; and these in their turn are indissolubly connected with the political and social destinies of specific peoples and periods."

The above remarks are true not only when one religion rises out of another either by way of fulfilment or by way of protest but also when a particular religion seems to arise out

of an antecedent nothing, i. e. when it seems to be an absolute innovation. Whereas in the first two cases the historical continuity lies on the surface, as it were, in the last case the social tradition seems to be overpowered altogether. But this is not true, for not only in many cases is it difficult to decide whether what seems to be an absolutely new faith is not really a protest against existing beliefs but also because careful search is almost invariably able to detect something in the natural and social surroundings that might give rise to the new faith in a responsive breast. Was Buddhism a new faith in China? It was and was not at the same time. The detailed doctrines were certainly new, but not so the general outlook on life and the main religious standpoint. Long before Buddhism made its appearance China had begun to believe in the teachings of Confucius and Lao-tze. Both of these writers had vaguely talked of a supreme personality but had definitely inculcated the doctrine of a moral law which man was to obey and worship by moral practices without any additional faith in a hereafter that rewarded or punished. When, therefore, Buddhism came it found the soil prepared for its acceptance, for it too taught that man should concern himself with the present and the here without overburdening religion with the unseen and the hereafter. Take again the case of Egypt. Her cults took their rise in connection with her geographical peculiarities—a regularity in the seasons and a detached character of the settlements or Nomes. The gods accordingly were mostly connected with heat and agriculture and localised habitation when they were not introduced by foreigners, and the cult of the dead never lost its fascination through the long centuries because the living and the dead were regarded as subject to the same laws of bodily need. The gods of Brahmanism similarly arose among an agricultural people as a natural necessity as among the Egyptians; but India presented a more varied aspect than Egypt and so the gods were diverse and the settlements being continuous local deities were at a discount. That India

lapses back to polytheism in spite of her repeated monotheistic (and atheistic) speculations and theistic practices is due to the fact that Nature presents here the diverse aspects of her men and things with such obtrusive prominence that the unity is lost in variety and an innate tendency towards hero-worship, terminating in deification, adds itself on to an habitual nature-worship with the aid of personification. So in all climes and at all times the birth of a positive religion synchronises with an unconscious tendency of the society towards that new form of belief, for otherwise it is not likely to be accepted by the majority. The first religions grew imperceptibly out of certain common social needs, fears, hopes and aspirations in close contact with the natural environment of the social group, and the seer was either the compiler, or the vehicle of expression, of the social beliefs. Very frequently, the ancient religion is merely a collection of individual rhapsodies in which the social mind recognised its own unconscious wishes concretely expressed. Some of the books of the Old Testament are of this type, e. g. the books written after the Babylonian captivity of the Jews bear deep resentment towards polytheism because of the bitter memories of the land of exile where polytheism was practised. When a nation is in a certain mood, only a certain type of creed can appear or flourish. This explains why, for instance, in India different types of religious literature have a very well-defined period of growth—the hymns, sacrifices, interpretations, speculations and devotional compositions coming in regular order in harmony with the prevailing mood of the times. Confucianism was similarly a codification of ancient beliefs and practices which the genius of the Chinese race had evolved in answer to its life's needs. When a new faith suddenly makes its appearance we may rest assured that the seed thereof was maturing in the dark depths of the social mind and being fed and nourished by kindred social beliefs. For instance, the conception of a local deity may easily arise from a pre-existing totemistic mode of thought just as the conception of a supreme God in Heaven may arise

from the idea of a supreme ruler on earth. Thus while the origin of religion is obscure and universally similar, each positive religion arises in its own historic time by a process of synthesis of social cults and beliefs, effected either by a single individual, as was done by Confucius in China, or by a number of individuals simultaneously or in succession.

But inasmuch as a positive religion is very rarely a mere collection of ancestral practices there enters into its formation not only a rejection of contradictory beliefs, which are not uncommon in an ancient faith, but also a total rejection of many crudities and superstitions which a later generation finds to be irrational. Thus a new creed is at the same time a protest against the old. When the protest is mild and partial and directed against inessential dogmas and practices, the new movement is called reformation. The excrescences are sought to be pruned away, leaving the nucleus of faith intact. If however the inessentials smother the essentials and the irrational elements preponderate over the rational, the protest becomes strong and a new faith seeks to supplant the old. Samuel Butler compares these two types of reform to the two ways in which a species may change *viz.* continuous variation and mutation. An organism "must either change slowly and continuously with the surroundings, paying cash for everything, meeting the smallest change with a corresponding modification so far as is found convenient; or it must put off change as long as possible, and then make larger and more sweeping changes." Similarly, "however conservative we may be and however much alive to the folly and wickedness of tampering with settled convictions—no matter what they are—without sufficient cause, there is yet such a constant though gradual change in our surroundings as necessitates corresponding modification in our ideas, desires and actions. We may think that we would like to find ourselves always in the same surroundings as our ancestors, so that we might be guided at every touch and turn by the experience of

our race, and be saved from all self-communing or interpretation of oracular responses uttered by the facts round us. Yet the facts will change their utterances in spite of us; and we, too, change with age and ages in spite of ourselves, so as to see the facts as perhaps even more changed than they actually are." But just as it is unwise to defer making a change in keeping with the times, so also is it unwise to move too much in advance of time lest the reform be not appreciated and there be a falling back to an inferior mode of thought and life and a setting back of the clock of steady progress. "It is more easy and safer to make such alterations as experience has proved to be necessary than to forecast what is going to be wanted. Reformers are like paymasters, of whom there are only two bad kinds, those who pay too soon and those who do not pay at all."

But conditions may arise when the inventory of ancestral beliefs fails to supply what the growing rationality of a man requires and then a mutation of faith is almost inevitable. If a new religion spreads more quickly among backward tribes than among the more advanced, it is because either the tribes in question do not mind what faith they profess or because their own ancestral beliefs fail to answer the problems which their questioning mind, coming in contact with higher cultures, naturally raises. The case of India may point a moral. Here the largest number of conversions by Christian and Mahomedan missionaries has been from among the backward and down-trodden classes of the Hindu community and among the savage tribes of the hills and the plains. The main reason of defection is not an enlightend faith but a protest against an inferior social position in the Hindu community. As soon as social equality is preached by Hinduism itself and social restrictions against interdining and intermarriage and foreign travel are withdrawn, we find not only an almost complete stoppage of conversion but even a reclamation of the converted. The Brahmo Samaj movement stemmed the tide of Christianity because it gave social liberties without relinquishing

altogether the ancestral faith, just as Vaishnavism at one time stemmed the tide of Mahomedanism by incorporating a good deal of the Buddhistic ideal of equality, sympathy and love along with the Vedantic doctrine of a unitary Absolute. The Arya Samaj movement, going back to the Vedic faith, has obliterated caste but retained fire sacrifices that appeal to a greater and less cultured number than the Upanishadic speculations preached by the Brahmo Samaj, and has not only held Hinduism against other faiths but brought back some of the lost sheep within the fold. Meanwhile legislatures have legalised widow-remarriage and intercaste marriage; the historical origin of many doctrines and practices is becoming known; and the social conscience is asserting itself in favour of adult marriage and strict monogamy (a practice that is spreading also slowly and surely among the Moslems) and tolerance in respect of dining and travel. The factors that clouded the issue are thus being eliminated one by one, and Hinduism is bidding fair to take a fresh lease of strenuous life and proving how little of pure religion and how much of social practice enters into the question of conversion when the ancestral faith includes as distant modes of thought as primitive animism and gross idolatry. on the one hand, and theism and pantheism, on the other. In proportion as India scrutinises her inexhaustible store of religious creeds of diverse enlightenment, the more she ceases to be the happy hunting ground of non-Hindu missionaries. The battle-ground of the future missionaries of Christianity and Islam is Africa and not India: in fact, the battle of missionaries has begun in Africa already, whereas in India the Hindus are gradually awakening to the fact that social rigour means desertion from their ranks and this, in a land where government is sought to be run on communal lines, means loss of political power. Hence in India religious reform is marching in the wake of social and political needs, thus showing that it is not always the needs of the spirit that evoke a protest against an established elastic creed in thinking minds.

What then is the nature of the protest that one historical

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religion raises against another ? The protest generally takes the forms of waging war against sinfulness, extolling matter over form and abandoning polytheism and primitive worship in favour of monotheism or some other coherent form of religious belief. Occasionally, all the three forms are found combined. Thus, the protest of Christianity against Roman belief was directed against public and private corruption in the decadent empire, polytheistic beliefs and idolatrous practices and spectacular ceremonials. The protest of Christianity against Judaism was mainly a protest against formality in religion and incidentally against sinfulness, which was also the target of attack of John the Baptist immediately before Christ. The protest of Islam against Arab belief was against polytheism and attendant ceremonial; against Christianity it was an attack on the trinitarian's tritheism. Buddhism and Jainism protested against the sinfulness of hereditary caste and the complexity, and cruelty of ceremonials in Hinduism, but their protest against polytheism did not take the form of theism. All subsequent reforming movements in India have protested mostly against social iniquity and ceremonial worship and a few have attacked polytheism also. It is not unlikely that the schism within the Indo-Iranian group was over polytheism and formality in worship which the Indian group adopted and the Iranian group rejected. Judaism was originally a protest against Egyptian polytheism and later against Babylonian religion but with a tendency towards idolatry and formality in the intervening period. The religion of the Upanishads, on which modern Brahmoism is based but which was probably at its inception the private creed of a few advanced thinkers, was a protest against formalism and polytheism of the Brahmana and Vedic periods. Protestantism was a dissent against the formalism and corruption of the Roman Church of the time and unitarianism is a protest against trinitarian tritheism which upholds the divinity of God, Christ and the Holy Ghost alike.

The character of any historical religion is so much determined by its environment that, without an adequate knowledge of the determining influences of the locality and the time, we run the risk of crediting it with an amount of originality which it does not really possess. It is very rarely, if ever, that a religion with all its details complete rises Athene-like from the head of a seer or a prophet without any reference to an existing local creed. If individual vision could possess so much potency, then philosophers would have influenced local faith far more effectively than they appear to have done in any country. Historical religion is rather an effect of compromise between the existing creed and the new enlightenment, and its success depends materially upon its appeal to the conscious interests or unconscious desires of the community at large, leaving aside, of course, cases of forced conversion at the point of the sword. Generally speaking, the social majority is constituted by persons of conservative ideas whom sudden change gives a rude shock. They have to be weaned over to the new faith by gradual steps and by as much accommodation as possible. Reference may be made, for instance, to the incorporation of many pagan festivals within early Christianity and of many local celebrations later on in South India and elsewhere to make Christianity locally attractive and acceptable. Was not Mahomet obliged to keep up the annual pilgrimage to the Kaaba at Mecca which was held sacred by the Arabs long before his time? Similarly, Buddhism had to incorporate a lot of Bon superstitions before it could be accepted by the Tibetans who did not want to part entirely with their spirits and gods. Hinduism too had to make friends with the tribal and local deities of the non-Aryans of India in its onward march through the country and to evolve a popular religion in the times of the Puranas to catch the fancy of that large majority who could be attracted only by forceful personalities of the type of Mahavira and Buddha and by attractive chaityas, stupas and images with which the Buddhists had strewn the whole

country, but not by the cold intellectualistic faith of the Upanishads. It had also to evolve a tantricism of its own when a large scale absorption of Buddhists within its fold became necessary in East Bengal where Mahayana Buddhism in commerce with Tibetan tantricism held previous sway. Vaishnavism assumed a democratic form in Bengal under Chaitanya who preached not only a monotheistic creed but also social equality and virtual abolition of the caste system under the influence of the contiguous Mahomedan faith. Reference has already been made to the polytheistic and idolatrous leanings of the Jews at different periods of the old Testament against which the prophets had to hurl repeatedly their violent jeremiads. It is to get rid of the historical accretions that reformers in all lands have to sound the warning note "Back to the original pure faith", whether these are Christians, Buddhists or Hindus; and this leads to a re-reading of the scripture in the light of cultured reason and the sifting of the pure ore from the mass of inessential dross by critical analysis or allegorical interpretation. But the character of the reform is itself historically determined, and reform within the same faith has taken different shapes according to the exigencies of the times although each reformer has professed to go back to the source, so unambiguous are the scriptures generally in their contents and their wordings. Where the source of religion does not lie in the inspiration, exhortation, address or talk of a single prophet, matters become more complicated still, for there it becomes a matter of personal liking as to which source is to be regarded as primary and pure. Thus the Brahmo Samaj and the Arya Samaj in India both profess to go back to the pure Aryan faith, but while the one chooses the Upanishads for guidance, the other goes back to the Vedas themselves in order to reform the Hindu faith.

The substantial ground of mental life

OR

The Self as Substance.

G. R. Malkani

We observe mental life in close and constant connexion with bodily life. It is also affected by changes in the latter. The use of certain drugs, the quality of food we take, the general health of the organism and of the brain in particular, have all a marked effect upon the activities of the mind. It is accordingly natural to suppose that mental life is a product of physical process, and that matter is the only true substance.

Consciousness is what characterises all mental life. This consciousness as consciousness is not identical with cerebral processes. It may be a bye-product or a side-effect, but it cannot be *the same thing as* a process in a material medium. We can, on the other hand, only think of the effect as continuous with the cause. We cannot think of any sort of continuity between the two sets of phenomena, physical and mental. "We may imagine a quantity of movements of material elements and we may attribute to them whatever degree of complexity we choose; but we shall never reach a given moment at which we can say. Now it is obvious that this sum of movements can remain movements no longer but must pass into sweetness, brightness or sound.....It is utterly fruitless to attempt to show how a physical nervous process gradually transforms itself into sensation or any other mental occurrence."*

We may indeed regard the physical occurrence as merely the occasion for the mental event. But this does not give an intelligible meaning to their connexion. It is virtually to admit that the substantial ground of the two cannot be the same, and that mind and matter are quite heterogeneous in nature.

* Lotze's *Metaphysic*, p. 167.

There is lastly the consideration of the primacy of mental life so far as we are concerned. Matter is not primary. We cannot *start* with it and reach mental life. What is primary to us is the fact of consciousness. It is by and through this fact that matter and its processes are intelligible to us. While therefore mind cannot be deduced from matter, it is not such a hopeless task to explain matter entirely in terms of mind.

We conclude that matter cannot be the substantial ground of mind. Physical processes are unintelligent. They require for their medium what is unintelligent. Mental processes are nothing if they are not intelligent. Physical processes can be supposed by us to exist even though nobody apprehends them. Mental processes can only exist as constituting the experience of someone; they have a direct reference to something that is intelligent.

The two groups of facts may be admitted to be quite incomparable one with the other. But all that we can deduce therefrom is that each group has its own special ground of explanation. Our psychical analysis may start with sensations and ideas, feelings and emotions, and seek to explain mental life through them. The processes of our body may be studied in their own way on purely physical grounds. The relation between these two sets of phenomena may also be studied so far as it is empirically determinable. But it would still seem to be possible that the two principles, physical and mental, which we must separate, do not necessarily belong to two different sorts of substances. It is possible that "every element of reality unites in itself the two primitive qualities, from one of which mental life may arise, while the other contains the condition of a phenomenal appearance as matter. On this view, instead of having, on the one side, souls destitute of all physical activity and, on the other, absolutely self-less elements of matter, we might suppose that the latter, like the former, possess in various grades an inner life, though a life which we cannot observe nor even guess at, so long as it has no forms of expression intelligible to us."*

* Lotze's *Metaphysic*—P. 168.

on this hypothesis, what is known as dead and lifeless matter may have a mental life. Similarly the highest form of mental activity may be supposed to be necessarily associated with a body. Leibnitz's idea of ultimate reality as the monad is very similar. But the monad is essentially a soul although it happens to have a body. Spinoza credited Substance with both sets of attributes, physical and mental. But his Substance is essentially spiritual. Our present hypothesis differs from these views in-as-much-as it emphasises the purely physical aspect of substance. What has the two sets of qualities is first and last material.

How shall we decide this matter? Lotze thinks that "if we were confined to the external observation of psychical life not our own, I do not know of anything perfectly decisive that could be alleged against this supposition". * The question however is whether external observation of psychical life is at all possible. It is quite possible in the case of physical processes. But then we do not refer a physical process to an inner centre. One state succeeds another; they are spread out in time; they lack soul, or any inner unifying principle. We may indeed suppose that all physical processes occur in a homogeneous medium which we call mere matter. But does this "mere matter" remain unchanged? In that case it will be beyond time. It will neither receive change nor effect it. And since it cannot also unify what is in time, because of its unintelligent character, it will be more dead than the matter we know. The matter we know behaves like a substance. It can act and also be acted upon. There is no such thing as mere dead stuff. The modern view is that matter is a series of events. In any case, it is not something that can stand quite aloof from actual physical processes. The supposed unchanging ground of material processes is only a meaningless hypothesis. It solves none of our problems. The real matter is what we know it to be,—a series of changes without any inner centre or principle of unification. Material processes then can be observed from outside, for they lack

* Metaphysic—P. 169.

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soul. They do not involve any reference to an inner principle which may be said to unite them.

Psychical processes differ from the physical just in this very respect. Every mental state belongs to a self. There can be no sensation without the subject which has it. This is still more evident when we compare ideas. "Any comparison of two ideas, which ends by our finding their contents like or unlike, presupposes the absolutely indivisible unity of that which compares them: it must be one and the same thing which first forms the idea of *a*, then that of *b*, and which at the same time is conscious of the nature and extent of the difference between them."* All mental life involves this relating principle,—this indivisible unity of consciousness. The inner world of individual experience is not made up of ideas coming one after another without relation. The ideas are held together and arranged according to an intelligent purpose and by the relating activity of one pervading principle. Our conclusion is: (*a*) Psychical processes cannot be observed from outside; (*b*) they have a necessary reference to a unity which cannot exist in space like matter; (*c*) this unity is necessarily immaterial, intelligent and indivisible.

The question now is, can we call this conscious unity in any sense *substantial*? It may be argued that this unity need not be traced to a particular indivisible subject. It is unsubstantial like a motion; and like the latter, it may be the result of many co-operating forces although it appears quite simple. It is evident however that a resultant motion is always the motion of the *particular point* in which the different motions coalesce. It can not be a motion of nothing,—a motion in empty space. Similarly, even though the unity of consciousness may be a resultant, it cannot be a phenomenon produced in nothing. It can only be produced in some element of the real. Further, this element cannot be material. It must be intelligent and can therefore in no way be different from the unity of consciousness itself. Nevertheless let us

* Lotze's *Metaphysic*—P. 170

suppose that this unity is the result of the inter-action of the different elements of an organism. In that case, the unity will be reproduced as many times as there are the elements, and it will vary in intensity with the liveliness of each element. The question will now be, which of these resultant consciousnesses is the soul of the organism? We may adopt the device of Leibnitz who admitted "*a prima inter pares*, a central monad.....capable of the intensest mental life and able to master all the others". But then other monads will be related to the central monad, as the several members of a society are related to a particular individual member. The latter has no direct access to the inner life of those other members and the unity of his own consciousness is not explained by it. It supports itself so to say. The other members stand to him in varying relations of interaction; they do not contribute anything to his consciousness of self or unity of consciousness. The latter cannot be reduced to anything simpler. Our conclusion is that the unity of consciousness is not a resultant. No point of a manifold can be made into this unity of consciousness if it is not that unity already. This unity is quite simple and it cannot be unsubstantial like an empty movement.

The unity of consciousness is intelligent, immaterial, indivisible, simple and not unsubstantial. Nevertheless, is it substance? According to Lotze, it is. Substance however signifies for him no more than "the power of producing and experiencing effects." It is not some mysterious quality which can give to the thing a new status. The substantiality of the soul is accordingly for him a simple matter of observation. The soul or the unity of consciousness behaves in a way in which anything that is substantial may be expected to behave.

Kant, it is well-known, argued against the commonly accepted substantiality of the soul. He thought it quite inadvisable to deduce the substantiality of the soul from the mere fact that we appear to ourselves as the constant subject

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of our states. It is quite possible that the appearance is no more than a subjective illusion, and that in the nature of things there is no single substance which is the ground of the appearance. He even suggested a way of explaining away this appearance. He says, "An elastic sphere which collides with another in a direct line, communicates to it its whole motion and, therefore, (if we regard nothing but their positions in space) its whole state. Now if, on the analogy of such bodies, we suppose substances, one of which imparted to the other ideas together with the consciousness of them, we can imagine a whole series of these substances, of which the first would impart its state, together with the consciousness of that state, to the second, the second would impart its own state, together with that of the preceding substance, to the third, and this again would communicate to another, not only its own state with the consciousness of it but also the states of all its predecessors and the consciousness of them. Thus the states of all the substances which had undergone changes, together with the consciousness of these states, would be transferred to the last substance : and in consequence this last substance would be conscious of all these states as its own, and yet, in spite of this, it would not have been the same person in all these states."

It is indeed unquestionable that many things may be different from what they appear to us to be. But the unity of consciousness through different states which we want to emphasise is not based on the fact that we appear to ourselves to be the constant subject of our states. What is more significant than that is *that we appear to ourselves to be anything at all*. Unless we persisted through states there would be no appearance of this unity. We would neither appear to ourselves a unity nor even a multiplicity. It is immaterial then what we appear to ourselves to be. The important thing to note is that we appear to ourselves to be something; and that this appearance would not be possible without the real unity of that to which the appearance was any appearance. Accordingly, as

Lotze says, "supposing the soul appeared to itself as a multiplicity, we should on the same grounds conclude that it was certainly mistaken if it took itself really to be what it appeared."† The real unity of consciousness is proved in the mere fact of appearance regardless of the nature or the content of it.

This becomes still clearer if we raise the question, appearance to whom? To the state that is? This is not possible unless the state divides itself into the object appearance and the subject that apprehends. But it is unthinkable that the same state can be at the same time both object and subject. To some other entity on the analogy of the elastic ball? This would be too grotesque. A new entity is created out of nothing and disappears into nothing at every stage of mental life. We have no evidence of any such entity. We would accept even this absurd hypothesis, if it could be shown how is it that one important item in the list of the communications it receives is suppressed from it, namely the fact that all these communications are a communication from a different entity. If this item were not suppressed, there would not be any illusion of self-identity. As it is, Kant's doctrine strikes us as a case of "a strange transmigration of the soul, in which the personality, while it grows in content, passes from one substratum to another." *

There may, however, let us suppose, be a soul-substance in the intelligible world which fully answers all the requirements of substantial being in the sense demanded by Kant. How will this substance be materially different from the apprehended unity of consciousness. We cannot suppose that it will be more solid, or that it will have any accretions of material or of any other kind of being. Any other kind of being which is not the perceiving ego, can only be conceived on the analogy of mere matter; and any accretions of this being will only render our conception of the soul grossly materialistic. The unity of consciousness or what we know as the ego must in any case be the ultimate expression of any substance that is intelligent. Any attempt to go beyond the

† P. 176.

* P. 178.

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ego in order to grasp intelligent being is bound to fail. For the ego is the last word in subjectivity, which is the only appropriate indication of being that is intelligent and non-material. It is the most perfect and the most satisfactory form of expression of any soul-substance that has value for us. In fact, even when we desire for immortality, we can only desire the immortality of that which we somehow know to be our self. We cannot desire for the immortality of something that is distant and unknown—a soul-substance outside the universe of our experience. As Lotze puts it—"No one who wished the doctrine of immortality to be assured, could concern himself with anything but that continuity of his consciousness which he desired not to lose." He would be quite indifferent to the continuity of something that he did not know, and did not clearly recognise as *his* self. Nothing then would be gained by postulating a substance that had no relation with any known reality and could not be directly apprehended through the latter.

Our conclusion is that the unity of our consciousness or what we call the ego has a substantial character which we cannot improve upon, and which we must accept as true and ultimate so far as conscious experience is concerned. If we want any *proof* of its substantiality beyond that which is supplied by the mere fact of its being, we cannot seek it better than in its production of ideas, emotions and efforts. Lotze regards the *life* of the soul as the most convincing proof of its reality and substantiality.* Those however who want a better proof, must first critically examine their expectations and the notion of substance on which those expectations are based. They will then realise that their efforts have no admissible aim at all.

We have so far taken no account of the contention that a substance must necessarily be permanent, and that a soul-substance must be immortal. The view of the soul which we have set forth so far evidently cannot be interpreted to

* p. 180-81

countenance this demand for immortality. The soul is conceived as an agent or as the apprehended unity of consciousness. But the agent is necessarily bound up with a material system or the physical organism. When this system goes to dissolution the agent can function no longer, and we can have no reasonable assurance that we can retain the unity of consciousness that we wish not to lose. Lotze perceives this very well, and so he goes on to express himself in the following terms on this subject. He says, "The question of the immortality of the soul does not belong to metaphysic. We have no other principle for deciding it beyond the general idealistic conviction that every created thing will continue if and so long as its continuance belongs to the meaning of the world; that everything will pass away which had its authorised place only in a transitory phase of the world's course. Further application of this principle in human hands is impossible." We do not think that the demand for immortality can be lightly set aside, or that it is not a problem for metaphysics. We shall next proceed to consider the problem in its true metaphysical bearing.

The Nature of Universals

Miss Krishna Desai.

What is a Universal ? this question has been answered in many ways but a mere collection of definitions will not help us to understand the problem before us. Let us, then, start with a general definition and try to find out its implications. We may say that what is common to many things or situations is a universal, e. g., there are red things such as a red rose, a red nose etc. What is common to them is "redness" and that is their universal. The same name is applied to so many different things because of the universal which is common to them all. But this is all vague as yet. We must further ask ourselves what this "commonness" really signifies ? Does it mean that there is an identical something in all the particulars ? There is no doubt that there must be some identity in all red things ; otherwise they will not be called by the same name. It is sometimes held that "redness" is a universal and red things are its particulars just because in all we have the same quality of redness. In other words, there is a "qualitative identity" between the things but no "numerical identity". This position looks sound at first sight but it in fact is not so. It has been rightly questioned by Stout and others. What right has anybody to give the qualities a status different from that of the particular things which they qualify ? a quality is as particular as the thing itself. The "redness" of a rose is as much in "Time and Space" as the rose itself. The same quality cannot exist in more than one place. To put it technically, "Qualitative identity" cannot be separated from "Numerical identity". "No two things can be exactly alike and differ only numerically." This is the principle of the "identity of indiscernibles" propounded by Leibnitz and we see no way of refuting it. We never find in experience two things "exactly alike". Even the proverbial

peas cannot violate this principle. We need not go into the details of the controversy which has arisen about this point. The conclusion we have arrived at is that there is nothing identical in a red rose and a "red nose". The quality of "being red" does not repeat itself in all particular red things. Why do we then call them by the same name? Why don't we call a "yellow rose", red? Is there no difference between the two pairs "a red rose" and "a red nose", and a "yellow rose" and a red nose"? Is there mere diversity in the world? Are there only particulars which are separated from one another with a world of difference, so that they cannot receive a common name? Are we, then, reduced to such a fix that we must deny the existence of universals? There are three main views on this problem. viz. (1) Nominalism, (2) Conceptualism and (3) Realism. According to the first view, universals are but names. There is nothing corresponding to them in the world. Groups of things get associated with the same name and thus they are called by the same name. This view is untenable. Why don't we call a cat and a dog by the same name? The same name implies some identity between the things which possess the same name. Again, a nominalist has no right even to use the phrase "the same name" because this assumes identity between the words used by different persons at different times. Knowledge itself will be impossible unless we grant some identity somewhere. According to the conceptualists, there is diversity in reality but unity in thought. Thus there is an opposition between our ideas and the world. How can real diversity be reconciled with ideal unity? Can we call a universal a mere idea? Universals cannot be subjective; otherwise why do we correct our ideas? "Logical thinking is a habit of following the logical structure of things" and not merely of following the trend of our private ideas. As we know there is an artificial grouping together of things and a natural one. There are natural groups over and above the artificial groups. Universals are not mere short-hand signs in our study of nature. Classes are *formed*

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and *not made*. Both these views, then, are unsatisfactory. According to the third i. e. the Realistic view, there is a real identity in the diversity of the world. We have already seen that this identity cannot be mere "qualitative identity" in different particulars. It must be "numerical identity" of some sort. As Husserl says, "wherever there is exact likeness, there is also identity, in the strict and the true sense of the term." This cannot be taken to mean that all reds are "numerically identical". For in that case, they will not be "reds" but a "red". Sameness is not mere Similarity which is meaningless without identity. What is the identity, then which combines different particulars? Here is an almost insoluble difficulty unless it is held that all the things called by a common name are members of one world and that that is the only thing that is common. It is not that an identical quality is repeated in each one of many things, which is impossible, but that each one of the things falls within the same unity, and therefore contributes to the same purpose. It is the one *purpose* running through all the particulars that constitutes their community. The "*principle*" "*law*" or the "*purpose*" which governs the world constituted by the particular is contributed to by the particulars or illustrated in them with varying degrees of relevance or adequacy. Their contribution to the same purpose is what constitutes the resemblance between the particulars. As Husserl puts it, "Resemblance is the relation between objects subsumed under one and the same species. If we could not speak of the identity of the species, of that in which resemblance consists, there would be no question about resemblance at all." Since all things belong to *one universe*, they resemble one another more or less. All things (without exception) are related and *have a common name so far as they belong to the same universe*. But all things are not equally alike and so there are genera and species, all these classes being based on the purpose which each subserves. In the universe there is *one purpose* consisting of many subordinate purposes and all these purposes

are universals of varying completeness. There are no things which are quite different from one another. A member of one class will resemble a member of another class so far as these two members of different classes contribute together to a common purpose ; for we must not forget that the whole purpose is a system of purposes and thus within the great system there will be many smaller systems. These overlap one another. In this sense, a particular is a meeting point of many universals. Red things belong together because they are the members of *the coloured* universe but they have other aspects in virtue of which they belong to other systems as well. A red rose besides being a member of the coloured universe has a place in the world of flowers. When a thing is *viewed in all its aspects, we use a concrete universal*. Thus "Redness" is an abstract universal while "roseness" is a concrete universal. This is of course, a relative distinction because we never view things in their completeness. We have to abstract things from the universe for our every day and even for scientific purposes. Thus all universals are abstract when viewed in relation to the *perfect universal* which alone is fully concrete. But all are not equally abstract. There are degrees of abstractness as of concreteness. What is lacking determines the degree of abstractness while positive contents determine the degree of concreteness. Universals are called abstract in another sense. We are said to arrive at universals by the so called method of abstraction. This method consists in arriving at universals by paring off the differences in the particulars and by retaining what is only common to them. But we have just seen that there is nothing that is common like that. This method of omission will do away with the things and will not enable us to arrive at a universal. "Colour" is abstract in the sense that it is arrived at by omitting all the other characters of coloured things. But it is not abstract in the second sense. It is a concrete universal. It is not arrived at by denying to it greenness, redness and all such differentiations. But it comprehends the possibility of all its

instances. Its content is certainly richer than any one of its instances. Some particular colour is red or yellow but it cannot be both just because it does not exhaust all the characteristics of being coloured. Colour in general must be all these and *even more*. Berkley's criticism of Locke's doctrine of the formation of abstract general ideas, in his "Principles of Human Knowledge" may well be noted here. 'Of the true universal', he says 'which contains the rule for the entire formation of its species, it may rather be said that its content is always precisely as rich, the sum of its marks precisely as great as that of its species themselves—etc.' Thus when universals are confined to qualities and characters common to things and when the identity is arrived at by means of the method of omission, there is a "twofold abstraction". First, only one aspect is separated from the whole thing and secondly, the continuity is still further cut in two by following the identity without the differences. The spirit of totality must govern our procedure. Neither one sided identity nor diversity alone will do. "Classification by resemblance" is the principle of universality superficially applied. "Grouping by reciprocal determination" is a higher application of the same principle. That universal, which binds together differences is higher than that which binds only similars. Resemblance here is taken to mean *perceptual* resemblance, which is different from what we have found it to be. *Things resemble one another so far as they belong to an organic whole.* There is more (*perceptual*) resemblance between the particular instances of 'whiteness' than between the parts of a chair. But we have to reverse this statement when *we take resemblance to mean contribution to a common purpose. Particular instances of whiteness are more distinctly related than the parts of an organism or an organic whole.*

Individuality is the best type of concrete universal we know. It may be said that there is no one purpose in my *life*. My actions have no connection whatsoever with one another. It is true that the purpose of *my life* is not complete in itself but

my life is *my life* and not somebody else's so far as it is the embodiment of one purpose. *The unity of the purpose is not fully realized in my life yet a certain plan of construction is preserved in all changes physical or psychical.* My way of responding to various situations is mine and nobody else's. Whatever variations there may be they are more or less uniform (relevant) and no mere repetitions. This explains why habits are called universals. It may further be objected that quite opposite tendencies cannot be attributed to the same person. Not being similar, how can they cohere? Coherence does not mean that what coheres must be similar in order to cohere. Rather what coheres is so far similar. What exemplifies a law need not be homogeneous. A skilful artist binds together objects of greater variety than one who is not skilful. Lotze compares a highly organised individual to the structure of a melody. *If in the midst of variety we feel our identity, it is just because the variety is teleologically held together.* We generally judge from outside and consequently find it difficult to see the principle binding the saintly and devilish tendencies in the same person. Careful examination will show that from the point of view of the devil-saint there is a *kind of unity* in his life. The unity underlying the conflicting tendencies in the devil-saint can be easily realised when we remind ourselves that only *contradictories* are incommittible not *opposites*. This is the simple principle which Heracleitus taught long, long ago, that strife is the father of all harmony.

This view of universals which is the outcome of absolutism is akin to that of Bradley and Bosanquet and has been strongly criticised by Norman Kemp Smith in a series of articles published in *Mind*, 1927. I am not going to concern myself with the constructive portion of the article but only with that portion of the criticism which is relevant to our purpose. I may first sum up the main points of criticism. (1) There is no real separateness of things in the world for Bradley; therefore there is no problem of universals for him. (2) No distinc-

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tion is made between two main forms of identity—identity of a character as found recurring in numerically distinct particulars and the self-identity of each thing or self. (3) By the abstract universal he means an identical character found in separate particulars and by the concrete universal the identity wherein a thing or self expresses itself through its changes and the diversity of its constituent character. (4) All universals are abstract in character and can be quite adequately defined in independence of their varying embodiments. These are the main points which we may now take up one by one. (1) Smith says, 'Bradley has been so ready to adopt the view of universals as being identical in their various instances because he has no belief in the real separateness of the latter'; we may ask what is *real separateness* after all? Is it being utterly dissimilar or altogether unrelated? Smith also could not have universals if he held such a view. Besides he clearly says at the beginning of his first article that 'universals expressive of genuine identities and not merely similarities are necessary to knowledge.' Is this position different from that of Bradley? Bradley does not mean to deny all diversity. Unity can have meaning only through diversity. What he means by denying real separateness to things is that nothing is self-explaining and in this sense they are not really separate. They form parts of an organic whole. Smith says further that 'If *A* and *B* are not really what they would seem to be, separate and distinct, there need be no obstacle in the way of our holding, on the contrary there must be every reason for holding, that the "red" is identically the same in both.' But distinction is not the same thing as separation. To say that there is no real separation between *A* and *B* does not necessarily compel any body to hold that the "red" is identically the same in both on the traditional view. *You cannot get rid of some identity but the question is what identity?* It is not true that there is no problem for Bradley. His problem is not the same as that of these who believe in the "real separateness" of things as interpreted

above. *They have to bind quite different things by means of universals which is an impossible task.* Unless there is some resemblance which is the something as identity, you cannot have a universal. (2) Let us now proceed to the next point. On Smith's view, the two forms of identity are applications of two different principles—"Relatedness in a system" and "Identity in difference". That is why he accuses Bosanquet of having wrongly identified a system with an individual. A system contains relations and therefore Bosanquet who is an absolutist cannot accept it as an ideal and identify it with an individual. Against this contention of Smith, we may say that an absolutist need not deny the existence of relations within Reality. The Reality itself is not related to anything outside. An individual does not exclude relations; it also combines differents into a system. The principle underlying both these identities is the same and that is "Identity in difference"—not abstract identity. This principle is illustrated both in recurrent particulars and in an individual life. I think Smith denies the name of universal to the self-identity of a thing or self just because he takes identity in a restricted sense. He perhaps thinks that there is no identity in recurrent particulars. What recurs can never be either a continuant or an event according to him. *I say that the continuant alone can recur.* Nothing recurs if we interpret this strictly to mean *exact repetition*. A thing recurs because it is *the same*. Recurrence is nothing but identity expressing itself through diversity. I do not understand why universals should be identified with the recurrent type only. Characters and relations are in some form recurrent just because they point to some identity or unity in which they fall. I think Smith is misled by the spatial and temporal distance between particulars otherwise he would not deny continuity to them. He says that we have no empirical evidence that the physical system within which organisms occur is itself an organism. It is seemingly a highly unified system but this evidence is not enough. If

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we carry this argument further we may say that to call any part of the universe a thing, an organism, is arbitrary. For partical purposes, we have to make such distinctions but they cannot be ultimate because nothing is complete in itself. It is difficult to say where one organism ends and another begins. One body which we call one contains many living cells and so it is at once one and many. Our interest determines the individuality of things—whether they are to be called one or many. A drop of water is one to us but when a scientist analyses it or puts it under a magnifying glass it is found out to be a complex world of living beings. Identity therefore is always ideal. The conclusion is that the recurrent and the continuant types of identities are *at bottom* the same. The recurrent particulars also are *continuous* with one another although not in time and space. *They belong to a common world and so far they are organic. An organic unity need not have its parts continuous in time and space.* Continuity of purpose is what constitutes an organic unity. Take for instance, the postal system. It is an organic unity although the individual post-offices in which it is represented are not continuous in time and space. (3) Smith seems to misunderstand the point at issue. Individuality is the best type of universal we have in experience but this does not mean that all other universals are abstract. When a thing is viewed as a whole, we take a concrete view and when viewed in one of its aspects, it gives rise to an abstraction. Even an individual life can be viewed in abstraction. It is our point of view that makes the difference. We may even say that all concrete universals are partial when compared to the perfect universal. 'The abstract universal applies to things considered only in their aspect as so many resembling but mutually exclusive particulars.' "Mutual exclusiveness" comes in because we are taking a partial view. Diversity of aspects is supposed to be irrelevant for our purpose. Identity is persued apart from differences. Wherever identity is arrived at by disregarding the differences, we have an abstract

universal. According to Smith, Bosanquet denounces the abstract universals for two quite opposite reasons; (1) It generates classes which exhibit a haphazard diversity (2) It creates classes characterized by the monotonous uniformity of their recurrent instances. These two types are illustrations of the same principle of abstract identity. So, the reasons though they seem to be two and opposite, are the result of one and the same erroneous principle.

(4) Now the last point. According to the abstract view of universals, there must be some simple concept which can be predicated in "the same sense" of all the particulars in which it is represented. The differences are irrelevant and may be safely omitted. Supposing, we take the universal "humanity" then it must have a content which can be predicated of every man. Rationality is the essence of human beings and other differences are "external" to our purpose. But Rationality itself is a complex concept and admits of differentiations. What will be the mode or degree of rationality to be included in "humanity"? It will be an "empty minimum". If on the other hand, we construct as full a concept as possible, we arrive at something which is never found realised in any individual human being. The objections against the concrete view of universals are that (i) no difference is made between essence and accidents; (ii) such an all-inclusive concept cannot be predicated of the particulars 'in the same sense.' (iii) such an "elastic" use of concepts lacks preciseness. (i) According to the absolutists, there are ultimately no accidents in the universe. Everything has its place in the scheme of things. What we mean by an accident is what is not relevant to a particular universal, not what is not relevant at all. It is not essential to be a negro so that one may be called a human being. Certainly not, but the negro has a necessary place in the universal that makes him a man. (ii) It may be asserted that certainly you cannot hold that any one of the particular instances exhausts the contents of the universal. Certainly not, of course. *The universal, on our view, is the system of*

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the particulars and the universality in the particulars is their membership of the system or their systematic nature.

"The test of universality which it imposes is not the number of subjects which share a common predicate, but rather than this, the number of predicates that can be attached to a single subject." The particulars are not included *under* the notion but *in* the notion. This explains why the universal need not be fully represented in each of the particulars. Besides, it is true in a way that the whole is in each part, but not wholly nor equally in each part. We say "*I see*," "*I hear*," etc. Not "one part of me sees, another part hears," etc, (iii) The vagueness is due to the inadequacy of our knowledge. We have not to be precise at the cost of truth. For ordinary purposes, we can afford to leave out some aspects which we take to be irrelevant. When trying to find out what universals *must* be, we have no other choice. We must include in it all that is relevant in the wider sense.

The import of a proposition in Vedanta Philosophy.

Dhirendra Mohon Dutta.

The import of a proposition forms one of the most important topics for discussion in Western logic. It will be interesting therefore, to know the views of Indian logic on this matter. In this brief paper, we shall try to present and critically understand the views of a prominent section of Indian philosophers—namely the Vedantins. As will presently appear the views of other schools resemble more or less those of the general Western thinkers ; but the views of the Vedantins possess some striking peculiarities which deserve more than a mere passing consideration at the hands of unbiased students of logic.

In Indian philosophy, the word *vākya* stands for both a sentence and a proposition. It was looked upon not only as a mere verbal expression of which grammatical correctness or incorrectness could be predicated, but also as a unit of thought which was subject to the logical judgments of truth, falsity and doubt.

Now the *vākya*, like the proposition, was usually analysed by Indian thinkers into two constituents—an *uddesya* and a *vidheya*, which, as will appear presently correspond to a subject and a predicate respectively. The idiom of the sanskrit language does not necessarily require any word corresponding to the word 'is' as the connection-piece between a substantive and an adjective. Consequently the problem whether the copula is to be considered as the third constituent entity of a proposition which proves a puzzle to many Western logicians* did not naturally trouble Indian thinkers.

* Eminent Western logicians like Mill, Johnson etc. do not consider the copula as an additional constituent element of the proposition. In the words of Johnson "the tie is not an additional component in the construct, but a mere formal element" :—Logic, vol. I. P. II.

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As to the relation between the subject and the predicate it is generally held that the subject is the *uddesya* or the content to which something is referred or attributed whereas the predicate is the *vidheya* or something which is referred or attributed. Again the subject is the *visesya* or substantive whereas the predicate is the *visesana* or the adjective ; lastly the subject is *anuvadya* or already known whereas the predicate is *ananuvadya* or something new or previously unknown. It is interesting to find that Indian thinkers were well aware of the puzzle of predication as well. If the subject or *uddesya* is as they hold, already known (*anuvadya*) where is the necessity for the proposition in which we only predicate something of the subject ? The solution offered for this difficulty is that the subject (*uddesya*) is known already not wholly but only as possessing some characteristics (*dharma*) and the proposition represents the knowledge of the subject as possessed of some *other* characteristics, not already known.

The function of a proposition, according to this general view of Indian philosophers. is consequently, to express a relation (*samsagara*) between the subject, as the substantive (*visesya*) and the predicate as an adjective (*visesana*) thereof. The proposition "The cow exists" (*gauh asti*) is, therefore, interpreted to mean "The cow is characterised by existence" (*astitvavān gauh*). Similarly, "The pot is blue" (*ghatah nilah*) is said to mean "the pot is characterised by blueness" (*nilatva-visistah ghatah*) and "the pot is not blue" is interpreted as meaning "the pot is characterised by the non-existence of blueness" (*nilatvābhāva visistah ghatah*) and so on.

It will be evident from what has been said above, that the general Indian conception of a proposition resembles the general western conception namely that in a proposition one content is attributed to another or that a proposition expresses a substantive-adjective relation between two contents. The words *Visesya* and *Visesana* (as applied to the *uddesya* and the *vidheya* respectively) mean exactly *determinandum* and

determinans respectively, as used by the eminent western logician Johnson to characterise the subject and the predicate respectively.

But, just as in western philosophy writers like Russell object to this general view and assert that the subject-predicate or substantive-adjective relation should not be thought to be present universally in all propositions, so in Indian Philosophy also, the Vedantic thinkers object to the general Indian view set forth above namely that every *vāka* (proposition) should express a relation (*Samsarga*) between a substantive (*visesya*) and an adjective (*visesana*). But whereas Russell disproves the absoluteness of the subject-predicate view by citing, as exceptions, the cases of propositions such as of the asymmetrical type, the vedantins perform the same thing by calling attention to certain propositions the purpose of which is not so much to relate, in any way, two contents as to assert one identical content.

According to the vedantins, propositions are of two kinds:— (1) those expressing substantive-adjective or subject predicate relation between two contents (and called *samsargāvagāhi*) and (2) those not expressing any such relation (and called, therefore *samsargānavagāhi*). As regards the former class they hold the views held by other schools. But as to the latter class they differ widely from those thinkers. It is this peculiar class of propositions that we want to discuss in this paper at some length. We shall first state the vedantic views and then try to ascertain their real logical worth through criticism of our own.

Two kinds of examples are cited by the vedantins in illustration of this exceptional type of propositions:—*First*, propositions expressing an identity such as “This is that Devadatta”, *Secondly*, propositions expressing some definition such as “The most resplendent (planet at night) is the moon”.

As to the first of these two illustrations, the vedantins say that when a person sees another person, Devadatta, for a second time he passes a judgment represented by the proposi-

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tion—"This is that Devadatta". In such a case, the speaker does not surely mean to say that 'that Devadatta' (seen at some other time) characterises "this Devadatta" (seen at present); but he means to say that the two are identical. It may be asked, how "this Devadatta" as determined by the present time and space can be thought to be identical with 'that Devadatta' as determined by another time and space. The vedantins answer this difficulty by saying that the import of a proposition must be understood in strict obedience to the object with which the speaker asserts it. The linguistic expression must always be interpreted so as to bring out that object in view, even if that requires us to forsake the obvious or apparent common meaning of the expression. In the present case, for instance, knowing from the universe of discourse that identity is the objective of the speaker we have to interpret the language so as to bring out that very meaning. Devadatta as qualified by the determinant 'this' cannot be conceived to be identical with Devadatta as qualified by a different determinant 'that'. Yet this seems to be the apparent meaning of the expression. We can remove this apparent contradiction only if we deduct the determinants 'this' and 'that' and consider that the determinandum (*visesya*) Devadatta is identical. In plain language we are to think that 'this Devadatta' is identical with 'that Devadatta' in so far as Devadatta is the one and the same individual. In such a proposition the two contents presented by the two different words or phrases cannot be related together as such owing to a contradiction and consequently we have to extract the common elements on both sides (by rejecting the peculiar ones) and understand an identity between two terms which are wholly identical. A proposition (*Vakya*) of this kind then, cannot be explained in the ordinary subject-predicate (*uddesya-vidheya*) way. There is no substantive-adjective relation between the two contents here. Nay, there is no relation between two such contents—except if identity be conceived as a relation by an unusual extension of the term relation.

So it is said that such a proposition (Vakya) presents a non-relational meaning(asangsargārtha) or unitary meaning (akhandārtha).

To come to the second illustration of these exceptional types of propositions. A certain person does not know which of the heavenly bodies seen at night, is the moon and asks another person "which is the moon"? The reply comes "The most resplendent (body) is the moon" or "The moon is the most resplendent (body)". This reply yields a proposition (vākya) where also the ordinary subject-predicate relation is absent. At first, it is true, it will appear that the two contents present in such a proposition consist of a noun and an adjective (from the grammatical point of view) and consequently that there is present in it an ordinary substantive-attribute relation, too. But on closer enquiry we find that such a view is only apparent. For the enquirer does not want to know what the moon is or what attributes it has, but to know which of the heavenly bodies it is. So the reply to be true to the enquiry, must state which the moon is and not what it is. So the sentence (Vakya) expressing this answer cannot be understood to be the expression of a substantive-attribute relation at all. The object of the speaker is not to state any relation between the content 'moon' and the content 'most resplendent'—but to identify to the enquirer the object, moon, through a description or definition of it. In such a proposition also, then, we have a unitary non-relational content.

We have stated above the vedantic views as to the existence of two types of propositions (vakyas) which present a non-relational unitary meaning. Many objections can be raised against such a view—many have actually been raised in Indian philosophy by the non-advaitic thinkers. We shall consider the more important objections and judge the real worth of these vedantic views. It will be convenient to consider each of the two illustrated types separately.

To begin with the first type, the very first and most fundamental objection, that will be raised, will be against the

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possibility of an identical proposition itself. Bradley says, that 'judgment is not the assertion that subject and predicate are identical or equal, ¹ and that a 'judgment asserts the equality or sequence or position of two subjects and it surely does not say that both are the same' ² and Hobhouse goes a step forward. He criticises Lotze ³ who favours an identity judgment and quotes Hegel ⁴ to show that such a judgment is self contradictory, as it 'sets out to say something and ends precisely by saying nothing.' So he thinks that the "study of identical judgments belongs, together with tautology, not to logic, but to the pathology of thought" ⁵, So the very existence of the identity judgment is threatened. Let us examine the real worth of these objections, as applied against the vedantic position.

It should be first of all made clear that the vedantists do not claim identity as the general relation between the subject and the predicate of all judgments, against which view the criticism of Bradley, and also to certain extent that of Hobhouse are levelled. On the contrary, they do maintain, as would be evident from what has been said before, that most judgments do not signify identity. It is only a few judgments as illustrated above, which do so. The illustrations which Bradley as well as Hobhouse, take to show that there cannot be a relation of identity between the subject and the predicate of a proposition are :—"You are standing before me" "A is north of C" B follows D". "All Negroes are men" "Iron is a metal" "A is like "B" "Some men are black" "Body has extension" etc.....It will be seen at once that

1. Bradley, Logic. Vol. I p. 22.
2. Ibid. p. 26.
3. Lotze, Logic bk. I. Chap. ii, art 54.
4. Wissenschaft der Logik, bk. II.
5. 'Theory of Knowledge' p. 163.
6. Bradley, Logic Vol. I. pp. 22-23.
7. Hobhouse pp. 160-161.

the Vedantists also will join hands with these critics in maintaining that none of these judgments signify identity. But this does not, of course argue that there is no judgment which signifies identity.

How are we to understand a judgment like "A is identical with B"? We can, we hope, assume that no reasonable person will go to the absurd length of saying that such judgment is not possible or is meaningless. If so, if such a judgment can be seriously passed, what do we mean by the words "Identical with"? If a word is used for its meaning, then, we think, there is no other alternative but to confess that identity and nothing but identity is meant by the phrase. If however such a usage implies any slipshod method of speaking or thinking it has no place in philosophical criticism. For, the very presupposition of criticism or argument is the significant use of words. But it may be said that the proposition "A is identical with B" means only that there is one aspect from which "A is identical with B". But from other aspects A is also different from B. And if A was not any way different from B such a judgment would have been quite unnecessary; nay, it would have been not a judgment at all, but a tautology. There would have been, then, no meaning also in using two different terms A and B instead of one identical term A or B.

This method of argument is inspired by the so-called Hegelian conception of identity-in-difference which has been found to be the universal solvent in the reconciliation of all contradictions in Philosophy. But we confess, this method, with its cheap paradoxical phraseology casts only a mystic glamour over contradictions which are merely concealed and not explained. Let us see how. In the illustration. "A is identical with B", let us suppose that there is an element "m" common to both A and B so that A is equal to 'am' and B is equal to 'bm' and the proposition becomes on substitution "am is identical with 'bm'". It will be found that the proposition in its present form, inspite of the common element

being shown up, is not a whit nearer to the explanation of identity, than it was before. For if, there is the common element "*m*" on both sides ; there are also peculiar elements "*a*" and "*b*" which stand in the way of identity. So long as "*a*" and "*b*" are thought as real as "*m*" the only reasonable judgment can be one of similarity or even dissimilarity and not surely of identity. If so, judgments like—"Bradley, who is the author of 'Appearance and Reality' is the same or identical with Bradley, the author of 'Truth and Reality' would not have been possible. We would have instead, judgments like "Bradley, the author of Appearance and Reality is similar to Bradley the author of Truth and Reality". So that so long as difference is thought to exist *pari passu* with commonness, there cannot be any question of identity at all. Identity is possible only when difference has been effaced or negated. If the paradoxical expression 'identity-in-difference' means identical as different, we shall have no choice but to repeat the words of Hobhouse, that the study of such meaningful contradictions belongs 'not to logic, but to the pathology of thought'. The only rational meaning of this expression can be identity where there was apparent difference ; that is to say identity established by the sublation of apparent difference. It is true that identity always presupposes difference. But how ? Identity does not surely presuppose a difference that continues to be as real as identity. Identity presupposes difference, just as every negation presupposes a position or every position presupposes a negation ; without implying that both are equally real to thought.

A second objection may be raised. If the judgment "A is identical with B" implies no real difference between A and B, then the judgment is a mere tautology. The criticism of Hegel that such a judgment is contradictory as failing to assert something which it wanted to do, applies to it.

To this we have to reply that identity, as we have seen, implies difference. But it is not necessary or possible that this difference also should be thought to be true when

identity is asserted and for the particular purpose for which (or from the particular standpoint from which) identity is asserted. If difference also is thought to be real at that very time and for that very purpose or in that very respect, then judgment of identity would be impossible and unnecessary. The question of tautology is not peculiar to this kind of judgment alone. It is common to all judgments. As Hobhouse, himself has shown, the proposition "Some men are black" means nothing more than that only black men are black. The dog drinks also means that only the drinking dog and the dog while drinking drinks¹

The charge of tautology is due however, to a misconception as Hobhouse points out, as regards the function of a judgment. A judgment does neither add anything to reality nor does it take anything away from it. So metaphysically considered there is no novelty in a judgment. But judgment concerns *Knowledge* of reality; it is essentially a movement of thought; whatever was eternally real or even eternally false may be known to be so by the judging mind only now and in asserting it a judgment really achieves something new for *thought*. And therein lies the fulfilment of its humble mission. If this view of a judgment is able to explain away the charge of tautology brought against other judgments it does not fail in the case of an identity-judgment as well. For here, the movement of thought begins with difference as the starting point and ends by negating the difference and reaching identity as its terminus. In the judgment "A is identical with B" or "*a*m is identical with *b*m", the different determinants *a* and *b* are first thought to be as real as *m*. But in the end they are considered as nought, as only apparent, as unable to affect the identity of *m*. Hence through their sublation the identity of '*m*' alone is asserted. So much a Vākya (sentence or proposition) may be called akhandārthaka, (possessed of unitary meaning) as the

(1) Hobhouse—"Theory of knowledge" pp. 160.

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existence of a single content alone is asserted here and it is distinct from the ordinary type of judgments in which one ideal content is applied to another content, whether real or imaginary and the two different elements are related to one another. Such a judgment will be possible only when in any way the different determining elements a and b are somehow thought to be apparent and not capable of affecting the identity of "m". Such accidental and apparent determinants (or rather mere marks) have therefore to be distinguished from the real ones, which can modify the identity of the substantive they qualify. [In vedantic terminology they are called upalaksanas, whereas the ordinary determinants are called visesanas.]

We may come now to the second type of non-relational propositions (akhandārthaka vākyas). They are as mentioned already, sentences containing the knowledge of a single object through definition or description. The definition of an object it will be at once said, is to show its relation to its genus and other co-ordinate species. A description also contains relation of an object to various other things. How then can the meaning of such a sentence be non-relational? To this we have to reply that we must distinguish between the end that a judgment is out to achieve and the means through which that end is achieved. The import or meaning of a proposition is constituted not by the means but by the end, that is attained by the judgment expressed by that proposition. If this be not granted, then we cannot even distinguish between a positive judgment and a negative one, such as A is B and A is not B , (which differ only in respect of their respective ends—position and negation—the terms and relations being all identical). Now the definitive or descriptive proposition in question, may express relation of the unknown object to other objects. But the end wanted to be achieved by such a proposition is not to show relations but to show the object as it is, relation being used only as means to that end. So the import of such a proposition cannot be said to be relational. We have

already mentioned that the illustration used by the vedāntists for this purpose is a proposition defining the moon, namely: "The moon is the most resplendent (body)." Now this sentence is spoken not to express any relation of the moon to anything else but to indicate which the moon is. At first sight it would seem that in this sentence an adjective (namely 'the most resplendent') is attributed to a substantive (i.e. the moon). But really it is not so. A quality can be predicated of a substantive, only when the substantive is already known. But here the substantive itself is unknown. Besides, the enquirer does not want to know what the moon is, i. e. what quality it possesses, but which the moon is i. e. which particular object it is. So the answer, to be relevant to the question, can only say which it is and not what it is.

It may be said that as an object without any attribute i. e. characteristic cannot be known, because without a distinguishing mark it cannot be differentiated from other objects of its kind, the knowledge of quality or attribute is necessary even for the knowledge of an object as it is. To this we reply that it is really necessary to use some distinguishing attribute even to point out an object. And it is exactly for this purpose that the adjective "the most resplendent" has been used. But it only comes to this, that such a sentence points out the object only through the help of a distinguishing attribute. So it does not mean that the import of the sentence is either to predicate an attribute of the object or to relate the object to any other object. So if we bear in mind the definite purpose of the sentence, the end it tries to achieve as distinct from the means, we have no choice but to admit that the sentence means only one single unrelated element. Though the sentence taken by itself can mean a relation between a substantive and adjective, yet when interpreted with reference to the motive of the speaker (and the question asked) it has to be taken in a modified sense (to suit the particular purpose) as meaning only the object inquired about and no relation. So such a vākya, also can be said to be akhandāarthaka.

While conceding all that has been said above, the objection may yet be raised that such a definitive or descriptive sentence as asserting only an isolated content—a mere identity—is a mere verbal expression, it is no judgment. As Hobhouse says:—"There may be mental acts which predicate mere identity. There are such acts; every circular definition is an instance; but they are not judgments; they are simply the verbal expression of an attempt to make a judgment which has failed" ¹ As the writer does not illustrate his statement, it is not quite clear what sort of definitions he has in view. But as for the definitive sentences we have given above, we may say that whether they can be said to contain any judgment or not would depend entirely on the conception of judgment. If it is held that the attribution of one content of thought to another is the essential requisite of a judgment, then of course, such sentences as containing no such characterisation, are by definition barred from being judgments. But if we refuse to make the definition of a judgment so arbitrarily narrow, and consider, as some philosophers have done, any proposition of which truth or falsity can be significantly predicated, as containing a judgment, then these definitive sentences also can be said to contain judgment. Of a mere verbal expression, we can predicate only grammatical correctness or incorrectness and not truth or falsity. ²

The common view in Indian logic that every vākya must contain a uddesya and vidheya, as well as the common western theory that every proposition must contain a subject and a predicate in a substantive-adjective relation, are based on a faulty generalisation from the vast majority of cases where such a relation really holds. But this theory neglects the small minority of cases, where as we have seen such a relation is not present. But even this wrong theory has struck such deep roots into the mind, that when the neglected refractory cases are shown, rather than the long cherished theory be sacrificed or modified to include the new cases,

(1) Hobhouse "Theory of knowledge". pp 162-3.

(2) Vide Jonson's logic p, 1 Vol. I.

the gordian knot is cut by declaring these cases to be merely verbal and not genuine enough to call for any reconsideration. We have observed how some modern western logicians, like Russell, have tried to expose the folly of such a philosophic conservatism. We have also shown how in India the vedantists also from a different point of view fought against the absolutism of this orthodox dogma and tried to establish the genuineness of the akhandārthaka vākyas. We shall end this discussion with a short reflection on an important point that will go to justify the vedantic contention.

In all judgments, containing a subject and a predicate one content is applied to or attributed to or referred to or related to another. Whether such a judgment is positive (S is P) or negative (S is not P) the ground is the same, namely, P is referrible to or relatable to S. We have before our mind a possible relation between P and S and the relation is either affirmed or denied, giving rise to the entire series of judgments of the subject-predicate form. So the ground of all propositions of the subject-predicate form is "P is referrible or relatable to S". If so what to say of all propositions of which the ground is "P is not referrible to S"? The negative judgments of this class have to be distinguished from those of the former class. The illustrations of the former class would be "The flower is not white", "The square is not big" whereas the illustrations of the latter class would be "The flower is not honest" "The square is not circular" "The rope is not a serpent". [The vedantic texts where qualities and relations are denied of Brahman should also come under this second class.]

It will be remembered that Hegel¹ notices this distinction and calls the former class of judgment simply negative and the latter negatively-infinite. But he thinks that the latter are absurd. He thus observes:—"Examples of the latter are: 'The mind is no elephant' 'A lion is no table'

(1) Wallace—"The Logic of Hegel" p 306.

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propositions which are correct but absurd, exactly like the identical propositions 'A lion is lion' and 'Mind is mind'. Consequently he holds that "the negatively infinite judgment in which the subject has no relation whatever to the predicate, gets its place in the Formal Logic solely as non-sensical curiosity".¹

As against such criticism we have to say, that such propositions are not altogether meaningless or non-sensical. The very fact that an infinitely negative judgment is distinguished from other classes of judgments is a proof that they are neither absurd nor meaningless in which case the author's statement would have been absurd and meaningless. As we said in a previous connection, the non-existence of a relation or even the frustration of an attempted relation may be the objective of the speaker as much as the affirmation of a relation. So a proposition which has such an objective is as full of meaning as any other. As Hobhouse observes :—"It is not always absurd to deny a connection between things so remote that no connection between them should be conceivable. 'The soul is not an attenuated gaseous substance' there is a stage of intelligence at which that denial is worth making however superfluous it may seem latter on"²

But it may be urged that even the rejection of a relation presupposes its possible affirmation and without it the negation would be useless though not meaningless. To this we may say that it is true that the negatively infinite judgment in which relation is rejected, logically presupposes a possible or suggested relation. But it does not mean that the presupposition of the judgment is identical with its immediate import or objective ; if it were so, the import of an affirmative judgment would be negation and that of a negative judgment, affirmation. Neither does it mean that the presupposed possibility of a relation should be real. The possibility may be merely subjective and illusory

(1) *Ibid.*

(2) Theory of knowledge. p. 154-5.

and the negation would thus be highly useful as representing the correction of an error, possible or actual.

To sum up the results of this paper, we may say that the general Indian view of a proposition as consisting of a subject and a predicate, related in the substantive-adjective way resembles the general western theory of a proposition. Again just as some western thinkers take exception to the universality of this subject-predicate relation, so some Indian thinkers also (namely the Vedantists) raise the same objection. But whereas the former prove their thesis by showing that the subject-predicate relation fails in the cases of propositions expressing relations between two or more contents, the vedantists, on the contrary disproves the universality of the subject-predicate relation (Uddesya-vidheya Sambandha) by pointing out the existence of some propositions such as those expressing an identity or those expressing some definition. When the object of the speaker is to assert one unitary content and not any relation of the subject-predicate (i. e. substantive-adjective) type or of any other type whatsoever. We have tried to adduce a few arguments of our own in support of the vedantic views. The most fatal objection that can be raised against the vedantins would perhaps be to say that a vakya expressing a bare identity or a definition is a sentence that cannot be strictly called a proposition containing any real judgment. All would depend however on the definition of a proposition (or a judgment). If it be held that a proposition must express a relation between two contents, the vedantic illustrations of non-relational proposition are ruled out as being no proposition at all, *ex hypothesi*. But similarly one may hold that a proposition must contain a substantive-adjective (or subject-predicate) relation and can thereupon rule out propositions, shown by Russell as containing no such relation, as no real propositions at all. But we believe that nothing but hasty generalisation can lead us so arbitrarily to narrow the denotation of a proposition so as to exclude these exceptional types

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of propositions as illustrated either by the vedantists or by Russell. If a proposition or a judgment be conceived as a piece of thought of which truth or falsity can be predicated, all these different types can be included under the term and then the vedantic classification of a proposition into those expressing a relation and those not doing so, becomes highly useful and significant.

Sat Karyavada of Sāṃkhya

[An Exposition.]

Shyama Ch. Chatterji.

This doctrine of Sāṃkhya, as the very name implies, affirms the existence (*satta*) of the effect (*kārya*) even before the causal operation, but only in an unmanifested form. Production of effect does not mean any creation of a new thing in the sense that something that was not existing before comes into being ; —it implies only the manifestation of what was before in an unmanifested or potential form. The causal operation only serves to render manifest what was formerly in an unmanifested form. The oil exists in the sesamum, the statue in the marble stone—but only in a potential form and causation means only the manifestation of that which was unmanifested before.

This theory of causation is really based on the Sāṃkhya theory of Prakṛti which is supposed to be in eternal flux. "The total energy remains the same while the world is constantly evolving and cause and effect are only more or less evolved forms of the same ultimate energy. The sum of effects exists in the sum of causes in a potential form. The grouping or collocation alone changes and this brings on the manifestation of the latent powers of the guṇas but without creation of anything new".

In going to establish this theory of *Sat Kārya*, Sāṃkhya refers first to the Buddhists who adhered to the doctrine of production of an entity from a non-entity. The Buddhists, also, we may observe, believed in change but with them there was no background to this change. So they could only affirm that there were changes and not that this changed into that. With Sāṃkhya, however, it is the Prakṛti that changes so that there remains something at the background that remains throughout the same in the midst of all changes. The reals, the guṇas persist all the same, change being only of the groupings or collections of the reals which are them-

selves unchangeable. According to the Buddhists, however, there was no underlying permanent *dharma* or substance so that causation according to them meant the coming into being of a previous non-existent thing. Sāṃkhya controverts this and holds that cause is an entity in which the effect subsists in a latent form. The sprout is, indeed, consequent upon the destruction of the seed but it cannot for this reason be held that cause is a non-entity. What can truly be called the cause is not the destruction but the seed itself.

Reference is then made to the Vedānta view which declares only the cause to be real and the effect or effects to be unreal or illusory (*Satkārana vāda*). But Sāṃkhya disposes of this illusory conception of the world and asserts that we have no rational positive ground for disbelieving this external world of changes. And Sāṃkhya insists on the view that both cause and effect are entities,—real and not illusory.

The Naiyāyikas argue that if effect is to be existing even before the causal operation, effectuation would be meaningless and that the production of that which was existing before is simply absurd and that consequently, production, to have any meaning must refer to that which was non-existent. This doctrine of Nyāya is known as the *asatkārya vāda* or the *ārambhavāda*—the doctrine of epigenesis or the creative process of reality that goes on adding fresh aspects to itself. But this we must admit does violence to our notion that the less can be derived from the more and not that the more from the less. And Sāṃkhya holds that a nonentity can never be brought into existence. What is non-existent can never be made to exist. Blue cannot be made yellow even by a thousand artists. And also, it will not do if existence and nonexistence were made only the properties of a thing, say of a pot, because in this case, the pot being endowed with the property of nonexistence will simply be non-existent and as such must be devoid of all positive characters.

Sāṃkhya further stresses the determinate relation between the cause and the effect. Causation refers to a kind

of relation between cause and effect but there can be no such relation if the effect were non-existent, all talks of the subsistence of any relation of anything with something non-existent being simply nonsense. So that if we ascribe any sense to causation we must speak of it as a relation and so must grant the existence of the effect. And it cannot be said that there is no such determinate relation because in that case it will lead to the position that anything can come out from anything, which is manifestly absurd. This conception of a determinate relation between the cause and the effect goes equally against the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas. The *asatkāranavāda* of the Buddhists will lead us to the position that a particular thing can be derived from anything and not from any definite thing; and the *ārambhavāda* of the Naiyāyikas will lead to the position that a particular thing can cause any effect. But both these two positions are according to Sāṃkhya, absurd. Sāṃkhya, thereupon lays down that causal efficiency belongs to that which has the necessary potency i.e. a competent cause only can produce an effect for which it is competent.

It is further asserted that the effect is of the same nature as the cause. The cloth is not different from its constituent threads in its essence. There can be no causal relation between objects that are essentially different, say between cloth and jar. Cloth and thread, Sāṃkhya holds are not different because the relations of conjunction (*Samyoga*) and non-contiguity (*aprāpti*) which subsist between things that are different do not subsist between them. There are, of course, differences but these do not contradict one another and as such are not insuperable barriers in the way of a causal relation between things or events.

To make clear this *parināmavāda* as distinguished from the *ārambhavāda* Sāṃkhya adduces the example of a tortoise. The tortoise draws out and draws in its limbs but from this it cannot be argued that the limbs are produced or destroyed—they only appear and disappear but

do not begin or cease to exist at any point of time. Similarly the effect comes to manifestation but this does not mean that it is produced anew—its has only appeared and has manifested itself.

But it is argued that it must be granted that this manifestation or appearance itself is, prior to the operation of the cause, either an entity or a nonentity. If it is a nonentity, then we affirm the production of a nonentity and this was so long being denied. And if it is an entity then we cease altogether to speak of causal agency. And, of course, no manifestation of this manifestation is possible because that will lead to an infinite regress.

Sāmkhya here retorts in an indirect way and tasks those who subscribe to the theory of production what production itself is—an entity or a nonentity and shows that they also fare no better. If production be an entity, we do away with the causal agency. And if production be a nonentity we shall have to fall back on the production of that production and so on *ad infinitum*. It may, of course, be said that production refers but to the cloth itself but if it were so, there would have been no sense in speaking of cloth as produced or cloth as destroyed because in the one case we affirm a tautology and in the other we are led to a contradiction.

Hence Sāmkhya argues that the effect is an entity and really exists beforehand in the cause. And this is known as the *Satkāryavāda*—the theory of the effect as existent. 'The cause and the effect are the undeveloped and developed states of one and the same substance. All production is development (*udbhava*) and destruction is envelopment (*anudbhava*) or disappearance into the cause." There are no creation and annihilation but only evolution (*āvirbhāva*) and involution (*tirobhāva*).

Philosophical Periodicals.

Mind Vol. XXXVII No. 148, October ; 1928

Contents:—**C. A. Strong**—*The continuity of space & time ; John wisdom*—*McTaggart's determining correspondance of substance : a refutation ; R. M. Blake*—*On McTaggart's criticism of propositions ; Richard Robinson*—*Cook Wilson's view of the origin of "Judgment."*

C. A. Strong has discussed the problem of the relation between points of space and extension, between instants of time and duration. The dilemma is that if we conceive the durations and the instants as mutually external, and the latter as merely bounding the former, we are forced either to lodge the real in the instants, and so deprive it of the benefit of enduring, or to lodge it in the durations, and so deprive it of the power of ever being a present.

The nature of continuity has usually been discussed with special reference to space, and the application then made to time. But, Strong thinks it advantageous to consider the continuity of time first. His view rests on the following points (1) The Present, since it alone is ever real, is *not a mere boundary*. It is not extended temporally (i.e. it does not endure), but neither is it empty. It is one of the constituent parts of time. (2) The Present cannot of course be two or more instants, but only one. But since, at that instant, all earlier instants are past and no longer real, and all later instants are future and not yet real, the present instant must be *distinct* from all other instants.

(3) Since the instants come in single file, and since future instants are farther away from and others nearer to the present, there must be one future instant which is nearest to the present, or *next* to it.

(4) Instants which are next to each other may be said to be *joined* and the connection which binds them together may be called a *Junction*. Instants which are not next to each other are dis-joined by intervening instants.

In the case of space four similar points may be made out (1) The reality of points (2) Their distinctness from one another (3) The nextness of a point to certain others, that is, the existence of junctions between them, and (4) The disjunction of the point from all other points.

Juncticons must be rightly conceived. If two points are next to each other there is no place between them. Junction is a bond that includes and not a boundary that separates. Junction is between the points only in the sense "in which friendship is between friends."

Extensions do not lie outside the points, but include them, each smallest extension consisting of two adjacent points. In the same way a duration does not lie outside of, and externally connect, two sequent presents, but consists of them in their immediate sequence. Thus joined, the two presents form an infinitesimal duration, an infinite number of infinitesimal durations—or (to analyse to the end) of instants with temporal junctions between them—form a finite interval of time; and finite intervals, similarly joined (and they cannot possibly be joined except in thought), form all time.

According to Strong, there is nothing between two successive instants. Not an interval of time because both of them are necessary to form the smallest interval of time. Not an instant, for, if there were an instant between them, they would not be next to each other! There is nothing between them except their distinctness and temporality. next-ness and these are between them only in the sense in which friendship is between friends.

For proving the reality of infinitesimals, Strong refers to the fact that the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle, whose sides are unity, is measured by $\sqrt{2}$ —and yet is real; and that the circumference of a circle, though as real as the diameter, is measured by π .

Strong traces the doctrine of the unreality of points and instants to its source, which according to him is, the fallacious empirist theory of perception.

Among the philosophical consequences of Strong's theory, the first that claims notice is that the analysis into points and instants explains satisfactorily why Mathematics applies to Nature. It applies because Nature is at bottom, in one aspect, number.

The universe is indeed a whole, on this theory; but the whole has unity only for a mind that conceives it; apart from human thought, its wholeness consists solely in the junctions that bind its parts together. Similarly, relations between non-adjacent parts of space and of time have no existence in nature, but are sums made by human minds thinking of Nature, and, if the sums have been correctly made, possessed of truth.

D.G. Vinod.

R. M. Blake—

The second chapter of 'the Nature of Existence' contains an elaborate argument against the reality of something which McTaggart calls propositions. R. M. Blake wishes to point in his article, that despite McTaggart's polemic, he does explicitly admit that there are propositions, in a certain sense of the term; but that he nevertheless betrays a very strong reluctance to state his theory of truth and falsity in terms of this admission—a reluctance which can only be explained by the fear that if propositions are admitted at all, they will turn out to be of a sort the reality of which he wishes to deny.

Blake observes that it *may* be that Mc Taggart was not really concerned to deny that there are propositions of the sort which he *apparently* wished particularly to avoid, but only to deny that there are propositions of still another sort. And with regard to this sort of propositions Blake *argues* that even if they were in fact the only sort of propositions *that* he really intended to deny, it is nevertheless clear that he *has* no right to make even this denial.

Blake proceeds upon the assumption that when Mc Taggart holds that every belief asserts that it corresponds to some fact what he means is that every belief asserts the proposition that itself, as a psychical state, corresponds to a certain fact. Even on this interpretation McTaggart does not succeed in avoiding the admission of propositions of the sort that he is concerned to deny. But, what McTaggart himself comes to state what he means by saying that every belief asserts that it corresponds to some fact he explains himself quite otherwise, as follows: "This only means that to believe anything means to believe it to be true." And this clearly implies that every belief asserts *not* that it, as a psychical state, is true; but rather that what it asserts, i.e. the proposition asserted, is true. If this interpretation is carried out "in the case of two timelessly true beliefs "in the same thing," we shall clearly be led quite directly to the conclusion that there are not only timeless, and therefore, independent, propositions, but also that some of these propositions are themselves timelessly *true*.

Mc Taggart, it might be argued, is not concerned to deny that there *are* true and false propositions, or even that there are timelessly true and false and therefore in a sense, 'independent' propositions, provided only it be allowed that every such proposition either has been, is now being, or is going to be asserted in some actual beliefs so that all such propositions are "real as constituents of beliefs, and not otherwise." He merely wants to deny, it might be held, that there are in addition

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to propositions of this sort, independent propositions of another sort which are such as never to get themselves asserted in any belief whatsoever, and to which, therefore no belief can ever do more than "correspond."

But thinks Blake, even if this was all that Mc Taggart intended to deny, it seems quite impossible for him to do so. For (1) McTaggart has produced no positive ground for denying that there are propositions of this sort. Moreover (2) it is difficult to understand, how, McTaggart can have supposed that propositions, that are independent of beliefs in any sense, would if they were real at all have to be non-existent; and should have felt constrained to reject them. For (a) it is by no means evident that the mere fact that some or all propositions are independent of beliefs would constitute any reason for declaring that such propositions must be non-existent. Indeed, it would seem that in order to be non-existent, propositions would, have to be independent not merely of beliefs but of any *existent* thing whatever, "since it is impossible that a constituent of an existent thing should not itself exist." Moreover (b) on McTaggart's own view propositions are composed of characteristics; and there are no non-existent characteristics. Finally (3) if propositions always consist simply of one or more characteristics, and if it be admitted that there are characteristics which neither have been, nor are now being, nor are ever going to be asserted in any belief whatsoever (and McTaggart would not be prepared to deny this), then it will seem to follow directly that there are propositions which are, in the fullest sense of the term "independent" of beliefs.

D. G. Vinod.

Richard Robinson.

Cook Wilson is frequently concerned to show that the notion of judgment is false, but never to show how it arises and why it has such a hold. Richard Robinson, in discussing Cook Wilson's view of the origin of 'judgment' makes a point, which he thinks Cook Wilson would agree to, though he has failed to make it. The point is that notion of judgment is not a reasoned conclusion but an assumption. We fall into the habit of talking about 'judgments' unconsciously, and not because we have been driven by our own or other people's arguments to believe in their existence. The notion of judgment is an *assumption* only, which means *behaving* upon some belief reached without reasoning.

The outstanding circumstance which inclines us to fall into this error is, says Cook Wilson, the fact of *Statement*. Modern logicians make the mere statement do the function of judgment, that is they think if a statement is possible a corresponding thought also must be possible, and they also take for granted that all such thoughts which correspond to statements are of the same kind and genus. But statements proceed from different kinds of thinking. What is known, perceived, supposed or believed may be expressed in an identical verbal form; and again, it is not true that, to each separate statement a separate thought must always correspond.

Robinson thinks that Cook Wilson takes judgments to be assumptions, though he does not so clearly state it. But an objection may be raised to Robinson's interpretation of Cook Wilson. It may be argued that Cook Wilson does not take the notion of judgment to be an assumption but a definite view that statements mean thoughts. But Robinson says that Cook Wilson is always concerned with pointing out the falsity of the *judgment*, and never undertakes to consider the problem of its origin for its own sake, and if he had done it he would have accepted that judgments are assumptions.

A second objection may be raised that Cook Wilson might be taking judgments as assumptions but assumptions which are not, in the sense, of behaving on *blind beliefs* but assumptions reached by a *decision* that statements mean thoughts. But Robinson states against this objection that Cook Wilson has never given grounds for such an objection. Cook Wilson never ascribes to any one a decisive view that statements mean thoughts.

The belief that our knowledge of the conclusion is something separate from the act of inferring it arises out of the fact that we habitually state the conclusion by itself, without stating the premises, and, without putting a 'therefore' in front of the conclusion. But, why should this habit—the habit of stating facts which we have learnt by inference without reference to the facts that they are conclusions—result in the false theory that the conclusion can be known by itself? Obviously because we assume that what can be stated separately can be thought separately—in other words because we assume the parallelism between statement and thought which has been said to be Cook Wilson's view of the nature of the assumption of judgment. So that it is not the false view of inference which causes the assumption of judgment, but the assumption of the judgment that causes the false view of inference.

D. G. Vinod.

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Ramanuja's Idea of the Finite Self.

By

P. N. Srinivasachari, M. A.

Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd., pp. 124.. Price Rs. 3.

Ramanuja occupies a prominent place among Indian philosophers. As was the case with all the classical philosophers of India, Ramanuja wrote in Sanskrit, and all the authoritative works on his system are still to be found in Sanskrit. There are a few good books in Indian vernaculars which explain the main principles of his system; but the number of books in English on the philosophy of Ramanuja is yet very small. We therefore welcome very heartily the publication of this little book by Prof. Srinivasachari. It will serve, we are sure, a very useful purpose as an introduction to the system of Ramanuja. The book is divided into following six chapters. (i) Introduction (ii) *Prakara* as the Logical ego. (iii) *Prakara* as the Ethical Ego. (iv) *Prakara* as *Sarira* of *Isvara*. v. Religious significance of the *Prakara* as *Bhakta* and *Prapanna*. vi. Conclusion.

By *Prakara* is meant the individual self conceived as an adjective (viseshana) of god. When we apply to reality the logical categories, o cause and effect, substance and qualities, and whole and parts, we have to take the individual as the effect (upadeya), the quality (viseshana) or the part (amsa) of the absolute which stands to the individual in the corresponding position of cause, substance or whole. The logical view has got a tendency to reduce the individual to the states of a vanishing mode or an illusion. This tendency is corrected by the ethical view which regards the finite self as a 'means' (sesha) to the divine purpose or as a servant (Dasa) of the Lord. But even in the ethical view the relation between God and man is somewhat external. This defect is removed by considering the finite self as part of the body of God. Persons are not mere bodies; they are certainly selves with regard to their bodies. But as God is the self of our selves, we can be regarded as the body of God. This in brief, is the view of the finite self which is presented in this book.

Prof. Srinivasachari writes with understanding and devotion and sometime, with eloquence. His familiarity with Western philosophy is evident almost on every page. But we are at times doubtful whether the language of western idealism, which he very frequently uses, is always a safe vehicle for the precise expression of delicate ideas taken from Indian philosophy. However Prof. Srinivasachari has always tried to make his meaning clear; he has given wherever possible sanskrit equivalents of English terms used by him. This will guard the reader against any possible misunderstanding. We commend this book to all students of Indian philosophy.

R. Das..

Kthakopanashad. Sanskrit Text with English metrical version. Explanatory Notes and glossary. By D. Venkataramiah, B. A. L. F. Macmillan and co. Ltd. pp. 67.

The translation, although in verse, appears to be very faithful. The exhaustive glossary at the end of the book has enhanced the value of the book. Anyone with a very elementary knowledge of Sanskrit will be able to make use of this little book as a suitable introduction to the literature of ancient Indian philosophy. In the introduction the author has briefly explained the nature of *Samsara*, the nature of self and the nature of Liberation (*moksha*) from the advaitic point of view. The explanatory notes are also very useful. The get up of the book is excellent.

R. Das.

Karma Yoga

By Jogi Bhikshu,

Yogi Publication Society, Chicago U. S. A.

Indian Agent :—Latent Light Culture.

Tinneveli India.

The book consists of eleven lessons in what is called the yogi Philosophy of Thought-Use and the Yogi Philosophy of Work. The lessons are intended for the English speaking people of the world. At the end of each lesson a *mantra* is given, for example, "Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law" (lesson II). After giving at the beginning a sort of historical account of Karma yoga, the author proceeds to dwell on the danger of doubt and significance of faith, which according to him, is the necessary antecedent of Karma. Karma analysed following the Gita into five factors, viz. Adhishthana Bhokta, Cheshta, Karana and Daiva. Karma is said to be universal. Karma is thought and thought is a constant function in the universe. It is further, pointed out that detachment is the essence of Karma yoga. The noteworthy example of Karmayogins is Janaka the Emperor of Mithila. Karmayogi, it is suggested, may live as kings do. He may serve humanity if he likes but it is not obligatory. Helping humanity is a nice thing, but the feeling of the desire to help humanity is itself a limitation and a drag just as bad as any other (p. 120).

The style is simple but the treatment of the topics is not lucid and the reading makes a staccato effect on the mind.

The book gives a very general and somewhat vague idea of the philosophy of Karma Yoga.

D. G. H.

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"What is it that differentiates metaphysics from other branches of philosophy?" asks Edmund Holmes in his article, "Philosophy without metaphysics". Not the desire "to think about and comprehend reality," but the desire to do the business of thinking "properly" and "strictly" in accordance with "the principles of thought's own distinctive working." (Bradley)

By thinking Bradley means intellectual thinking. Intellect is most at home in pure Mathematics, and where the objects of thought are abstractions, and symbols take the place of words. In Inductive Logic we start with experience and end with experience. The metaphysician has no use of Inductive Logic.

In Bradley's description of the Absolute, there is one word which stultifies all its attributes, the word—Infinite. It is in mathematics that pure thought (so far as thought can be pure) is in its happiest mood and does its best work. The Infinity of the mathematician is the analogue of the "ultimate Reality" of the metaphysician. And Bradley's name for ultimate Reality is the Absolute. The Infinite is that which eternally eludes us by eternally retiring into and beyond itself.

The Metaphysician's Logic is dominated by the Law of Contradiction and its satellites is the logic of Being, not of Becoming. If Being could resolve itself into Becoming, the Law of Contradiction would cease to

operate ; for we should then understand that the world is for ever changing its identity, that at any given moment it both is and is not itself. The Logic of Being, with its demand for internal consistency, freezes the world into complete immobility, the immobility of perfection.

Holmes concludes that philosophy must disentangle itself from Metaphysics if its quest of wisdom is not to miscarry at the outset.

THE INNER MORALITY OF ART.

Morality in relation to art is usually understood as a quality outside art itself ; as a conformity of the work of art—be it picture or poem—to ethical Laws, or to public or social morality. This conception gives rise to two literary and artistic currents. The one, 'Art for art's sake' repudiates in art all moral bonds and principles ; the other would make art serve a moral purpose, thus depriving it of all autonomy.

Morality is not a law outside human life. It is primarily an inner law. Man is an indivisible whole. Truth is intrinsically moral ; and beauty also. Truth in relation to man has one inherent purpose—that of transforming itself into good—and this is the intrinsic morality of Truth—in the same way beauty in relation to man transforms itself into good. All reality exists for man, in function of the good, whether knowledge of the stars as revealed by the telescope or joy in a beautiful landscape.

The sense of decency is both a safeguard and a psychic limitation of the sexual instinct, and it develops spontaneously into a moral factor in the standard of individual and social conduct. With differences of degree, it is also a limit of the expressiveness of a work of art which reproduces the human form. This theory applies also to poetry.

D. G. Vinod.

Contents:—**L. P. Chambers:**—*The search for certainty*; **Charles W. Morris:**—*Neo-pragmatism and the Ways of Knowing*; **A. K. Majumdar:**—*A Personalistic Conception of nature*; **Paul Weiss:**—*Relativity in Logic*; **Charles M. Attlee:**—*Egoism*; **Joseph Ratner:**—*The Foundations of Adler's Ethical Philosophy*; **Paul Crissman:**—*Dewey's Theory of the moral Good*; **William F. Clarke:**—*The Idea of God in a Philosophy of events*; **J. K. Kantor:**—*Can psychology contribute to the study of Linguistics.*

THE SEARCH FOR CERTAINTY.

Mr. Chambers says that the search for laws governing the relations of phenomena constitutes the motive of science and philosophy, that not by analysis but by synthesis; not by discovering parts but by tracing relations, can we come by any useful knowledge. And if philosophy is not content, as are the particular sciences, to limit its investigations to fairly well delimited fields, but insists on taking the whole of reality as its field, it is for the very good reason that even the particular sciences do not really restrain their own thinking within the narrow limits, they seem to set to themselves. For man needs not only to bring his scientific, his historical, his ethical and his other *interests* into some sort of unity *within* themselves, but also to establish some sort of unity *between* these interests, when they seem to conflict. He who would act coherently and think coherently must needs seek coherence in the world in which he lives.

If the degree of coherence which it introduces into experience is the test of Truth of any proposition, scientific theory, or system of philosophy, it would follow that absolute truth would be attained only in that Absolute or completed Experience in which all the particulars of actual and possible experience would be given their proper place.

Speculative philosophy affirms, first, that even in the confusion of unsystematized experience we are in direct, though fragmentary, contact with reality; and, secondly, that since the confusion we feel is due to this fragmentariness, it is to be removed by tracing connections between

the various bits of reality actually given. Reality is not a distant goal ; a 'first or 'final' cause, to be discovered at the end of an endless search, but it is the unity of the experience that now is ; and as I attain to more of unity and coherence, do I attain to a more adequate knowledge of reality.

Certainty, then, in one sense of the word, is not a goal to be arrived at. We are always certain in that whatever experience we have is a real experience. But certainty in another sense of the word, the certainty whereby I can pass from one experience to another—this is something to be sought, and this can be had in discovering ever wider ranges of coherence in our universe.

RELATIVITY IN LOGIC.

One of the most interesting suggestions made in connection with modern symbolic Logic has been put forward by Prof. C. I. Lewis. For him, there is not one but many possible systems of Logic ; each valid within its own domain. A somewhat similar attitude towards logic, though based on different grounds, has been expressed by Santayana in his recent *realms of essence*.

It is by the discussion of the primitive ideas of (1) Implication and (2) Truth and falsity, that Paul Weiss has tried to show some grounds for the possibility of more than one systems of logic. In the first part of his article on relativity in Logic he has made a distinction between two fundamental types of Logics. In the second part, he discusses the necessity for a propositional analysis of logic and has tried to offer a justification for the generalization of the concepts *proposition* and *truth* and *falsity*. In the third part he has presented a schema for the ready apprehension of the nature of one of the Logics discussed in part one.

The differentiation between kinds of implication makes it possible to speak of accidental and necessary Logics. "Principia" of Russell and Whitehead belongs to the accidental Logic. Lewis' and MacColl's systems belong to the necessary Logic. The systems of both Whitehead and Russell and of Lewis treat of (1) the Truth and falsity of (2) propositions and what is derived from propositions by a process of generalization. In Lewis' system as well as that of MacColl's a third truth-value is introduced, that of impossibility, which when combined with the other two gives an infinite number of possible truth-values. The accidental propositional Logics, so far developed, all restrict themselves to only two truth-values, defined as mutually exclusive, expressing the truth or falsity of any proposition treated. They are what C. S. Peirce would call dichotomic Logics.

There is no necessity for a systematic Logic to restrict itself to two truth values, or if only two are considered, to the two values truth and falsity. Passing over the first point which is one of the bases for the systems of Mac Coll and Lewis, and referring only to the two truth-values accepted in the other systems, it should be evident that any two properties defined as mutually exclusive would do just as well as truth and falsity for the purposes of a symbolic Logic. The truth that concerns Logic is not the truth of its elements but the truth of a tautology.

Implication, when not defined only as a necessary relation holding in any context, may introduce relativity in Logic. Relativity in Logic is relativity in notation or in the definition of implication. The fact that the familiar laws of logic (Contradiction, Excluded Middle etc.) are invoked to permit the discrimination between elements, values, functions, etc. points to an Absolute Logic over and above the symbolic statements. One can never include in the system the principles of conditions which determine it. This is one of the real meanings of the theory of types, and is as old as Aristotle. Relativity in Logic does not mean, therefore, a Schiilerian scepticism, but simply a freedom in choice of expression.

THE IDEA OF GOD IN A PHILOSOPHY OF EVENTS.

William F. Clarke, raises the question whether in a philosophy where the only real is the infinite texture of events ; and where objects eternal or temporal, are but qualities—aspects of events, can there be any room for the idea of God—a God who acts and is and makes a difference in lives of men !

Events require space and time and objects for their occurrence. These are the characters of events, and without them events could not occur. But without events time, space and objects would disappear into nothingness. Even if God is a necessary ingredient in events, then events are a necessary ground for the actualization of God. God abstracted from events becomes an empty name.

In the philosophy of events God is never a self-sustaining entity moving in the interstices of events. Consciousness, memory, insight, foresight, power; and self directing will ; all perfect in and through eternal experience ; together with an infinite capacity for love and joy in action, would give us all we mean by God—not a distant contemplative God, not a God who is just the sum of all that goes on, but God who is the immanent life—the full meaning—of infinitely complex “divine” event which is the perduring universe,

D. G. Vinod,

Contents:—*Value Primarily a Psychological conception ; Prof. Mary Whiton Calkins.* II. *The confusion of the concept ; Prof. Wm. McDougall.* III. *The Marriage of Universals (II) ; G. R. G. Mure.* IV. *Ethics, Psychology & Sociology ; Principal Alfred E. Garvic.* (V). *A century of Philosophy at University College London ; Prof. G. Dawes Hicks.* VI. *Philosophy of Social Life ; C. Delish Burns.* VII. *The non-existence of Matter ; C. E. M Goad.*

Prof. Mary Calkins in her article 'Value : Primarily a Psychological conception' says that the conception of value is mean to be either objective i.e. realistic or subjective i.e. psychological. Then she proposes to examine critically the theory of the objective type. The theory defines value as 'an indefinable quality which attaches to things independently of consciousness'. The fundamental objection to such a theory is (1) that beauty or goodness cannot be said to exist or experienced as existing qualities like extension, colour &c. ; (2) and again there are no distinctive correlates for those values in terms of external stimuli. In sharp opposition to this objective theory of values is the subjective theory of values of Spinoza. Things are valuable, according to him, because we desire them. According to Prof. Alexander also value is born along with the act of appreciation. This subjective theory of values does not always imply an idealistic theory of metaphysic. For Perry says that the being of things may be independent of a subject, but therefore not their value.

After this, Prof. Mary Calkins proceeds to defend the subjective theory of value by analysing in detail the nature of experience called 'valuing'. All the modern writers agree in this that valuing is not primarily a cognitive sort of consciousness. They either define it as feeling, or willing or affirming (belief) experience separately emphasising each, or some say that valuing experience is the combination of feeling or willing with affirmation and so on.

Then Prof. Mary Calkins says that her own theory is much affiliated to the foregoing theories with the difference that it does not identify valuation with feeling or will, or with feeling and will together ; or with feeling fused with willing and affirmation together. Rather it regards

all these to be three distinct types of valuing occurring either singly or in combination. Then the professor tries to show that her doctrine has the advantage over the fusion theories in the fact that none of these three experiences invariably go together or with anyone of the others. In other words emotion is not always accompanied by will or affirmation. You may have an æsthetic emotion without any desire of possession. So also of others. So the results are : (1) Feeling, desiring, affirming may singly or in combination be regarded as valuing ; (2) No one of them singly can claim to be the essential factor in valuing consciousness ; (3) Valuing may, though need not, consist in any combination of these. The classification of values may be based on the basal elements of value-experience—feeling, willing and affirmation—as beauty, goodness, and truth respectively. Again a cross division of them can be made, for all values may be (1) immediate or mediate ; (2) personal or impersonal ; (3) inclusive or exclusive.

Then she assigns the place of valuing among the intellectual disciplines. She protests against the commonplace opinion that sciences deal with facts and philosophy with values. The sciences also cannot disregard values for they are facts as well, nor can metaphysic discard facts. There is a tendency to unite all scientific and metaphysical studies into a separate discipline called axiology or general theory of value according to Perry. But can all the special disciplines be brought under a general value theory? According to Prof. Mary Calkins a value is an object *valued*. Valuing is the experience of a self ; and the experience constitutes the toptic of psychology. The concept of value is accordingly a psychological one.

* * * *

Prof. McDougall in his article "the confusion of the concept" tries to show how the words 'idea' and 'concept' have been confused in use. He says that the word 'concept' is notorious in logic as the word 'idea' is in psychology. Ideas are not things or entities ; they are processes or activities. In psychology this is gradually being understood and accepted, but in logic and philosophy 'concepts' continue to figure as 'things.' He then examines the treatment of ideas and concepts in Sigwart's book 'the Formal Logic.' Sigwart distinguishes three meanings of the word 'concept.' First, it denotes a natural psychological production ; in the second meaning of the term it must be viewed as an ideal, the mark at which we aim to attain knowledge. Such ideal ideas are unattainable goals of the metaphysicians and as such they must be dismissed from the class of existing concepts. Thirdly there is the logical meaning. This logical meaning is, according to Sigwart, is our conscious construction. It differs from the empirical idea that has

naturally developed in the natural course of thought in its constancy and immutability of meaning.

Now this definition of the logical concept is faulty according to McDougall. Sigwart conceives it as something that is forged out as fixed and identically the same for all time. Again Sigwart means to say that simpler ideas of this fixed nature are compounded as if to form complex ideas. But do we get at such simple entities as commonly found in all men? Such a theory presupposes a psychology of an atomistic type, which is false. Such fixed, simple elements have no existence, and so Sigwart's logical concepts turn out to be as false as his metaphysical concepts. Only his empirical concepts can claim existence of some sort. It is a psychological fact or process of some mind. This is a concept discussed by the psychologist. Then McDougall gives a fourth sense in which the word concept may be used. In this sense a concept is a way of thinking some object that is common to all men of similar culture. This is the correct logical concept. Prof. McDougall warns us against confusing the word 'idea' and the word 'concept.' He reserves the word 'idea' to denote the concepts of psychology; and reserves the word 'concept' to denote the concepts of the other sciences.

Then Prof. McDougall begins to examine the doctrine of the immutability of concepts. According to him there is a way in which the concepts are immutable. If in the ordinary sense they are fixed and immutable it would mean an arrest of all progress of knowledge. Gradually these fictions may be taken as things.

Ideas in psychology does not mean only process but it means mental structure as well. This fact has been often emphasised by him before. The process of thinking an object O is called the idea of O, and since you may think of O again and again in much the same way it has been convenient to say that the idea of O rises to the mind on each occasion. But in reality the processes leave behind a structure disposition. Thus the psychological idea may relatively endure and gradually change also.

In logic and other sciences idea means the current meaning of the word as accepted by the men of similar culture.

To sum up: There are three ways in which the word 'idea' may be understood: (1) the process of thinking an object O in the mind; (2) that part of the mental disposition which endures and enables a man to think of O; (3) the accepted scientific way of conceiving O called the concept of O—the part of the cultural tradition.

In the first and second senses the idea is the peculiar concern of psychology, in the third sense the concern of logic. Concepts are not the objects of thought, the objects denoted by them are so. Just as concepts are mistaken as objects in sciences, so in psychology ideas are mistaken for subjects. The ideas are said to be active in various ways. They are meant to be thinking, willing, intending and so on. Again in Cosmology, the concept are often hypostatized and reified through mistake. In short one must be careful to avoid all these pitfalls.

R. D. Desai.

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(ii)

a feeble attempt to present the original in English metrical version, with a view to convey, in however small a measure, the poetic beauty of the Upanishad and if it should prove the means of attracting some of the more thoughtful amongst us to the eternal wisdom of Aryavarta, I shall be highly gratified.


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